In re N.C.E.

379 N.C. 283

864 S.E.2d 293

In the MATTER OF: N.C.E. and N.D.C.

No. 366A20

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Filed November 5, 2021

Frank P. Hiner IV, for petitioner-appellee Pasquotank County Department of Social Services.

Chelsea K. Barnes, Winston-Salem, for appellee Guardian ad Litem.

Robert W. Ewing, Clemmons, for respondent-appellant mother.

HUDSON, Justice.

¶ 1 Respondent-mother appeals from the trial court's orders terminating her parental rights to N.C.E. (Nathan) and N.D.C. (Nick).¹ Because we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that it was in Nathan's and Nick's best interests to terminate respondent-mother's parental rights, we affirm the trial court's orders.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

¶ 2 During a thunderstorm on the evening of 18 August 2018, respondent-mother left then twenty-month-old Nathan on the front porch of the maternal grandmother's temporary residence. After leaving, respondent-mother called the maternal grandmother to let her know that Nathan was on the porch and that respondent-mother would be back to pick him up in the morning. The maternal grandmother reported this incident to the Elizabeth City Police Department.

¶ 3 A law enforcement officer and a social worker with the Pasquotank County Department of Social Services (DSS) responded to the maternal grandmother's residence. The maternal grandmother was unable to provide respondent-mother's location or the location of Nathan's younger brother, Nick, and respondent-mother did not respond to attempts to contact her. The social worker initiated a Child Protective Services investigation and determined that neither the maternal grandmother nor the children's maternal aunt (with whom the maternal grandmother was residing) were willing or able to provide care for Nathan on an ongoing basis.

¶ 4 On 20 August 2018, after learning that DSS had opened an investigation, Nick's purported paternal grandmother brought him to DSS. The purported paternal grandmother stated that she often cared for Nick. The next day, respondent-mother and Nick's purported paternal grandmother reported to DSS along with several other parties. A domestic incident occurred at the agency which resulted in a law enforcement officer taking respondent-mother into custody, whereupon she requested that DSS take custody of Nathan and Nick.

¶ 5 On 22 August 2018, DSS filed separate juvenile petitions in District Court, Pasquotank County, alleging that Nathan and Nick were neglected and dependent juveniles. On 17 October 2018, the trial court entered an adjudication order concluding that Nathan and Nick were neglected and dependent juveniles. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(9), (15) (2019). In a disposition order entered the same day, the trial court ordered that respondent-mother participate in a Parenting Capacity Evaluation and follow all recommendations, participate in outpatient mental health counseling/therapy addressing anger management and parenting education, secure employment and stable independent housing, keep all scheduled visitations with her children, maintain weekly contact with DSS regarding her whereabouts, and meet with a social worker monthly. The trial court allowed respondent-mother two hours of weekly supervised visitation with the children. The trial court granted DSS custody and placement authority over the children and ordered DSS to place the children in a licensed foster home or other court-approved placement.

¶ 6 On 18 December 2018, the matter came on for a ninety-day review hearing. In the resulting order entered on 30 January 2019, the trial court ordered that DSS continue to provide for and arrange placement of the children in a licensed foster home or any other home approved by the court.

¶ 7 On 24 May 2019, the trial court entered a permanency-planning order. The trial court set the permanent plan for the children as reunification with a concurrent plan of custody with a relative or court-approved caretaker. The trial court also ordered that if respondent-mother "ha[d] not done the items ordered [by the next review hearing], [DSS] shall recommend changing the permanent plan to adoption." The matter came on for review on 27 August 2019. In its 10 October 2019 permanency-planning order, the trial court set the permanent plan for the children as adoption and the concurrent plan as reunification. The trial court ordered DSS to file a petition to terminate respondent-mother's parental rights.

¶ 8 On 3 December 2019, DSS filed separate petitions for termination of respondent-mother's parental rights in Nathan and Nick. With respect to each child, DSS alleged that respondent-mother had neglected the children within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) ; willfully left the children in foster care or placement outside the home for more than twelve months without showing to the satisfaction of the court that reasonable progress under the circumstances had been made in correcting those conditions which led to the children's removal within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) ; and for a continuous period of six months next preceding the filing of the petition to terminate her parental rights, willfully failed to pay a reasonable portion of the children's cost of care in DSS custody although physically and financially able to do so within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3).

