In re R.H.

316 A.3d 593

258 N.J. 1

In the MATTER OF Registrant R.H.

In the Matter of Registrant T.L.

A-20/21 September Term 2023

088232

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued May 1, 2024

Decided July 1, 2024

On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 475 N.J. Super. 460 (App. Div. 2023).

Jonathan Edward Ingram, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant T.L. in A-20-23 (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Jonathan Edward Ingram, of counsel and on the briefs).

Jesse M. DeBrosse, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant R.H. in A-21-23 (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Jesse M. DeBrosse, of counsel and on the briefs).

Maura M. Sullivan, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent State of New Jersey in A-20-23 (Grace C. MacAulay, Camden County Prosecutor, attorney; Maura M. Sullivan, of counsel and on the briefs, and Matthew T. Spence. Assistant Prosecutor, on the briefs).

Sarah A. Spanarkel, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent State of New Jersey in A-21-23 (Christine A. Hoffman, Acting Gloucester County Prose- cutor, attorney; Sarah A. Spanarkel, of counsel and on the briefs).

Alexander Shalom argued the cause for amici curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey and Rutgers Criminal and Youth Justice Clinic (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, Rutgers Criminal and Youth Justice Clinic, and Lowenstein Sandler, attorneys; Alexander Shalom, Jeanne LoCicero, Laura Cohen, Liana Irizarry, and Natalie Kraner, on the brief).

Claude Caroline Heffron argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, attorneys; Claude Caroline Heffron and Joshua P. Law, on the brief).

Kaili E. Matthews, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney; Kaili E. Matthews, of counsel and on the brief).

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER delivered the opinion of the Court.

₅Megan’s Law requires individuals who commit certain sex offenses to register with a law enforcement agency. If they meet certain requirements, they can apply to terminate their obligation to register. One requirement is "that the person has not committed an offense within 15 years following conviction or release from ₆a correctional facility for any term of imprisonment imposed." N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f) (emphasis added). Another is that the person is "not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others." Ibid.

This consolidated appeal raises a novel question: whether the requirement to remain offense-free applies to juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent. Based on the plain language the Legislature used in crafting the statute, we find that the requirement applies to juveniles who are prosecuted as adults and convicted of a listed sex offense, or released from a correctional facility, but not to those who are adjudicated delinquent in proceedings in the family court.

Consistent with the law’s text, however, all registrants including juveniles must satisfy the second requirement - the public safety requirement - to be eligible for termination of their obligations under Megan’s Law.

Because the Appellate Division reached a different conclusion regarding the first requirement, we reverse its judgment and remand both cases involved in this appeal to the trial court for further proceedings.

I.

To provide relevant background information, we begin with a brief overview of Megan’s Law.

The Legislature enacted Megan’s Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23, in 1994 to combat "[t]he danger of recidivism posed by sex offenders." N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1(a). The law imposes a scheme to register sex offenders and notify the public about offenders who present a danger to children. Ibid.

Megan’s Law requires "[a] person who has been convicted, adjudicated delinquent or found not guilty by reason of insanity" of certain sex offenses to register with law enforcement. Id. at -2(a)(1). Section 2(b) of the statute defines the terra "sex offense" and lists various offenses that can trigger Megan’s Law obligations. Id. at -2(b).

₇Offenders are required to register with the police department where they live. Id. at -2(c). They must provide personal information - their name, social security number, physical description, date of birth, address, place of employment, school enrollment status, and other details -- as well as fingerprint specimens and a brief description of the offense. Id. at - 4(b)(1) to (2). Registrants are required to notify law enforcement if they change their address, employment, or school enrollment status. Id. at -2(d)(1). Failure to register or inform law enforcement of a change of address or status is a third-degree crime. Id. at -2(a)(3), -2(d)(1).

