In re Reeder

691 S.W.3d 628

EX PARTE Shanea Lynn REEDER, Applicant

NO. WR-93,824-01

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Delivered: June 26, 2024

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN CAUSE NO. 5427A IN THE 31ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WHEELER COUNTY

OPINION

Hervey, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which Richardson, Newell, Walker, Slaughter, and McClure JJ., joined.

Shanea Lynn Reeder, Applicant, was convicted for the offense of Unlawful Possession of Firearm pursuant to a plea bargain and was sentenced to 5 years’ imprisonment.¹ Applicant, in a pro se capacity, contends his conviction is improper because he had not been convicted of a felony at the time of his arrest but was serving deferred-adjudication community supervision. We filed and set this application to decide whether serving deferred-adjudication community supervision constitutes being convicted of a felony for the purpose of Unlawful Possession of Firearm. Because we conclude that it is not, we agree that Applicant was not convicted of a felony at the time of his arrest for Unlawful Possession of Firearm. We also hold Applicant’s plea was involuntary due to a fundamental misunderstanding by all parties of the law in relation to the facts at the time the plea was made. Applicant shall be allowed to withdraw his plea and the judgment of conviction for that offense should be set aside.

I. Background

In April of 2017, applicant was placed on deferred-adjudication community supervision for a period of six years for the felony offense of distributing a controlled substance.² In February of 2021, while still serving deferred-adjudication community supervision, Applicant was arrested for Unlawful Possession of Firearm.³ One month later, the State filed a Motion to Proceed with Adjudication of Guilt for the Applicant’s original, controlled-substance offense.

Two hearings were scheduled on the same day in August of 2021. The first hearing was held relating to the trial court’s consideration of a plea bargain agreement for the offense of Unlawful Possession of Firearm. The second hearing related to the State’s Motion to Proceed with Adjudication of Guilt for the offense of distributing a controlled substance.

During the first hearing, Applicant pled guilty to the offense. The trial court found Applicant guilty and sentenced him to a term of 5 years’ imprisonment pursuant to a plea bargain. During the second hearing, the State alleged Applicant violated conditions 2, 11, 12, 13, and 20 of the order of deferred-adjudication community supervision.⁴ Applicant pled true to the violations.

The trial court found Applicant violated the said conditions and entered a judgment of guilt against defendant for the controlled-substance offense.⁵ Applicant was sentenced to a term of 5 years’ imprisonment pursuant to a plea bargain agreement on the drug offense. The sentences for both offenses were to be served concurrently.

In January of 2023, Applicant filed his initial post-conviction application for a writ of habeas corpus arguing that his conviction was improper because he was not a convicted felon at the time he was arrested for Unlawful Possession of Firearm. We filed and set the application for submission and remanded the case to determine whether Applicant had another felony conviction that would have supported his guilty plea. He did not.

II. Analysis of the Statute

[1] We must first address the threshold question of whether serving deferred-adjudication community supervision for a felony offense constitutes having been convicted of a felony pursuant to Texas Penal Code § 46.04. We hold that it does not.

A. Law of Statutory Interpretation

[2–4] Statutory construction is a question of law that we review de novo. Delarosa v. State, 677 S.W.3d 668, 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (citing Liverman v. State, 470 S.W. 3d 831, 836 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)). This Court has adopted a text-first approach when interpreting statutes. Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). It is presumed that the legislature intended a purpose for each word. Sims v. State, 569 S.W.3d 634, 640 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). It is also presumed that an enacted statute intends (1) compliance with state and federal constitutions, (2) that the entire statute is effective, (3) a just and reasonable result, (4) a result feasible of execution, and (5) that public interest is favored over private interest. Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.021; Dunham v. State, 666 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023).

