In re R.L.J.

IN THE INTEREST OF: R.L.J., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: R.L.J.

J-A13043-15

No. 798 WDA 2014

SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JUNE 30, 2015

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Order April 15, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Juvenile Division at No(s): No. 1849-09

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., SHOGAN, J., and OTT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.:

R.L.J. ("R.J.") appeals from the dispositional order entered following an adjudication of delinquency for the offenses of possession of a firearm with an altered manufacturer's number, carrying a firearm without a license, and possession of a firearm by a minor.¹, ² On appeal, R.J. raises two issues: (1) "Did law enforcement fail to present objective evidence of reasonable suspicion to perform an investigative detention of R.J. when the police failed to sufficiently prove that R.J. was the person who ran from police in a high crime area," and (2) "Was the identification evidence insufficient beyond a reasonable doubt when police identified R.J. as the suspect because he stoodin the backyard of fifteen row houses, considering that the police never saw the suspect's face, could not describe the suspect in any detail, and lost sight of the suspect when he or she ran behind the fifteen row houses?" R.J.'s Brief at 8.³ Based upon the following, we affirm.

Prior to the adjudication hearing, R.J. filed a motion to suppress, which was denied by the juvenile court. The facts adduced at the suppression hearing were set forth in the juvenile court's findings of fact:

1. On the date in question, the police officer in the case was on routine patrol in the area of Mon View Heights.

2. This area is known by the police to be a high-crime area for both drugs and violence. While on patrol in this area, the police officer observed a person wearing dark clothes, with a hoody, cross the roadway in front of his marked vehicle. The individual was wearing a hoody with the hood up.

3. This person turned, viewed the patrol car, and began to hurry away from the area. Thereafter, he turned and looked back at the patrol car and began to run around a building in the area.

4. The officer drove around the building and around the block. He stopped the car, exited, and walked through the building tunnel, which was a passageway described in the record of being able to gain access from the front to the back area of the building, which the police officer described as almost like a yard-type landscape.

5. Upon turning the corner, the officer saw a person who matched the clothing and description of the person he saw running from the patrol car.

6. The Officer, due to the late hour, the darkness, the flight and his inability to see the person's hands, asked him to raise his hands for the officer's safety.

7. Upon raising his hands, the Officer saw in plain view a pistol in the waistband of the juvenile.

8. There were no other people seen in the area at this time.

9. Given the high-crime area, the flight of the person that matched the description of the person he saw running earlier, and the inability to see that person's hands, the officer was within his rights to ask for the minimal intrusion for officer's safety for the raising of the juvenile's hands. Thereafter, the weapon was in plain view and properly seized.

Juvenile Court Opinion, 12/19/2014, at 1-2.

R.J. first challenges the court's suppression ruling. Specifically, R.J. contends that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him because "in the present case, the officer was not justified in his belief that R.J. was the suspect." R.J.'s Brief at 20. R.J. asserts the Commonwealth's evidence only showed:

R.J. was merely standing in the backyard area of the fifteen row houses. There was no indication that he had just run from police or that police could provide any sufficient identifying information that connected R.J. to the fleeing suspect, other than R.J. stood outside in the general area where the suspect had run and he wore nondescript dark clothes.

R.J.'s Brief, id.

Our standard of review is as follows:

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is

limited to determining whether the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record and whetherthe legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and may reverse only if the court's legal conclusions are erroneous. The suppression court's legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to our plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 605 Pa. 188, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 832, 131 S. Ct. 110, 178 L. Ed. 2d 32 (U.S. 2010) (citations, quotations and ellipses omitted). Moreover, appellate courts are limited to reviewing only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing when examining a ruling on a pre-trial motion to suppress. See In the Interest of L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1083-1087 (Pa. 2013).

Commonwealth v. Ranson, 103 A.3d 73, 76 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___ (Pa. May 13, 2015). "It is within the suppression court's sole province as factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony." Commonwealth v. Clemens, 66 A.3d 373, 378 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quotations and citation omitted).

Our law recognizes three levels of police interaction with civilians. "The first is a mere encounter, which requires no level of suspicion at all. The second level is an investigative detention, which must be supported by reasonable suspicion. Finally, the third level is an arrest or custodial detention, which must be supported by probable cause." Commonwealthv. Walls, 53 A.3d 889, 892-893 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). Regarding an investigative detention:

In the seminal case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), the United States Supreme Court indicated that police may stop and frisk a person where they had a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. In order to determine whether the police had a reasonable suspicion, the totality of the circumstances - the whole picture - must be considered. Based upon that whole picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.

In the Interest of D.M., 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (Pa. 2001) (citations omitted). Unprovoked flight in a high-crime area from persons identifiable as police officers is sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion to support an investigative detention. Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 853 A.2d 404 (Pa. Super. 2004). See also Commonwealth v. Brown, 904 A.2d 925 (Pa. Super. 2006).

At the suppression hearing, Officer David Haines, of the Mifflin Police Department, testified that on March 3, 2014, he was by himself, in uniform and in a marked vehicle, patrolling the Mon View Heights housing project. N.T., 3/20/2014, at 6. He further testified:

Q. Did anything unusual happen during your shift?

A. Yes. As I was driving on the property towards the 31 row, which is in the back of the complex, I saw a person in dark clothing with a hood over his head cross in front of me. When that person looked in my direction, he began to run.

As I got closer, the person looked back again and increased his speed, and he ran and continued to run and ran behind the 31 row apartment building.

****

THE COURT: Okay. You were driving?

THE WITNESS: I was driving.

THE COURT: He came across. Go ahead. Tell me.

THE WITNESS: He was probably about 150 feet ahead of me.

THE COURT: Okay.

THE WITNESS: As I continued to a location, as he looked back and looked at my vehicle, he ran.

When he got to the rear at the 31 row building, he looked back again, and he ran and turned to the left and ran behind the building.

[BY COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY]:

Q. Okay. Can you describe this area.

A. It's a residential area. It's a private property. There's a front gate that's monitored by guards.

We have a huge amount of crime in this complex, especially in the area that I saw this individual. Anything from homicides to drugs to burglaries, robberies. We have - almost on a daily basis we are up there at that area a couple of times.

Q. You called it a residential area. Is it homes, row houses, apartment buildings?

A. It's row houses.

Q. Okay. What time was this?

A. This was 12:08 a.m.

Q. Was anybody else around in the area that you could observe?

A. No. I didn't see anybody else.

****

Q. Okay. He's at this point about 150 feet away.

A. He's probably about 100-to-150 feet in front of me to my right.

Q. Okay. Where was he located exactly?

A. To the right. When I initially saw him, he had just crossed the road. He walked across the road and looked in my direction as I was approaching. As soon as he looked in my direction, he began to run.

As I closed the distance, he continued to run. But then he looked back again, and he ran harder and made the left behind the complex of buildings.

Q. Prior to him running, how fast was that person going?

A. He was just walking.

Q. Okay. Was anything else around? Any other cars on the street?

A. Yes. There are cars parked on the street.

Q. Any other moving vehicles that you recall?

A. No.

Q. At that point did you make eye contact?

A. No.

Q. Okay. You said when that person first looked in your direction, he started running?

A. Correct.

Q. Where was the person when he first looked in your direction? What part of the street?

A. Immediately to the right side of the street. He had just crossed the street from my left to my right. Once he

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