In re N.G.

1

IN THE INTEREST OF: N.G., A MINOR APPEAL OF: N.G., MINOR

No. 2901 EDA 2022

No. J-S40013-23

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

January 18, 2024

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Dispositional Order Entered November 9, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-JV-0000918-2021

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., SULLIVAN, J., and COLINS, J. ^[*]

MEMORANDUM

NICHOLS, J.

Appellant N.G., a minor, appeals from the dispositional order entered following his adjudication of delinquency for receiving stolen property (RSP) and unauthorized use of an automobile (UUA).^[1] Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his adjudication of delinquency for RSP and UUA. We affirm.

The juvenile court summarized the facts of this case as follows:

On August 13, 2021, at approximately 6:25 P.M. on the 2900 block of North A Street in the City and County of Philadelphia, PA, Philadelphia Police Officer Czapor (badge #4423), working in full uniform in an unmarked car, witnessed [Appellant] operating a vehicle in stolen status (red Nissan Sentra with a Pennsylvania tag of KKG-2994) (herein referred to as "the vehicle"). At this time, Officer Czapor observed [Appellant] enter the driver's seat of the vehicle, and subsequently operate the vehicle by pulling out of a parking spot without signaling. Due to this illegal maneuver Officer Czapor then contacted Officer Ferguson over radio to run the Pennsylvania license plate, who then verified that the vehicle [Appellant] was operating was, in fact, a stolen vehicle. Acting upon this information, Officer Czapor returned to the 2900 block of North A Street in the City and County of Philadelphia, PA, where at approximately 6:45 P.M. Officer Czapor observed the vehicle parked in the same spot and [Appellant] walking away from the vehicle. Officer Czapor and his partner then observed [Appellant] walking toward them in the unmarked patrol vehicle, stop and bend down near the rear passenger tire of a yellow SUV type vehicle, and subsequently get back up and walk in the opposite direction of the uniformed officers. At this point Officer Czapor and his partner decide to apprehend [Appellant] for the stolen vehicle and recovered the vehicle's key and key fob on [Appellant's] person.

At [Appellant's] adjudicatory hearing on November 9, 2022, Commonwealth's witness Sarah Deveary testified that she was the owner of the vehicle in question, had not seen the vehicle since the night of August 3, 2021 and did not give permission for [Appellant] or anyone else to be operating the vehicle. Ms. Deveary also testified to the fact that the vehicle was in perfect condition the night she last saw it, and when she received her vehicle back it was in totaled condition (the cost to repair the damages were more than the vehicle was worth). According to Ms. Deveary, "the doors, the right side of the [vehicle], the bumper, the front of the [vehicle], and the side mirrors were knocked off." Furthermore, [Appellant] did not offer [his driver's] license, [the vehicle's] registration, or proof of insurance [for the vehicle].

Trial Ct. Op., 1/31/23, at 2-3 (citations omitted and some formatting altered).

On November 9, 2022, the juvenile court adjudicated Appellant delinquent of RSP and UUA. The juvenile court placed Appellant on probation and ordered Appellant to pay $200 in restitution to the victim.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Appellant and the juvenile court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises two issues on appeal:

1. Did the [juvenile] court err [by adjudicating] Appellant [delinquent] of receiving stolen property under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3925, where the evidence was insufficient to establish the elements of the offense, specifically, that Appellant had any knowledge or belief the property may have been stolen?

2. Did the [juvenile] court err [by adjudicating] Appellant [delinquent] of unauthorized use of an automobile under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3928, where the evidence was insufficient to establish the elements of the offense, specifically, that Appellant was at least reckless with respect to the owner's lack of consent to the vehicle's operation?

Appellant's Brief at 4.

