In re Oerman

279 A.3d 1287 (Table)

IN RE: Steven R. OERMAN, Deceased

Appeal of: Jeremy D. Keller

No. 873 MDA 2021

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Filed May 26, 2022

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:

Jeremy Keller appeals from the orphans’ court's order revoking admission of a writing purported to be the Last Will and Testament of Steven R. Oerman to probate. Upon review, we affirm.

The facts and procedural history are as follows. On March 13, 2021, Steven R. Oerman died. Oerman was survived by his three children, Brock A. Oerman, Kayla E. Matthews, and Michael B. Oerman. Keller was Oerman's tenant.

On April 6, 2021, Keller filed a petition for letters testamentary based upon a writing from Oerman, which Keller claimed was Oerman's will. The writing was very limited. It was titled "Last Will and Testament of Steven R. Oerman." The body of the writing provided: "I hereby place Jeremy D. Keller in charge of my estate His decision will be final in all matters of my estate." (punctuation omitted in original). The writing was signed by Oerman and marked with two bloody fingerprints. Based on this writing, the Register of Wills granted letters testamentary to Keller.

On April 29, 2021, two of Oerman's children, Brock and Kayla, filed a petition appealing the Register's admission of the writing to probate and the grant of letters testamentary to Keller. In their petition, they asserted that the writing was insufficient to constitute a will, and therefore, Oerman died intestate.

Upon review, the orphans’ court concluded that: 1) the alleged "Last Will and Testament of Steven R. Oerman" was not his will; 2) Oerman died intestate; and 3) the Register's admission of the alleged will was in error. Consequently, the court granted the children's petition, and revoked the admission of the writing for probate and the letters testamentary issued to Keller. The court further directed that, upon proper application, that the Register grant letters to one or more of Oerman's heirs as appropriate, pursuant to 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3155(b)(1). Keller filed this timely appeal.

On appeal, Keller raises the following two issues:

1. Whether a writing titled the last will and testament, dated, signed, sealed and naming an executor constitutes a will?

2. Alternatively, whether the writing was ambiguous such that extrinsic evidence should have been heard?

Keller's Brief at 3.

This Court has explained that our standard of review in such matters is narrow.

In a will contest, the hearing judge determines the credibility of the witnesses. The record is to be reviewed in the light most favorable to appellee, and review is to be limited to determining whether the trial court's findings of fact were based upon legally competent and sufficient evidence and whether there is an error of law or abuse of discretion.

Only where it appears from a review of the record that there is no evidence to support the court's findings or that there is a capricious disbelief of evidence may the court's findings be set aside.

In re Estate of Tyler , 80 A.3d 797, 802 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc ) (citations omitted).

In his first issue, Keller claims that the orphans’ court erred as a matter of law when it failed to accept Oerman's writing as a will because the writing was testamentary in nature and appointed an executor. Keller's Brief at 5. According to Keller, the use of the term "estate" with the title "Last Will and Testament" shows that Oerman desired the writing to govern the disposition of his property after his death. Keller further maintains that Oerman's testamentary intent is evidenced by his appointment of Keller to be "in charge of" his "estate." Id. at 9.

In considering the legal effect of Oerman's writing, the orphans’ court focused on whether the alleged will was testamentary in nature. It concluded that it did not contain a testamentary disposition of property. Trial Court Opinion, 6/3/21, at 3. Additionally, the court concluded that the writing did not establish Keller as an executor given its non-testamentary nature. Id. at 3-4. Notably, the orphans’ court reached these conclusions by examining only the four corners of the writing and without considering any extrinsic evidence.

To determine whether the orphans' court erred in concluding that the writing was not testamentary as matter of law and therefore was not Oerman's will, we bear in mind the following.

No rule regarding wills is more settled than the general rule that the testator's intent, if it is not unlawful, must prevail. Moreover, the testator's intention must be ascertained from the language and scheme of his will; it is not what the Court thinks he might or would have said in the existing circumstances, or even what the Court thinks he meant to say, but is what is the meaning of his words.

Our determination focuses on whether we are faced with a document that is testamentary as a matter of law, nontestamentary as a matter of law, or ambiguous, in which case extrinsic evidence is to be considered to resolve the ambiguity.

In re Estate of Tyler , 80 A.3d at 802-803 (citations omitted); In re Estate of Shelly , 950 A.2d 1021, 1025 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations omitted, emphasis in the original), appeal denied, 962 A.2d 1198 (Pa. 2008). "If the instrument is in writing and signed by the decedent at the end thereof and is an otherwise legal declaration of his intention[,] which he wills to be performed after his death, it must be given effect as a will or codicil, as the case may be." In re Kauffman's Estate , 76 A.2d 414, 416 (Pa. 1950). The court must determine whether, as matter of law, the instrument "shows testamentary intent with reasonable certainty." Id. The form and language of a writing are simply factors to be considered; an "informal instrument may be a fully effective will if the language suffices to show testamentary intent." In re Ritchie's Estate , 389 A.2d 83, 87 (Pa. 1978). "Testamentary intent [ ] is an indispensable element for the finding of a will. The writing must be dispositive in character, and the disposition must be intended to take effect after the testator's death." Id. "Disposition" has been construed as meaning "the destination of the maker's property." See In re McCune's Estate , 109 A. 156, 157 (Pa. 1920).

Here, the orphans’ court concluded that the writing submitted for probate was not testamentary in nature. In reaching this conclusion, the court observed that:

although it might look like it at first glance, the [a]lleged [w]ill does not make any transfer of the property of the estate. It does not list any property, and specify any outcome for said property. While it certainly provides broad discretion to the actions of Keller, it does not even enunciate Keller as the one to dispose of [Oerman's] property.... It never uses language directing the distribution of the estate in any manner, not even saying Keller may do with any property as he pleases. If [Oerman] intended Keller to have the power to distribute property, the Alleged Will falls meaningfully short of securing that outcome in a way to be supported and enforced by the Pennsylvania court system.... If this [c]ourt were to enforce the Alleged Will, it could potentially have the effect of falling far short of [Oerman's] intent ....

Trial Court Opinion, 6/3/21, at 3-4.

Based upon our review of the instrument itself, we agree with the orphans' court that the writing did not contain any language of a testamentary nature demonstrating Oerman's intent. Critically, the stark language does not dispose of Oerman's assets in anyway or use any dispositive terms. It gives no direction to Keller on how to handle Oerman's estate or indicate what Oerman wanted to happen with his assets. Even if Oerman intended to designate Keller as his executor, the writing does not express Oerman's intention regarding the disposition of his estate. Instead, it merely states that Keller's decision shall be final without stating in what regards. An "essential element of a valid will or codicil is that it dispose of property." In re Estate of Fleigle , 664 A.2d 612, 615 (Pa. Super. 1995).

Additionally, "[t]o make a testamentary disposition of property, a decedent must set forth both the thing given and the person to whom it is given with such certainty that a court can give effect to the gift when the estate is to be distributed." Id. Here, there are no words indicating the assets of Oerman's estate or anyone that he may have wanted to give or leave those assets to after his death, not even Keller.

Nonetheless, Keller argues that Oerman, by putting Keller "in charge" of his "estate," appointed Keller as his executor. As such, Keller argues that his appointment as executor, without any disposition, is enough to constitute a will. Assuming that it was Oerman's intention to do so, we, nonethtless, disagree that it is sufficient to make a will.

In support of his position, Keller relies on In re Sando's Estate , 66 A.2d 312 (Pa. 1949). There, our Supreme...