[5–10] We must give effect to the plain meaning of the statute’s language if possible. Delarosa, 677 S.W.3d at 674 (citing Liverman, 470 S.W. 3d at 836). The plain meaning is determined by reading the statute in context, reasonably giving effect to each word, phrase, clause, and sentence, and constructing them according to applicable rules of grammar and common usage, to include technical definitions. Id. at 674 (citing Lopez v. State, 600 S.W.3d 43, 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020)). "When determining the fair, objective meaning of an undefined statutory term, our Court may consult standard dictionaries." Dunham, 666 S.W.3d at 484 (citing Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 785-86). It is only when the text is ambiguous, or if the plain meaning of the words leads to absurd results, that extratextual factors are considered. Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 785-86. In construing an ambiguous statute, a court may consider, among other matters, the (1) object sought to be attained, (2) circumstances under which the statute was enacted, (3) legislative history, (4) common law or former statutory provisions, including laws on the same or similar subjects, (5) consequences of a particular construction, (6) administrative construction of the statute, and (6) title (caption), preamble, and emergency provision. Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.023; Watkins v. State, 619 S.W.3d 265, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Another matter that may be considered, which has been endorsed by this Court in another case interpreting the same statute, is the Rule of Lenity. Cuellar v. State, 70 S.W.3d 815, 819 n. 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ("The [R]ule of [L]enity is, in essence, another extratextual factor for a court to consider if, and only if, a statute is ambiguous.").

B. Texas Penal Code § 46.04 & Relevant Definitions

The statute reads, in relevant part:

(a) A person who has been convicted of a felony commits an offense if he possesses a firearm:

(1) after conviction and before the fifth anniversary of the person’s release from confinement following conviction of the felony or the person’s release from supervision under community supervision, parole, or mandatory supervision, whichever date is later....

Tex. Penal Code § 46.04 (emphasis added). The definition of community supervision is found in the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure art. 42A.001. The definition reads:

(1) "Community supervision" means the placement of a defendant by a court under a continuum of programs and sanctions, with conditions imposed by the court for a specified period during which:

(A) criminal proceedings are deferred without an adjudication of guilt; or

(B) a sentence of imprisonment or confinement, imprisonment and fine, or confinement and fine, is probated and the imposition of sentence is suspended in whole or in part.

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.001 (emphasis added). The definition of deferred-adjudication community supervision can be found in the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 42A.101. The definition reads:

(a) ... if in the judge’s opinion the best interest of society and the defendant will be served, the judge may, after receiving a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, hearing the evidence, and finding that it substantiates the defendant’s guilt, defer further proceedings without entering an adjudication of guilt and place the defendant on deferred adjudication community supervision.

Id. (emphasis added).

C. Interpreting Texas Penal Code § 46.04 - Unlawful Possession of Firearm

This Court has confronted the issue of an applicant having been arrested for Unlawful Possession of Firearm while serving deferred-adjudication community supervision without settling the question as to the scope of the statute relative to whether it constituted a conviction. In Ex parte Smith, this Court explained the answer was not clear but declined to resolve it because it was unnecessary in deciding the case. Ex parte Smith, 296 S.W.3d 78, 80-81 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (having only addressed the ineffective assistance of counsel claim and finding no ineffective assistance). Our limited analysis compared Unlawful Possession of Firearm to another statute - the handgun licensing scheme. The licensing statutes expressly defined conviction to include an order of deferred-adjudication community supervision. Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 411.171, 411.1711. Smith, 296 S.W.3d at 80-81.

[11] The Unlawful Possession of Firearm statute is not ambiguous.⁶ The statute’s text demonstrates an attendantcircumstance element of having been convicted of a felony. "Conviction" is not defined in the Texas Penal Code or the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. We must look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the word, precedent, and the most suitable canons of statutory construction to advise us. For the plain and ordinary meaning of conviction, we turn to dictionaries.

Dictionaries support the proposition that a judgment of guilt is a prerequisite to being convicted.⁷ The Unlawful Possession of Firearm statute expressly states one must be convicted of a felony. Tex. Penal Code § 46.04. The definition of community supervision, subsection (A), expressly states that criminal proceedings are deferred without an adjudication of guilt. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.001. The definition of deferred adjudication community supervision expressly states proceedings will be deferred without entering an adjudication of guilt. Id. Therefore, it is clear from the plain and ordinary meaning of conviction, and deferred-adjudication community...