In re R.R.G.

1

IN THE INTEREST OF R.R.G. IV, A CHILD

No. 13-23-00032-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Thirteenth District, Corpus Christi-Edinburg

July 6, 2023

On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5 of Nueces County Texas.

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Longoria

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GINA M. BENAVIDES JUSTICE.

Appellants A.A.N.P. (Alexis) and R.G. III (Ryan)^[1] appeal from the trial court's final order terminating their parental rights to R.R.G. IV (Roger). Alexis and Ryan both argue that the trial court's jurisdiction was extinguished when it failed to render an order extending the automatic dismissal date prior to the deadline lapsing. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann § 263.401(b). Alexis additionally argues that the trial court erred by: (1) terminating her parental rights when the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to show that it was in Roger's best interest; and (2) denying her motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence.^[2] We affirm.

I. Procedural Background

On May 10, 2021, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) filed an original petition for the protection of Roger and to terminate the parental rights of Alexis and Ryan. According to the affidavit in support of removal attached to the petition, the Department received a report of potential child neglect on May 4, 2021. As part of its preliminary investigation, the Department learned that Roger was born testing positive for methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), amphetamine, and benzodiazepine. Alexis submitted to a urinalysis test, which yielded positive results for methamphetamine.

That same day, the trial court signed an order removing the child from the parents' custody and appointing the Department as temporary managing conservator. Throughout the course of the proceedings, Alexis was permitted two-hour supervised visits with Roger twice weekly. On May 16, 2022, the trial court signed an order requiring Alexis to complete inpatient drug treatment.

Trial commenced on November 7, 2022. At the conclusion of trial, the court took the matter under advisement. On December 28, 2022, the trial court signed an order terminating Alexis's and Ryan's parental rights and finding that the termination was in Roger's best interest. Alexis filed a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence, but the trial court denied the motion. This accelerated appeal followed. See Tex. R. App. P. 28.4.

II. Jurisdiction

Alexis and Ryan contend that the trial court lost jurisdiction over the termination proceedings by failing to extend the automatic dismissal deadline.

A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law

"Before a court may enter judgment against a party, the court must have obtained jurisdiction over that party pursuant to applicable rules or statutes." Whatley v. Walker, 302 S.W.3d 314, 321 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied). A judgment is void when the court rendering judgment had no jurisdiction over the parties or property, no jurisdiction over the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, or no capacity to act. In re D.S., 602 S.W.3d 504, 512 (Tex. 2020). We review whether a trial court has jurisdiction de novo. Joyner v. Joyner, 352 S.W.3d 746, 749 (Tex. App.- San Antonio 2011, no pet.).

"Section 263.401 of the Texas Family Code establishes a deadline for rendition of a final order in suits affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCRs) brought by the [Department]." In re Tex. Dep't of Fam. & Protective Servs., 210 S.W.3d 609, 611 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (op. on reh'g). This provision requires trial courts to commence a trial on the merits by "the first Monday after the first anniversary of the date the court rendered a temporary order appointing the department as temporary managing conservator." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.401(a). If the trial court finds certain extraordinary circumstances exist, the statute allows the trial court to extend the deadline by a maximum of 180 days. Id. § 263.401(b); In re Tex. Dep't of Fam. & Protective Servs., 210 S.W.3d at 612. "But if the trial court neither commences trial by the dismissal date nor extends it in accordance with [§] 263.401(b), the statute dictates a dire consequence: the trial court's jurisdiction over the suit 'is terminated and the suit is automatically dismissed.'" In re G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d 288, 292 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.401(a)).

B. Analysis

On May 10, 2021, the trial court rendered a temporary order appointing the Department as temporary managing conservator. This made the automatic dismissal date May 16, 2022. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.401(a). At a docket call on May 5, 2022, the Department and counsel for Alexis informed the trial court that the automatic dismissal deadline was looming and that the trial court had not extended the deadline yet. Counsel for Ryan announced that he was not ready for trial. Counsel for Alexis discussed her client's attempts to begin inpatient drug treatment and stated the case "need[ed] an extension." The trial court pronounced, "Okay. I'll order the [263.]401 [extension], but let's set it for trial. If she gets into treatment-I mean, that's the goal here. . . . If she's in treatment in 45 days, my inclination will be to let her finish her treatment." However, the trial court failed to explicitly make the findings mandated by § 263.401(b). See id. § 263.401(b). No party objected to the trial court's oral rendition of the extension or its omission of the required findings. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). On May 27, 2022, the trial court signed a written order setting the new dismissal date as November 13, 2022, and explicitly finding "that extraordinary circumstances necessitate the subject child[ ]remaining in the temporary managing conservatorship of the Department and that continuing the appointment of the Department as temporary managing conservator is in the best interest of the subject child." See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.401(b).

We conclude the trial court's pronouncement that it would "order the [263.]401 [extension]" was sufficient to extend the mandatory dismissal deadline. See id. § 101.026; In re G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d at 299 (explaining that Texas Family Code § 101.026 "permits trial courts to render orders orally in the presence of the court reporter"); see also In re J.P., No. 13-18-00648-CV, 2020 WL 103858, at *4 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg Jan. 9, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that the trial court rendered judgment when it stated, "The Court will approve the agreement of the parties and I will order the release of [Mother]"). However, both Alexis and Ryan urge that because the trial court failed to explicitly make the findings required by § 263.401(b) prior to the expiration of the original dismissal deadline, the trial court's attempt to extend the deadline was ineffective. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.401(b).

"[T]rial courts must expressly make the 'extraordinary circumstances' and 'best interest' findings" required by § 263.401(b) "either in a written order or orally at a hearing, and their failure to do so is error." In re J.S., No. 22-0420, 2023 WL 4036262, at *7 (Tex. June 16, 2023). But "a trial court's failure to make the mandatory [§] 263.401(b) findings expressly does not affect the separate jurisdictional inquiry." Id. at *9; see id. at *12 (concluding that "a trial court's failure to make the mandatory 'extraordinary circumstances' and 'best interest' findings prior to the initial automatic dismissal deadline is a non-jurisdictional error"). Accordingly, the failure of the trial court to explicitly make the findings required by § 263.401(b) prior to the original dismissal deadline did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction. See In re J.S., 2023 WL 4036262, at *12. Further, because Alexis and Ryan did not object below to the trial court's failure to explicitly make the required findings prior to the original dismissal deadline, any other complaints they raise concerning this issue were not preserved for our review. See id. ("Because Mother did not object to the trial court's failure to comply with the non-jurisdictional findings requirement prior to the initial automatic dismissal deadline, that error cannot be addressed for the first time on appeal."); see also Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).

We overrule Ryan's sole issue and Alexis's first issue.

III. Best Interest of the Child

In her second issue, Alexis argues that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to find that termination of her parental rights was in Roger's best interest.

A. Applicable Law

"A parent's right to 'the companionship, care, custody, and management' of her children is a constitutional interest 'far more precious than any property right.'" In re D.S.P., 210 S.W.3d 776, 778 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2006, no pet.) (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982)). "Because the natural right between a parent and his child is one of constitutional dimensions, Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985), termination proceedings must be strictly scrutinized." In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101, 112 (Tex. 2014). "In parental termination cases, due process requires application of the clear and convincing standard of proof." Id. "'Clear and convincing evidence' means the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007.

To terminate parental rights, a court must find one of the grounds for termination specified in § 161.001(b)(1) of the family code and that termination is in the best interest of the child. Id. § 161.001(b)(1) (2...