In re Parental Rights to J.G.A.

In the Matter of the Parental Rights to: J.G.A., A.A.A., E.R.A., A.E.A.

Nos. 36776-2-III, 36777-1-III, 36778-9-III, 36779-7-III

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 3

March 31, 2020

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

LAWRENCE-BERREY, J.

A mother appeals after the trial court terminated her parental rights to her four youngest children. She raises several arguments that require us to review the record and determine whether various findings are supported by substantial evidence. Because they are, we affirm.

FACTS

At the time of trial, Ms. L.^[1] was 31 years old. She has seven biological children. This proceeding relates only to her four youngest children.

Ms. L has longstanding substance abuse problems involving methamphetamine, alcohol, and marijuana. She began using methamphetamine when she was about 14 years old and has been unable to sustain sobriety despite seven inpatient treatments. When she was 18 years old, her three oldest children were removed from her custody. Eventually, she relinquished her parental rights to her oldest child and agreed to nonparental custody for the other two children.

In July 2016, the Department of Children, Youth and Families (Department) received a referral that Ms. L. had relapsed on methamphetamine a couple of days before giving birth to J.G.A, the youngest of her seven children. The Department investigated and learned that the father of the youngest three children had a history of domestic violence against Ms L.

In September 2016, Ms. L. stipulated to dependency and out-of-home placement of her four children. The oldest child was placed separately from the three younger children. The court ordered Ms. L. to submit to random urinalysis (UA) tests four times per month and to engage in various services. These services included drug and alcohol evaluation and treatment, a parenting assessment and classes, a domestic violence assessment and classes, and a mental health evaluation and counseling. The Department made referrals to provide Ms. L. with all of the court-ordered services.

Clinicians diagnosed Ms. L. with severe stimulant use disorders for amphetamines, cannabis, and alcohol. One provider assessed Ms. L. in October 2016 and recommended a co-occurring treatment program where Ms. L. could receive both chemical dependency services and mental health care. Other providers assessed Ms. L. multiple times and secured for her bed dates for inpatient treatment.

Until May 2018, Ms. L. had little or no follow through on any of the offered services. In addition, a social worker testified that Ms. L. submitted to random UAs only a handful of times mostly during the two months before the February 2019 dependency trial.

Ms. L visited her children sporadically during the first two years of her dependency, missing approximately 50 percent of her scheduled visits. Witnesses described the visits as chaotic.

In July 2018, Ms. L. was admitted to Isabella House for inpatient substance abuse treatment. While there, Ms. L. also participated in parenting classes, domestic violence trauma counseling, and mental health treatment. During this time, she exercised consistent visitation. But the children fought with each other, and also fought with Ms. L. The children kicked, screamed, bit, and hit one another. This required the Department to drive the children separately and for two supervisors to attend visitations.

In October 2018, Ms. L. graduated inpatient at Isabella House. Her insurance permitted her to continue living at Isabella House for another two months if she was living there with a child. She asked the Department to allow her children to live with her, but the Department did not approve. Instead, the Department arranged intensive outpatient treatment in addition to other services. Ms. L. arranged to live with an aunt while receiving these services.

Ms. L. lived only briefly with her aunt before family conflict caused her to leave. Ms. L. did not notify the Department she left and soon became homeless. Ms. L. did not attend scheduled services and relapsed.

In December 2018, Ms. L. stayed with her grandmother for a couple days, then lived at the YWCA for 30 days. When the Department learned where she was, it referred her to domestic violence counseling. Her counselor realized Ms. L. did not have sobriety, which affected her ability to participate successfully. Ms. L. later admitted that she had relapsed multiple times with methamphetamine and alcohol after leaving Isabella House.

By December, the Department had concerns about the placement of the three younger children. The concerns included the foster mother sabotaging the younger children's relationship with their mother. In early 2019, various service providers were consulted. They agreed it was best for the younger children to move to a new foster home. The three were placed in a foster home approved for adoption, and the older child remained in the foster home where he had lived for over two years.

The termination trial began February 11, 2019. By that time, Ms. L. was participating in, but had not completed, most of her ordered services. She was participating in intensive outpatient treatment at Sundown M Ranch, but likely needed 6 months of inpatient treatment at the facility, followed by 9 to 12 weeks of intensive outpatient services. Ms. L. needed 3 more months in her current parenting program and one year of domestic violence counseling, the latter which could not begin until she demonstrated sobriety.

JoAnn Gibson, the social worker assigned to the case, has a Master's Degree in social work and public administration, and had worked for the Department for 17 years. She reviewed Ms. L.'s current parental deficiencies and testified she did not believe Ms. L. could remedy them in the near future. In her opinion, the near future depended on the age of the child. It ranged from a few weeks for the six year old to one to two days for the two year old. She testified that continuing Ms. L.'s relationship with her children would diminish their prospects for early integration into a stable home. In her opinion, the children had experienced trauma and needed stability and a routine, something Ms. L. could not provide. For this reason, she believed termination of Ms. L.'s parental rights was in the children's best interests.

For each of the four children, the trial court concluded the Department had proved the parental termination factors of RCW 13.34.180 by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, and terminated Ms. L.'s parental rights.

Ms. L. timely appealed.

ANALYSIS

Ms. L assigns error to several of the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law and asserts five specific arguments in support of reversing the trial court. We first provide an overview of the law and then address her arguments in the order raised.^[2]

Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and companionship of their children. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). To deprive a parent of this fundamental right is a two-step process. In re Welfare of A.B., 168 Wn.2d 908, 911, 232 P.3d 1104 (2010). First, the Department must prove the six termination factors set forth in RCW 13.34.180(1) by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. Id. If that is satisfied, the court then determines whether by a preponderance of the evidence, termination is in the best interests of the child. In re Dependency of K.N.J., 171 Wn.2d 568, 576-77, 257 P.3d 522 (2011). We afford the trial court great deference on review. In re Dependency of K.S.C., 137 Wn.2d 918, 925, 976 P.2d 113 (1999).

This court reviews a trial court's decision on any of the six termination factors for substantial evidence. In re Parental Rights to B.P., 186 Wn.2d 292, 313, 376 P.3d 350 (2016). The trial court's findings "must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find the necessary facts by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence." In re Welfare of M.R.H., 145 Wn.App. 10, 24, 188 P.3d 510 (2008). Clear, cogent, and convincing evidence means "highly probable." Id.

1. All necessary services were offered or provided

Ms. L argues the Department failed to provide all necessary services when it refused her request for her children to live with her at Isabella House. She argues this failure deprived her of the full benefit of the drug treatment provided her at Isabella House. She additionally argues the Department's negligent foster care placement caused her to be untimely discharged from Isabella House.

Under the fourth termination factor, the Department must provide "all necessary services, reasonably available, capable of correcting the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future." RCW 13.34.180(1)(d). Ms. L. implies the only way the Department could discharge its obligation to provide drug treatment services was to allow her to continue inpatient treatment at Isabella House. We disagree.

First, "[a] service is 'necessary' if it is needed to address a condition that precludes reunification of the parent and child." In re Parental Rights to I.M.-M., 196 Wn.App. 914, 921, 385 P.3d 268 (2016) (citing In re Welfare of C.S., 168 Wn.2d 51, 56 n.3, 225 P.3d 953 (2010)). There is no evidence that continued inpatient treatment at Isabella House was needed to address Ms. L.'s drug dependencies. Ms. L. had graduated from the House's inpatient program, and she was ready for the next step. The Department acted reasonably in transitioning her from inpatient to intensive outpatient treatment.

Second there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's challenged finding that Ms. L. was not ready for placement of her children at the time. At the time, the children were very...