In re Payton

1

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF ERIC A. PAYTON

No. 1122-2022

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

March 4, 2024

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND UNREPORTED ^[*]

Circuit Court for Baltimore City Case No. 24-C-22-001626

Zic Ripken, Getty, Joseph, M. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) JJ.

OPINION

ZIC, J.

This case arises from a motor vehicle collision involving appellant Eric A. Payton, a Baltimore City police officer. The collision occurred on November 4, 2021, while Mr. Payton was driving to his shift at the Northeast District Police Station. Mr. Payton filed a workers' compensation claim, which was heard before the Workers' Compensation Commission (the "Commission") on February 22, 2022. The Commission determined Mr. Payton's injuries were not compensable under the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act (the "Act") because he was not working at the time of the collision.

Mr. Payton appealed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Appellee Baltimore City (the "City") argued Mr. Payton's injuries did not arise in the course of his employment because his drive from his home to the Northeast District Police Station on the night of the collision was simply a commute under the so called "going and coming" rule. Mr. Payton argued the going and coming rule did not apply, or alternatively, that the dual purpose, special errand, and free transportation exceptions to the going and coming rule applied and, therefore, that his injuries were compensable under the Act.

Both parties moved for summary judgment. The circuit court granted the City's motion, finding that Mr. Payton was not working when the collision occurred and that his injuries were not compensable under the Act. Mr. Payton timely appealed.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Mr. Payton presents the following questions for our review, which we have slightly altered:

1. Did the circuit court err as a matter of law in failing to grant [Mr. Payton's] Motion for Summary Judgment as to the application of the exceptions to the going and coming rule?

2. Did the circuit court err in granting the [City]'s Motion for Summary Judgment where a question of material fact was at issue concerning the special errand exception and dual purpose exception to the going and coming rule?

For the reasons that follow, we answer the first question in the negative, decline to address the second question, and affirm the circuit court's judgment.

BACKGROUND

Collision on November 4, 2021

On November 4, 2021, sometime between 10:20 p.m. and 10:30 p.m., Mr. Payton arrived at the Northeast District Police Station and clocked in to work using an application on his phone, while he was in the parking lot. His shift was scheduled to begin at 10:39 p.m. While changing into his uniform still in the precinct parking lot, Mr. Payton realized he had forgotten his assigned police radio at home. He informed his supervisor, Sergeant Garcia, that he had left his radio at home, and he received permission from her to return home in his personal vehicle and retrieve the radio. Mr. Payton did not inform Sergeant Garcia that he had already punched in to work.

On his drive back to work with his radio, at 11:41 p.m., Mr. Payton was involved in a motor vehicle collision, which resulted in severe injuries to his right leg, neck, chest, ribs, lungs, left leg, head, right ear, face, and sternum. He subsequently underwent extensive treatment, including multiple surgeries, for these injuries. Mr. Payton still receives medical treatment and therapy for an "open reduction," an "internal fixation of a fractured tibia," a "cervical fusion at C5 through T1," and a "laminectomy at [C6] through [C7]." The accident occurred in the Northeastern District that Mr. Payton was assigned to patrol.

Hearing Before the Workers' Compensation Commission on February 22, 2022

Mr. Payton filed a workers' compensation claim, which was heard before the Commission on February 22, 2022. At the hearing, Mr. Payton testified that: he punched in early to his 10:39 p.m. shift; realized he had forgotten his radio; and called Sergeant Garcia, who permitted him to return home in his personal vehicle and retrieve the radio. Mr. Payton and the City also recited a stipulation before the Maryland Workers' Compensation Commission. The stipulation stated that although Baltimore police officers frequently punch in early, they are not paid until their shifts officially begin at 10:39 p.m.:

[COUNSEL FOR MR. PAYTON]: It's common -- the stipulation would further read, it's common to punch in before your shift starts at 10:39 p.m., but you don't get paid as an officer until your shift begins.

In other words, a lot of officers punch in ahead of time because they can remotely from outside, but they don't get that credit, you know, for that time period from the point you punch in to the point that you start at 10:39 p.m.

