In re Natasha T.

IN RE JACOB M.

IN RE NATASHA T. ET AL.

AC 44233

AC 44237

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

Argued February 18, 2021

May 20, 2021^**

Bright, C. J., and Moll and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent parents filed separate appeals to this court from the judgments of the trial court terminating their parental rights with respect to the minor children, N and J. N and J are the biological children of the respondent mother and J is the biological child of the respondent father. The petitions were consolidated for trial. Held:

1. The respondents could not prevail on their claim that the trial court, relying on an executive order issued by the governor in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, improperly denied their joint motion for a mistrial on the basis of the court's failure to render its judgments within 120 days of the completion of the trial as required by statute (§ 51-183b), as the time limitation in § 51-183b properly had been suspended by the executive order at the time the judgments in the present case were rendered: the General Assembly set forth in statute (§ 28-9) a policy, which the governor followed, that, upon the governor's declaration of a public health emergency pursuant to statute (§ 19-131a), the governor may suspend any statute that conflicts with the efficient and expeditious execution of civil preparedness functions or the protection of the public health, and such standards and limitations set forth by the legislature in § 28-9 (b) (1) were followed in the executive order suspending the 120 day requirement set forth in § 51-183b, and a requirement of adherence to a strict time limitation on the rendering of judgments in civil cases at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic, when there were critical shortages in sanitizer and personal protective equipment, reasonably could have interfered with the health and safety of the judges of the Superior Court and courthouse staff, who reasonably would have had to enter courthouses in order to review materials and to perform tasks necessary for the rendering of civil judgments; moreover, the time limitation set forth in § 51-183b, contrary to the mother's claim, was not jurisdictional, as § 51-183b related to the authority given to the Superior Court to render judgments in civil cases within a certain time frame, and did not pertain to the jurisdiction of the court to decide certain types of cases.

2. The trial court properly concluded that the Department of Children and Families made reasonable efforts to reunify the mother with the minor children, the evidence in the record having supported the court's determination; the department offered the mother many services over a number of years, including mental health treatment, parent mentoring services, visitation services, domestic violence counseling and transportation, as well as substance abuse treatment, and the mother attended a partial hospitalization program and an intensive outpatient program; moreover, although the department suspended visitation on the recommendation of a therapist, on the basis that the visits to the mother, who was at that time incarcerated, caused the children much emotional distress, the department continued its reunification efforts by regularly communicating with the children's therapist to inquire about the children's ability to resume visitation and provided updates to the mother on the children.

3. The trial court properly concluded that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify the father with J, the evidence in the record having supported the court's determination: the department referred the father for substance abuse services to address his admitted opioid dependence, but he did not complete those programs successfully, and the court properly determined that it was not unreasonable for the department not to have referred the father for mental health services when he denied having any mental health concerns; moreover, the department's efforts regarding visitation were reasonable under the circumstances wherein J had negative reactions following visitation, and, although the court suspended visitation, the department communicated with the father regularly and the department continually contacted the therapist to assess whether resumption of visitation was advisable.

4. The trial court's determination that the termination of the father's parental rights was in the best interest of J was not clearly erroneous, as it was supported by the court's findings and conclusions with respect to the applicable statutory (§ 17a-112 (k)) factors, as well as the court's conclusion regarding J's need for permanency and stability: the father failed to demonstrate, in relying on the therapist's recommendation that the children establish positive memories of their biological parents, that it was not in J's best interest to have the father's parental rights terminated, as the therapist recommended open adoption and did not recommend reunification, the court reasonably found that the father was not prevented from having a meaningful relationship with J due to the unreasonable acts or conduct of another person, specifically, J's foster mother, with whom J had bonded, and J's therapist, but, rather, that it was his own actions that caused him not to have a meaningful relationship with J; moreover, although the father alleged that the department did not make reasonable efforts to reunite him with J, including offering him services to improve his parenting skills or referrals for mental health concerns, the record indicated that the father denied that he had any mental health concerns, the department offered the father timely and appropriate services from the start of the case, and the court determined that the father neither adjusted nor corrected his circumstances to make it in J's best interest to be returned to him.

5. This court declined to review the mother's claim that the trial court improperly denied her motion to intervene, filed after the trial court rendered judgments terminating her parental rights, in which she sought posttermination visitation with the minor children, as the record was inadequate to review this claim because the trial court did not file a memorandum of decision explaining its ruling and the mother did not file a notice pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 64-1 (b)) or a motion for articulation of the court's factual and legal basis for its ruling.

Procedural History

Petitions by the Commissioner of Children and Families to terminate the respondents' parental rights with respect to their minor children, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Middlesex, Juvenile Matters at Middletown, and tried to the court, Woods, J.; judgments terminating the respondents' parental rights, from which the respondent father of Jacob M. and the respondent mother of Natasha T. et al. filed separate appeals to this court. Affirmed.

Karen Oliver Damboise, for the appellant in Docket No. AC 44233 (respondent father).

Albert J. Oneto IV, assigned counsel, for the appellant in Docket No. AC 44237 (respondent mother).

Evan O'Roark, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, and Clare Kindall, solicitor general, for the appellee in both cases (petitioner).

Chris Oakley, attorney for the minor children in both cases.

Opinion

DiPENTIMA, J. In these related appeals, the respondents, mother and father, appeal from the judgments of the trial court terminating their parental rights with respect to their minor children and child, respectively. The respondents both claim that the court improperly (1) denied their joint motion for a mistrial, (2) concluded that the Department of Children and Families (department) made reasonable efforts to reunify them with their children or child and (3) concluded that they were unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts. In Docket No. AC 44233, the father additionally claims that the court improperly concluded that (1) the termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of his son, Jacob, and (2) it lacked the authority to grant posttermination contact. In Docket No. AC 44237, the mother additionally claims that the court improperly denied her postjudgment motion to intervene. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The following facts, as found by the trial court, and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of the respondents' claims on appeal. At the time of the court's July 21, 2020 judgments, Natasha, the biological daughter of the mother,¹ was seven years old, and Jacob, the biological son of both respondents, was four years old. In its memorandum of decision, the court found the following. "On November 22, 2016, [the department] received a report alleging physical and emotional neglect of Natasha . . . and Jacob . . . by [the respondents]. Pursuant to the report, [the father] was in a car accident at work and appeared to be under the influence. [The father's] boss then sent a friend to the family residence. . . . The children were found to be naked and soiled. They were brought to the maternal grandparents' home. Police went to the home where the parents admitted to opioid overdoses while caring for the children. At that time the department invoked a ninety-six hour hold on behalf of both children.

"On November 25, 2016, petitions of neglect and motions for orders of temporary custody were filed by [the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families]. The [orders of temporary custody were] . . . granted on November 25, 2016, and sustained on December 2, 2016. The children were adjudicated neglected and committed to [the petitioner] on December 22, 2016. On February 8, 2017, they were sent to live with their mother at the Amethyst House women and children's program. On March 30, 2017, they returned to their apartment. . . . A motion to revoke commitment was filed on May 8, 2017, and commitment was revoked in a hearing on May 11, 2017 ....