In re Phillips

165 N.H. 226

75 A.3d 1083

APPEAL OF Thomas PHILLIPS (New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board)

No. 2011–683

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Argued: March 13, 2013

Opinion Issued: August 21, 2013

As Amended February 6, 2014

Wadleigh, Starr & Peters, P.L.L.C., of Manchester (Michael R. Mortimer and Emily G. Bolton on the brief, and Mr. Mortimer orally), for Thomas Phillips.

Bernard & Merrill, PLLC, of Manchester (Andrew A. Merrill and Gary S. Harding on the brief, and Mr. Merrill orally), for State Farm Fire & Casualty Company.

BASSETT, J.

The petitioner, Thomas Phillips, appeals a decision of the New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) denying him recovery under the Workers' Compensation Law. See RSA ch. 281–A (2010 & Supp.2012). The CAB ruled that the petitioner was not entitled to benefits because he had failed to timely notify his employers, Norman and Diane Crocker, of his workers' compensation claim. See RSA 281–A:19 (2010). The CAB further ruled that the petitioner was not entitled to benefits because, unbeknownst to the Crockers, he was intoxicated at the time of his injury. See RSA 281–A:14 (2010). We affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand.

The CAB found or the record supports the following facts. In 2006, the petitioner and his wife lived in a trailer that they rented from the Crockers. As part of the lease agreement, the petitioner performed yard work and minor home repairs for the Crockers in exchange for a rent reduction. The Crockers lived on the abutting property.

On August 11, 2006, Mr. Crocker asked the petitioner to remove the branch of a tree that was growing near the Crockers' house. The next day, the petitioner fell from a ladder while cutting the branch with a chainsaw. No one witnessed the petitioner's fall. The petitioner's wife found him shortly after he fell, and she immediately summoned the Crockers. Mr. Crocker later stated that "it seem[ed] the branch snapped in half causing [the petitioner] to [lose] his balance and he fell." The petitioner was taken to the hospital, where it was determined that he had a blood alcohol content of approximately .27. As a result of the fall, the petitioner was rendered a quadriplegic.

Nearly three years later, on August 10, 2009, the petitioner filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits, identifying the Crockers as his employer. The Crockers were insured under a homeowner's insurance policy issued by State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (State Farm) that included workers' compensation coverage for domestic employees. See RSA 281–A:6 (2010) (requiring all insurance companies that provide homeowner's insurance to provide workers' compensation insurance covering the domestic employees of the insured, unless the insured has arranged for such coverage elsewhere). On August 24, State Farm denied the petitioner workers' compensation benefits on the grounds that: (1) there was no employer-employee relationship; (2) the petitioner's injury was not causally related to employment; (3) the petitioner was at fault for his injury; and (4) the petitioner's notice of injury to the Crockers was untimely. Thereafter, the petitioner requested a hearing with the New Hampshire Department of Labor (DOL). The DOL Hearing Officer determined that the petitioner was entitled to workers' compensation benefits. State Farm appealed to the CAB.

After a de novo hearing, the CAB determined that the petitioner was an employee of the Crockers at the time of his injury. However, the CAB denied the petitioner's claim, finding that his claim was barred pursuant to RSA 281–A:19 and RSA 281–A:20 (2010) because he failed to provide timely notice of his injury to the Crockers. The CAB further found that the petitioner was intoxicated at the time of the injury. Because the CAB also found that the Crockers did not know that he was intoxicated when he fell, it determined that they were not liable for workers' compensation payments. See RSA 281–A:14. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, and this appeal followed.

The petitioner makes two arguments on appeal. First, he argues that, because the Crockers had actual, timely notice of his injury, the CAB erred in ruling that his claim was barred under RSA 281–A:19 and RSA 281–A:20. The petitioner next argues that the CAB erred in applying RSA 281–A:14 to bar his claim. We address each argument in turn.

I. Standard of Review

Our standard of review is set forth by statute:

[A]ll findings of the [CAB] upon all questions of fact properly before it shall be deemed to be prima facie lawful and reasonable; and the order or decision appealed from shall not be set aside or vacated except for errors of law, unless the court is satisfied, by a clear preponderance of the evidence before it, that such order is unjust or unreasonable.