Megan’s Law also provides for public notification that is keyed to the level of risk a registrant poses. Id. at -8. There are three levels or tiers. For Tier One, the low level of risk of re-offense, notification is limited to "law enforcement agencies likely to encounter the person registered." Id. at -8(c)(1). For Tier Two, the moderate level of risk, notification is also made to "organizations in the community including schools, religious and youth organizations." Id. at -8(c)(2). For Tier Three, the high level of risk, notification must also "reach members of the public likely to encounter the person registered," in accordance with the Attorney General’s Guidelines. Id. at - 8(c)(3); see also Attorney General Guidelines for Law Enforcement for the Implementation of Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Laws 17-18, 42-46 (rev. Feb. 2007), https://www.nj.gov/ oag/dcj/megan/meganguidelines-2-07.pdf (adopted pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(a)).

[1, 2] Offenders are classified based on a series of risk factors and the use of a Registrant Risk Assessment Scale (Scale). See N.J.S.A. 2C:7-(8)(b); Attorney General Guidelines 27, Ex. E, F. Mental health experts and law enforcement officials developed the Scale, and tier classifications based on it are entitled to deference. In re Registrant C.A., 146 N.J. 71, 82, 108, 679 A.2d 1153 (1996). "[C]lassifications based on the Scale are subject to judicial review and modification on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 108-09, 679 A.2d 1153.

₈Information about certain sex offenders is included in a central registry that is made available to the public on the internet. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-12, -13.

Sections 2(f) and 2(g) together govern motions to terminate a person’s obligations under Megan’s Law. Pursuant to subsection (g), individuals who are convicted, adjudicated delinquent, or acquitted by reason of insanity for certain sex offenses, or for more than one sex offense, are required to register for life. Id. at -2(g).¹

A person required to register who is not subject to subsection (g) may apply to the trial court "to terminate the obligation upon proof that the person has not committed an offense within 15 years following conviction or release from a correctional facility for any term of imprisonment imposed, whichever is later, and is not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others." Id. at -2(f).

II.

A.

At age fifteen, R.H. sexually assaulted his younger stepbrother. R.H. admitted his misconduct when the police interviewed him in the presence of his father. On October 14, 2009, R.H. was adjudicated delinquent of one count of aggravated sexual assault. The trial court sentenced him to three years’ probation - eighteen months at a residential treatment facility followed by eighteen months of aftercare treatment. He was successfully discharged in 2012 and has lived offense-free since 2009.

Since 2009, R.H. has been evaluated five times for the risk of re-offense. In 2011, he was designated at Tier Two. In his most recent evaluation in October 2020, a psychologist concluded that R.H. "is not likely to commit a sexual offense in the future." The ₉following month, the trial court designated R.H. as a Tier Two level of risk for re-offense but limited community notification to the Tier One level.

R.H. later filed a motion to terminate his obligations under Megan’s Law. The trial court found that the fifteen-year waiting period in subsection (f) applied to juveniles who were adjudicated delinquent for an offense they committed when they were older than fourteen. The court explained it was bound by this Court’s ruling in In re Registrant J.G., 169 N.J. 304, 777 A.2d 891 (2001), and therefore denied R.H.’s application.² Because the trial court bifurcated the motion and considered the statutory question first, it did not address whether R.H. posed a threat to others.

B.

On July 11, 2005, T.L. was adjudicated delinquent of one count of aggravated sexual assault for engaging in sexual acts with his younger sisters and a cousin as part of a game of "truth or dare." T.L. was fifteen or sixteen at the time. After the abuse was reported to the police, T.L. revealed that he had been sexually abused when he was a child.

The trial court placed T.L. on probation for three years and ordered him to attend therapy, which he successfully completed. In November 2008, the court designated T.L. at Tier Two but ordered notification obligations at Tier One.

In 2015, T.L. was convicted of a petty disorderly persons offense under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(b) for using offensive language. He was ordered to pay $508 in fines and fees. T.L. has remained offense-free since.

₁₀A psychologist evaluated T.L. in March 2022. She found that he "present[ed] a low risk of engaging in future acts of sexually inappropriate behaviors" and was "not likely to pose a threat to others in the community."

T.L. filed a motion to terminate his Megan’s Law obligations in May 2022. Among other things, he argued that the offense-free prong of subsection (f) does not apply to individuals adjudicated delinquent of a qualifying sex...