¶ 9 On 11 March 2020, the trial court conducted an adjudication hearing on DSS's petitions to terminate respondent-mother's parental rights in Nathan and Nick. On 29 April 2020, the trial court entered orders adjudicating grounds for termination of respondent-mother's parental rights and concluded that as alleged by DSS, grounds existed under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), and (3).

¶ 10 On 23 March 2020, the trial court conducted a disposition hearing. It concluded that termination of respondent-mother's parental rights was in the best interests of Nathan and Nick. Accordingly, in orders entered 29 April 2020, the trial court terminated respondent-mother's parental rights in both children. Respondent-mother appeals.

II. Analysis

¶ 11 Respondent-mother does not contest the trial court's adjudication of grounds to terminate her parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(3). She confines her appeal to challenging the trial court's dispositional determination under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a), that it was in the children's best interests to terminate her parental rights.

¶ 12 At the disposition stage of a termination-of-parental-rights proceeding, the trial court must "determine whether terminating the parent's rights is in the juvenile's best interest[s]." N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019). In making its determination,

[t]he court may consider any evidence, including hearsay evidence as defined in G.S. 8C-1, Rule 801, that the court finds to be relevant, reliable, and necessary to determine the best interests of the juvenile. In each case, the court shall consider the following criteria and make written findings regarding the following that are relevant:

(1) The age of the juvenile.

(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile.

(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile.

(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent.

(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other permanent placement.

(6) Any relevant consideration.

Id. "Although the trial court must consider each of the factors in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a), written findings of fact are required only ‘if there is conflicting evidence concerning the factor, such that it is placed in issue by virtue of the evidence presented before the district court.’ " In re G.G.M. , 377 N.C. 29, 2021-NCSC-25, ¶ 22, 855 S.E.2d 478 (quoting In re A.R.A. , 373 N.C. 190, 199, 835 S.E.2d 417 (2019) ).

¶ 13 "The trial court's dispositional findings of fact are reviewed under a ‘competent evidence’ standard." In re A.J.T. , 374 N.C. 504, 508, 843 S.E.2d 192 (2020) (quoting In re K.N.K. , 374 N.C. 50, 57, 839 S.E.2d 735 (2020) ). "We are likewise bound by all uncontested dispositional findings." In re E.F. , 375 N.C. 88, 91, 846 S.E.2d 630 (2020) (citing In re Z.L.W. , 372 N.C. 432, 437, 831 S.E.2d 62 (2019) ). We review a trial court's assessment of a juvenile's best interests only for abuse of discretion. In re A.R.A. , 373 N.C. at 199, 835 S.E.2d 417. "Under this standard, we defer to the trial court's decision unless it is ‘manifestly unsupported by reason or one so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.’ " In re J.J.B. , 374 N.C. 787, 791, 845 S.E.2d 1 (2020) (quoting In re Z.A.M. , 374 N.C. 88, 100, 839 S.E.2d 792 (2020) ).

¶ 14 As an initial matter, we note the trial court entered separate disposition orders for Nathan and Nick, with substantially similar, if not identical, findings of fact. In addressing respondent-mother's challenges to specific findings of fact, we will quote from the "Disposition Order for Termination of Parental Rights" in Nathan's case.

¶ 15 In both of its disposition orders, the trial court made findings of fact correlating to each of the statutory criteria in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(1)–(5). Addressing N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(1) and (2), the trial court noted Nathan's and Nick's ages and found the likelihood of their adoption "extremely high" due to their ages, health, and personalities. Addressing N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(3), the trial court found that termination of parental rights was necessary to accomplish the permanent plan of adoption. Addressing N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(4), the trial court found that "no bond" existed between respondent-mother and either child. Addressing N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(5), the trial court found that because neither child was in an adoptive placement, "there [was] no information on the quality of the relationship between [the children] and the proposed adoptive parent[s]." As respondent-mother does not challenge these...