Moreover, Mr. Payton stipulated that shifts at the Baltimore Police Department ("BPD") do not begin until roll call begins at 10:39 p.m., at which time the officers must report to their sergeant with their necessary equipment, including weapons, handcuffs, radios, and mace.

During roll call, the sergeant inspects the officers' uniforms and equipment before authorizing them to begin their shifts. The Department's policies require all officers to attend roll call and check in with the sergeant to officially begin the shift. During crossexamination, Mr. Payton confirmed he missed roll call on the night of his collision. Mr. Payton also agreed that, but for the accident, he would have returned to the precinct, reported to his sergeant, and been assigned a police cruiser for use during his shift. Furthermore, Mr. Payton stipulated that his radio was "an essential piece of equipment that's required to do the job, and it's required to report to roll call with all essential equipment." During cross-examination, Mr. Payton reiterated that his radio was "one of the pieces of required equipment" to perform his employment duties.

Mr. Payton argued his injuries arose out of his employment because: he punched in to work before the collision; he was in uniform; he had all his essential police equipment, including his gun belt, weapon, handcuffs, radio, and mace, with him when the accident occurred; and he would have responded to calls if he had received any because he was driving through his assigned district.

The City argued Mr. Payton's collision occurred while he was merely commuting to work. The City specifically noted that Mr. Payton did not attend roll call or otherwise report to his sergeant for a uniform and equipment inspection before the collision because he did not have his radio with him at the time.

The Commission determined that Mr. Payton's injuries did not arise out of his employment and, therefore, Mr. Payton's accident was not compensable under the Act.

Appeal to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City

Mr. Payton appealed to the circuit court for judicial review of the Commission's decision. Both parties moved for summary judgment. Mr. Payton and the City stipulated to the facts before the circuit court.^[1] Mr. Payton claimed that the dual purpose exception, the special errand exception, and the free transportation exception to the going and coming rule apply. The City argued that none of these exceptions apply in this case because Mr. Payton's entire trip from his home to the Northeast District Police Station constituted a mere extension of his typical commute under the going and coming rule.

The circuit court determined that Mr. Payton was not on duty at the time of the collision and thus, his injuries were not compensable under the Act. Mr. Payton then timely appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"Our workers'-compensation statute gives a party aggrieved by a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission a choice of appellate strategies." Montgomery County v. Maloney, 245 Md.App. 369, 379 (2020) (citing Bd. of Educ. for Montgomery County v. Spradlin, 161 Md.App. 155, 166 (2005) (cleaned up)). "First, the party may request, under Lab. & Empl. § 9-745(c) and (e), a 'routine' administrative appeal, in which the circuit court 'reviews the record of the proceeding before the Commission and decides, purely as a matter of law, whether the Commission acted properly.'" Maloney, 245 Md.App. at 379-80 (quoting Spradlin, 161 Md.App. at 167). Or a party may request as an alternative, an "unadorned administrative appeal," where the "circuit court engages in fresh, de novo fact-finding." Id. at 380 (quoting Spradlin, 161 Md.App. at 167, 179) (cleaned up)). Here, the circuit court and parties engaged in a de novo trial. Accordingly, we review the decision of the circuit court rather than the administrative agency's decision. McLaughlin v. Gill Simpson Electric, 206 Md.App. 242, 252-53 (2012).

This Court reviews a trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo, focusing on "whether the trial court's decision was legally correct." Bd. of Educ. of Harford County v. Sanders, 250 Md.App. 85, 94 (2021) (citation omitted). Summary judgment should be granted if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. Id.

DISCUSSION

I. The Circuit Court Did Not Err in Denying Mr. Payton's Motion for Summary Judgment and Finding That His Injuries Were Not Compensable Under the Act Because His Injuries Did Not Arise Out of the Course of His Employment.

According to Mr. Payton, the circuit court erred in denying his Motion for Summary Judgment by applying the going and coming rule to incorrectly determine that he was not working at the time of the collision. Mr. Payton also argues the circuit court incorrectly found that the dual purpose exception, special errand exception, and free transportation exception do not apply. The City argues the...