In re R.A.M.N.

230 A.3d 423

IN RE: R.A.M.N., a Minor

Appeal of: LCCYS

In re: F.A.N., A MINOR

Appeal of: LCCYS

No. 750 MDA 2019

No. 778 MDA 2019

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted October 15, 2019

Filed: March 5, 2020

Christopher Harrison, Wilkes-Barre, for appellant.

Louis J. Mattioli, Hazle Township, for C.M.M., appellee.

Joseph J. Mashinski, Plains, Guardian Ad Litem, for appellee.

Robert V. Davison, Kingston, for K.N., appellee.

Thomas W. Sharkey, Hazleton, for T.M., appellee.

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

OPINION BY BOWES, J.:

In these consolidated appeals, Luzerne County Children and Youth Services ("CYS") appeals from the April 29, 2019 decrees denying its petitions to terminate the parental rights of K.N. ("Mother") to her two minor children, F.A.N. and R.A.M.N. We affirm.

F.A.N. and R.A.M.N. were born during July 2006 and December 2009, respectfully. Their third sibling, C.N., died on January 4, 2013, due to a traumatic head injury that she suffered while in the care of Mother and/or Mother's former paramour. CYS immediately placed F.A.N. and R.A.M.N. in care. The juvenile court adjudicated F.A.N. and R.A.M.N. dependent on January 9, 2013. On December 14, 2017, the juvenile court entered an order finding Mother responsible for C.N.'s death by act of omission because she failed to protect the child from harm. However, neither Mother nor her former paramour, in whose care she left her daughter before she went to work that day was charged with a criminal offense.

The orphans' court succinctly summarized the relevant procedural history as follows:

[The children] have been in placement for six (6) years and have been most recently placed with their maternal great grandmother since March of 2019. Prior to March of 2019, the children were living with a traditional foster family ... for the majority of their placement. The children were originally placed in January of 2013 because [CYS] alleged that Mother was a safety threat to the children in light of Mother not offering a "plausible" explanation for [C.N.'s] death on January 4, 2013.... Within the last three and [one-]half ... years, Mother had expanded visits with her children commencing with supervised visits and concluding with unsupervised overnight visits with the children every weekend.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/17/19, at 3 (citations omitted).

On March 20, 2018, CYS filed petitions to terminate Mother's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511 (a)(8).¹ CYS alleged, inter alia , that the conditions that led to the placement of F.A.N. and R.A.M.N. continued to exist. As articulated by CYS, because Mother cannot or will not explain how C.N. sustained her fatal injuries approximately six years earlier, she remains a threat to the children's safety. N.T., 1/22/19, at 84-85. As stated in its brief, the gravamen of CYS's position is that Mother "continues to be a safety threat in [her] home ... [until she] provide[s] a plausible explanation as to how the [child] sustained the fatal injuries." CYS brief at 13.

On May 21, 2018, CYS filed concomitant petitions to change the permanency goals for both children from reunification to adoption. The trial court consolidated CYS's termination and goal-change petitions for disposition. During the ensuing hearings, Allison Miller, the CYS caseworker who was assigned to the family since 2016, confirmed that Mother exercised unsupervised visits since January 2018, and since Thanksgiving 2018, Mother exercised periods of overnight visitation without incident. N.T., 1/22/19, at 27-28. Ms. Miller also stated that the agency had no safety concerns regarding Mother's unsupervised overnight visitations, and did not identify any concerns or hazards while the children have been in Mother's physical custody. Id. at 53. Nevertheless, invoking a "state safety manual," which CYS neglected to identify or present to the orphans' court, Ms. Miller explained that Mother's failure to proffer a "plausible explanation" rendered her a threat to the children's safety. Id. at 31-32. Thus, despite Mother's compliance with her reunification requirements, the family's progress toward reunification, and the absence of an actual safety concern, the agency sought to terminate Mother's parental rights. Id. at 40-42.

In addition, CYS called as a witness Paul Bellino, M.D., the expert in pediatrics and child abuse whose report was admitted during the 2017 child abuse proceedings against Mother and her paramour. Presently, Dr. Bellino testified that, based on the mechanics of the child's traumatic head injuries, it was probable that C.N. sustained the injury after Mother left the residence for the day, and C.N. was alone with the paramour. N.T., 4/2/19, at 35-36, 50-51. Dr. Bellino's physical examination of C.N. revealed pre-existing fractures in the child's ribs and arms when she presented to the hospital with the head trauma. Id. at 29-30. He continued, however, that he had no reason to doubt Mother's contention that C.N. looked healthy when Mother left for work on the day the child died. Id. at 37.

Following the close of CYS's evidence, Mother moved for a directed verdict, contending that the agency "offered no evidence or testimony regarding the second part of that 2511(a)(8) factor [ (the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continued to exist) ], and ... that termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child." Id. at 54-55. In open court, the orphans' court granted Mother's petition, denied the petition to involuntarily terminate Mother's parental rights, and denied the requested goal change. Id. at 64-65. On April 29, 2019, the orphans' court entered an order formalizing its in-court ruling and directing that the children be returned to Mother at the close of the academic year, June 11, 2019. Trial Court Order, 4/29/19. CYS filed timely notices of appeal, which we consolidated sua sponte , and its concomitant statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i).

CYS presents a single issue for our review: whether the orphans' court erred in granting Mother's directed verdict and denying CYS's petition to terminate Mother's parental rights. CYS brief at 6. Mother filed a brief in support of the orphan's court's decision. While counsel for F.A.N. and R.A.M.N. neglected to file a responsive brief, he submitted a letter to this Court stating that the children joined Mother's brief.

In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our standard of review is as follows:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases requires appellate courts "to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record." In re Adoption of S.P. [616 Pa. 309, 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012) ]. "If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion." Id. "[A] decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will." Id. The trial court's decision, however, should not be reversed merely because the record would support a different result. Id. at [325-26, 47 A.3d at] 827. We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T. [608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010) ].

In re T.S.M. , 620 Pa. 602, 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). "The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence." In re M.G. & J.G. , 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). "[I]f competent evidence supports the trial court's findings, we will affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result." In re Adoption of T.B.B. , 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J. , 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa.Super. 2009). Instantly, CYS sought to terminate Mother's parental rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(8), which provides as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.-- The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:

....

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8).

As it relates to the argument that CYS raises on appeal,

Once the 12-month period has been established, the court must next determine whether the conditions that led to the child's removal continue to exist, despite the reasonable good faith efforts of the Agency supplied over a realistic time period. Termination under Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court to evaluate a parent's current willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that initially caused placement or the availability or efficacy of Agency services.

In re Z.P. , 994 A.2d 1108, 1118 (Pa.Super. 2010).

The only component of § 2511(a)(8) at issue in this case is whether the reason for placing F.A.N. and R.A.M.N. in placement continues to exist.² The crux of CYS's position is that, considering the circumstances of C.N.'s death, including Dr. Bellino's testimony that C.N. had pre-existing fractures in her ribs and arms when she presented to the hospital, Mother's failure to provide a plausible explanation for C.N.'s fatal injuries demonstrated that the condition that led to the placement of F.A.N. and...