RSA 541:13 (2007). Thus, we review the factual findings of the CAB deferentially. Appeal of N.H. Dep't of Corrections, 162 N.H. 750, 753, 34 A.3d 1210 (2011). We review its statutory interpretation de novo . Id.

On questions of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiters of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole. Id. We first examine the language of the statute and ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to the words used. Id. We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. Appeal of Gamas, 158 N.H. 646, 648, 972 A.2d 1025 (2009). We construe the Workers' Compensation Law liberally to give the broadest reasonable effect to its remedial purpose. Id. Thus, when construing it, we resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the injured worker. Id.

II. Notice

The petitioner first argues that the CAB erred when it found that he did not provide the Crockers with timely notice of his injury and, therefore, that his claim was barred. He maintains that the CAB misinterpreted Appeal of Gamas when it ruled that actual notice of injury was not sufficient because the Crockers did not have expertise in the field of workers' compensation law to know when an injury triggers obligations under the Workers' Compensation Law. He argues that Appeal of Gamas "requires only that the employer have knowledge of the injury and its causal relationship to the employment" and that, here, those requirements were satisfied.

State Farm disagrees, and argues that an employer's obligations under the Workers' Compensation Law should be treated differently when, as here, workers' compensation coverage is required under RSA 281–A:6. Specifically, State Farm maintains that "[t]he relative level of sophistication between a typical employer and homeowners who happen to employ ‘domestic labor’ and have workers' compensation coverage under [section] 6, must be taken into account." Thus, it contends that the CAB properly distinguished the experienced and knowledgeable employer in Appeal of Gamas from the Crockers, homeowners who do not have experience with workers' compensation matters.

We begin by reviewing Appeal of Gamas. In that case, we addressed whether an employee's actual notice of injury to an employer is sufficient notice under our Workers' Compensation Law. Appeal of Gamas, 158 N.H. at 648–50, 972 A.2d 1025. Under RSA 281–A:19, "[c]laims for [workers' compensation] benefits ... shall be barred unless notice of injury is given to the employer within 2 years from the date of the injury." RSA 281–A:20, entitled "Contents of Notice," provides that "[n]otice of injury in writing on a form prescribed by the commissioner shall apprise the employer of the injury and shall state the name and address of the worker injured and the date and place of the accident." Based upon our review of these statutory provisions, we determined that they are susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, and, therefore, we examined legislative history. Appeal of Gamas, 158 N.H. at 649, 972 A.2d 1025. We found that the legislative record is inconclusive as to whether the legislature intended written notice on a form prescribed by the commissioner to be the exclusive means of notice. Id. at 650, 972 A.2d 1025. Accordingly, because "we adopt a construction favorable to the claimant when statutory language is ambiguous," we held that "an employer's actual notice of an employee's injury is ... sufficient lawful notice under RSA 281–A:19 and :20." Id. at 650, 972 A.2d 1025 (quotation omitted).

Here, the CAB distinguished Appeal of Gamas on the ground that, in that case, the employee submitted notice of his injury to the employer's environmental, health, safety, and security manager, who the CAB characterized as "a professional in the field," whereas in this case, "[t]he Crockers had no such expertise and therefore [could] not be bound by the same level of ‘should have known’ as a professional in industrial safety." Our decision in Appeal of Gamas, however, did not rest upon the level of expertise of the employer or upon the fact that, once notified, the employer "should have known" that the petitioner was potentially entitled to workers' compensation benefits. Id. at 649–50, 972 A.2d 1025. We find nothing in the language of RSA 281–A:19 or :20 to support State Farm's argument that the legislature intended to impose different notice requirements based upon the relative level of sophistication of a "typical employer" and a homeowner who employs "domestic labor." Thus, we conclude that the CAB misapplied Appeal of Gamas to the petitioner's claim.

State Farm argues that, under RSA 281–A:20, the petitioner was required to give notice of injury in writing on a form prescribed by the commissioner, and, to the extent we ruled otherwise in Appeal of Gamas, that decision should be overruled. "The doctrine of stare decisis demands respect in a society governed by the rule of law, for when governing legal standards are open to revision in every case, deciding cases...