In re R.C.

1

IN THE INTEREST OF R.C. AND K.C., CHILDREN

No. 06-21-00100-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Sixth District, Texarkana

January 18, 2022

Date Submitted: January 12, 2022

On Appeal from the County Court at Law Lamar County, Texas Trial Court No. 89895

Before Morriss, C.J., Stevens and Carter, ^[*] JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Jack Carter, Justice

In the lawsuit brought by the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department), the trial court found that Father (1) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed his children, R.C. and K.C., to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being, ^[1] (2) contumaciously refused to submit to a reasonable and lawful order made during the investigation of reports that R.C. and K.C. had been abused or neglected, and (3) knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that resulted in his conviction of an offense and confinement or imprisonment and inability to care for the children for not less than two years from the filing date of the Department's petition. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D) (I), (Q) (Supp.). As a result, after finding that it was in R.C.'s and K.C.'s best interests, the trial court terminated Father's parental rights to the children.^[2]

On appeal, Father challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the trial court's Ground D, I, and Q findings.^[3] We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's Ground D finding that Father knowingly placed or allowed R.C. and K.C. to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being. Because our conclusion is dispositive of this appeal, we need not review Father's remaining arguments as to Grounds I and Q. Consequently, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

I. The Evidence at Trial

Mother and Father had two children together at the time of trial one-year-old K.C. and four-year-old R.C. Diane Black, a family-based safety services worker, testified that she was assigned to the case in December 2019, after recently born K.C. tested positive for marihuana. According to Black, both Mother and Father tested positive for marihuana. In addition to K.C. and her brother R.C, Mother had three more children by other men in her care, D.P., J.J., and R.W. D.P., then three years old, tested positive for cocaine.^[4] As a result, the Department found reason to believe that both Mother and Father had been neglectful in their supervision of DP.

Father, who had a total of five children, told Black that "his [other] children had been involved in [Child Protective Services (CPS)] cases, that he was aware of situations that they were involved in that led to the CPS cases[, ] but [that] he hadn't done anything about it." In a pending CPS case opened in Red River County in 2018, Father had tested positive for methamphetamine. Even so, Black provided a family-based safety plan to Father with the goal of fully reuniting him with R.C. and K.C.

Black testified that Father was ordered to participate in counseling, that he attended regularly, but that he did not make progress. According to Black, Father and Mother separated, and by March 31, 2020, Mother began living with a man named Nicholas Buster Jackson, who was a registered sex offender. Shortly thereafter, Mother signed a new family-based safety plan providing that she and the children would reside with a maternal cousin and would have no contact with Jackson.

On April 23, 2020, Father committed intoxication assault, injuring another driver, and sustaining serious injuries himself that required hospitalization until May. In July, the trial court held a hearing on the Department's "Petition for Order to Participate in Services" and ordered Father, who was present at the hearing, to participate in random drug testing, a psychological assessment, drug and alcohol assessments, individual and family therapy, and parenting classes, among other things. Even so, Black said that Father tested positive for marihuana in August and September 2020.

Black concluded that Father was on illegal drugs while he was actively involved with R.C. and K.C. during the pendency of the family-based services case. As a result, on October 23, 2020, the Department filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights to R.C. and K.C, and in November 2020, the children were removed from Mother's and Father's care and placed with Father's cousin. After D.P.'s and R.W.'s maternal aunt received temporary managing conservatorship of D.P. and R.W. and J.J.'s father received temporary managing conservatorship over J.J., the Department's petition as to those children was severed from the case involving R.C. and K.C.

During the July term of the Lamar County grand jury, Father was indicted for intoxication assault with a motor vehicle. After the Department's petition was filed, Father was jailed pending the November 2020 trial for the offense. Father eventually pled guilty to intoxication assault with a motor vehicle and was sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment beginning May 28, 2021, after the trial court found that Father had previously committed another felony.^[5] Stephanie Tatum, the Department's caseworker, testified that Father was incarcerated during the period when she was assigned to the case and that he did not complete his court-ordered family service plan. Because he was incarcerated, Tatum assumed that Father was then drug-free. Even so, Tatum believed that termination of Father's parental rights was in the best interests of the children, who were thriving in the paternal cousin's care.^[6] Tatum added that Mother was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in 2014, that Mother was convicted of two counts of endangering a child in 2015, that Mother's parental rights should also be terminated, and that the paternal cousin wished to adopt R.C. and K.C.

Misty Ricks, a Court Appointed Special Advocate, testified that both Mother and Father failed to complete family-based services. Ricks believed it was in the children's best interests that parental rights be terminated and that R.C. and K.C. remain with Father's cousin. Father's cousin also testified that she would care for the children and that it was in their best interests that Mother and Father's parental rights be terminated.

After hearing this evidence, the trial court terminated Mother and Father's parental rights. As to Father, the trial court found that termination of parental rights was supported by Grounds D, I, and Q of Section 161.001(b)(1) of the Texas Family Code.

II. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Trial Court's Ground D Finding

A. Standard of Review

"The natural right existing between parents and their children is of constitutional dimensions." In the Interest of E.J.Z., 547 S.W.3d 339, 343 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2018, no pet.) (quoting Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985)). "Indeed, parents have a fundamental right to make decisions concerning 'the care, custody, and control of their children.'" Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). "Because the termination of parental rights implicates fundamental interests, a higher standard of proof-clear and convincing evidence-is required at trial." Id. (quoting In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 502 (Tex. 2014). "This Court is therefore required to 'engage in an exacting review of the entire record to determine if the evidence is . . . sufficient to support the termination of parental rights.'" Id. (quoting In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d at 500)). "[I]nvoluntary termination statutes are strictly construed in favor of the parent." Id. (quoting In re S.K.A., 236 S.W.3d 875, 900 (Tex. App.- Texarkana 2007, pet. denied) (quoting Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20)).

"In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent has engaged in at least one statutory ground for termination and that termination is in the child's best interest." Id. (citing Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001 (Supp.); In re EMC, 384 S.W.3d 796, 798 (Tex. 2012)). '"Clear and convincing evidence' is that 'degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.'" Id. (quoting Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007) (citing In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. 2009)). "This standard of proof necessarily affects our review of the evidence." Id.

"In our legal sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings to determine whether the fact-finder reasonably could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the grounds for termination were proven." In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d 915, 920 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2015, no pet.) (citing In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam); In re J.L.B., 349 S.W.3d 836, 846 (Tex. App-Texarkana 2011, no pet.)). "We assume the trial court, acting as fact-finder, resolved disputed facts in favor of the finding, if a reasonable fact-finder could do so, and disregarded evidence that the fact-finder could have reasonably disbelieved or the credibility of which reasonably could be doubted." Id. (citing In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3dat573).

"In our review of factual sufficiency, we give due consideration to evidence the trial court could have reasonably found to be clear and convincing." Id. (citing In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 109 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam)). "We consider only that evidence the fact-finder reasonably could have found to be clear and convincing and determine 'whether the evidence is such that a fact[-]finder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations.'" Id. (quoting In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 109 (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17,...