Appellant's issues are related; therefore, we discuss them together. In his first issue, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to establish that Appellant knew or had reasonable cause to know that the vehicle he operated was stolen. Appellant's Brief at 14-30. Appellant claims that the Commonwealth must prove, directly or circumstantially, that Appellant had "guilty knowledge," i.e., Appellant knew or had reason to know that the vehicle was stolen. Id. at 15-22 (citing, inter alia, In re K.G., 278 A.3d 934 (Pa. Super. 2022); Commonwealth v. Dunlap, 505 A.2d 255 (Pa. Super. 1985)). Appellant contends that the owner offered contradictory answers about when she last saw the vehicle, the Commonwealth did not present evidence of the condition of the vehicle on the date of Appellant's arrest, and Appellant's conduct when the police approached him do not support an inference that Appellant had guilty knowledge. Id. at 22-30.

In his second issue, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to establish that Appellant was reckless with respect to lack of consent to operate the vehicle. Appellant's Brief at 30-33. As with his challenge to the sufficiency of evidence supporting his adjudication for RSP, Appellant contends that the evidence does not support an inference that Appellant knew he did not have the owner's consent to operate the vehicle or recklessly disregarded that risk. Id. at 31-32 (citing K.G., 278 A.3d at 937, 941). Appellant notes that like the juvenile in K.G., the record establishes that Appellant operated the vehicle with a key and attached key fob. Id. at 33. Appellant also claims that the juvenile court's observation that Appellant failed to produce his driver's license, the vehicle's registration, and proof of insurance was not supported by the record because there is no evidence that the police ever asked Appellant for those documents. Id. at 32.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the adjudication below, we recognize that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt at the adjudication stage when a juvenile is charged with an act which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult. Additionally, we recognize that in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the adjudication of delinquency, just as in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, though we review the entire record, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.

In re A.D., 771 A.2d 45, 48 (Pa. Super. 2001) (en banc) (citations and omitted and formatting altered).

Additionally, this Court has explained that "[i]n a juvenile proceeding, the hearing judge sits as the finder of fact. The weight to be assigned the testimony of the witnesses is within the exclusive province of the fact finder. . . . [This Court], as an appellate court, will not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder." Id. at 53 (citation omitted).

The offense of RSP is as follows:

(a) Offense defined.-A person is guilty of theft if he intentionally receives, retains, or disposes of movable property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it has probably been stolen, unless the property is received, retained, or disposed with intent to restore it to the owner.

(b) Definition.-As used in this section the word "receiving" means acquiring possession, control or title, or lending on the security of the property.

18 Pa.C.S. § 3925.

The offense of UUA is as follows:

(a) Offense defined.-A person is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree if he operates the automobile, airplane, motorcycle, motorboat, or other motor-propelled vehicle of another without consent of the owner.

18 Pa.C.S. § 3928(a).

Accordingly, in order to convict a defendant of RSP, the Commonwealth must establish three elements: "(1) intentionally acquiring possession of the movable property of another; (2) with knowledge or belief that it was probably stolen; and (3) the intent to deprive permanently." Commonwealth v. Gomez, 224 A.3d 1095, 1099 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The second element is sometimes referred to as "guilty knowledge." Id. "To establish a defendant had guilty knowledge, i.e., that he knew property in his possession was stolen or believed that it was probably stolen, the Commonwealth may introduce evidence that the underlying theft occurred recently." Id. at 1099-1100. "Such evidence will permit a fact-finder to infer guilty knowledge, particularly where there is no satisfactory explanation for a defendant's possession of recently stolen goods." Id. at 1100.

Our Supreme Court has explained:

"Recent" is a relative term. Whether possession is recent, and how recent it is, are normally questions of fact for the trier of fact, and require that the trier of fact consider the nature and kind of goods involved, the quantity of goods, the lapse of time from theft and possession, and the ease with which such goods can be assimilated into trade channels, as well as other circumstances relevant in any given case.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 362 A.2d 244, 249 (Pa. 1976) (citations omitted and some formatting altered). Specifically, the Williams Court concluded that the defendant's possession of a car twelve days after it was stolen was "recent" and supported an inference of guilty knowledge. Id. at 250.

Additionally, other circumstantial evidence may provide a basis for an inference of guilty knowledge:

Circumstantial

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