Case Law In re Rosenberg

In re Rosenberg

Document Cited Authorities (7) Cited in (4) Related

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Ira E. Zimmerman, Silver Spring, MD, for Appellant.

Robert M. McCarthy, Bethesda, MD, for Appellee.

Panel: KRAUSER, C.J., WRIGHT and BERGER, JJ.

KRAUSER, C.J.

Merilee Rosenberg, appellant, underwent brain surgery, in 2008, for Parkinson's disease. Unable thereafter to manage her financial affairs due to the side effects of her surgery and her Parkinson's disease, she consented to the appointment of a guardian over her property by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Two years later, believing that she had sufficiently recovered to resume control over her affairs, she urged the court-appointed guardian of her property to request a hearing, before the Montgomery County circuit court, to determine whether the property guardianship should be terminated.

After a hearing was held, as requested, the Montgomery County circuit court denied her request to terminate the guardianship. That decision prompted this appeal, which presents three issues. Rephrased so as to facilitate review, they are:

I. Whether the circuit court applied an incorrect legal standard in deciding to continue the guardianship of the property;

II. Whether the circuit court erred in failing to consider a less restrictive alternative to guardianship; and

III. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the circuit court's decision to continue the guardianship of the property.

Because we conclude that the circuit court did not apply the correct legal standard in declining to terminate the guardianship of Ms. Rosenberg's property, we vacate that decision and remand for further proceedings. On remand, it is our view that the circuit court may consider less restrictive alternatives to a full guardianship of property, if it deems such a course of action fitting and appropriate.

Background

Ms. Rosenberg was born in 1942. After earning a Ph.D. in French, she was employed as a professor of French and German at the University of Tennessee. Then, after moving to Washington, D.C., and earning a law degree, she worked as an attorney for the United States Department of Veterans Affairs, where she specialized in federal contract law.

When Ms. Rosenberg was 54 years old, she was diagnosed as suffering from Parkinson's disease. During the ten-year period that followed, her condition deteriorated, and, despite “massive doses” of medication, her symptoms worsened. As a consequence, her neurologist, Thomas Hyde, M.D., suggested that she undergo “deep brain stimulation.” 1

When she was admitted to Suburban Hospital, in the summer of 2008, for that procedure, two physicians examined her “to determine whether she was competent to consent to medical treatment and handle her financial matters.” After they found that she was competent to consent to medical treatment, though not competent to manage her finances, they obtained her consent to undergo deep brain stimulation.

Following that surgery, Ms. Rosenberg experienced, in the words of Dr. Hyde, “some postoperative medical problems that impaired her cognitive function”; in fact, she was, at least initially, “much worse off after the surgery than ... before.” When the time came to discharge her to “an acute rehabilitation facility,” the hospital filed a petition, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, seeking the appointment of “a temporary and permanent guardian of the property” for Ms. Rosenberg. A guardian was necessary, the hospital opined, “to manage Ms. Rosenberg's finances and property to assist in creating a discharge plan” and then “to consent to decisions regarding long term care.”

The hospital further stated that Robert McCarthy, Esquire, appellee, was willing to serve as temporary and permanent guardian of Ms. Rosenberg's property and was qualified for appointment under Maryland law,2 and that Ria Rochvarg, Esquire, was “willing to serve as the attorney for [Ms. Rosenberg] if appointed by the Court.” The circuit court promptly entered orders appointing Ms. Rochvarg as counsel to represent Ms. Rosenberg and Mr. McCarthy as the temporary guardian of her property. Although Ms. Rochvarg, as counsel for Ms. Rosenberg, initially requested that the guardianship petition be denied, Ms. Rosenberg ultimately consented to an order appointing Mr. McCarthy as the guardian of her property.

Mr. McCarthy, in his words, acted as “a heavy-handed guardian of the property” and, as he later admitted, “a pseudo-guardian of the person” (presumably, he meant “quasi-guardian”). He hired Ms. Felice Grunberger, a social worker, to act as his “private case manager” and to make sure that Ms. Rosenberg's needs were addressed.

While Mr. McCarthy saw the guardianship as indefinite, Ms. Rosenberg did not. In her view, the arrangement was temporary and solely one that applied to her property and not her person. In fact, she claimed that when she discussed the matter with Ms. Rochvarg, she was advised by her that it “should take about three months to recover and then [they] could have the guardianship dismissed.”

After Ms. Rosenberg was discharged from Suburban Hospital, she was admitted to a rehabilitation hospital and then a nursing home and, after that, an assisted-living facility. The following year, as Ms. Rosenberg's condition gradually improved, it was agreed that she would move to an apartment in Washington, D.C. Mr. McCarthy signed the lease for Ms. Rosenberg. Assisted by Ms. Grunberger, as well as an aide, who visited three days a week, four or five hours at a time, Ms. Rosenberg began living in the apartment in July 2010. Ms. Grunberger, among other things, monitored Ms. Rosenberg's medications, as she was then taking eight different medications for various illnesses,3and the aide helped her to shop for groceries and to perform such routine chores as preparing meals, grooming, bathing, and dressing.

At some point, Ms. Rosenberg felt she was now capable of living on her own. Mr. McCarthy felt otherwise. In a letter to “interested persons,” 4 dated August 2, 2010, Mr. McCarthy wrote that the move to the Washington, D.C., apartment would, in his view, “be a complete disaster,” as Ms. Rosenberg both lacked “the capacity to organize her own affairs” and suffered from “very poor judgment.” Ms. Rosenberg could live independently, he opined, but it would require the help of “twenty-four hour aides” at a prohibitive cost.

Predictably, Ms. Rosenberg had an entirely different view of her capabilities. Asserting that she was now able to handle the challenge of independent living, she urged Mr. McCarthy to seek a review hearing before the circuit court for the purpose of determining whether the guardianship should be terminated, and, thereafter, he filed a motion to set a review hearing “for the possible modification and/or termination” of her guardianship. A hearing was held, at Mr. McCarthy's request, on July 27, 2010. At that time, the circuit court, at Mr. McCarthy's suggestion, appointed Patricia T. Nay, M.D., to perform an independent medical evaluation of Ms. Rosenberg to “determine” if she had “recovered from the disability requiring [the] imposition” of the guardianship “to an extent” that it was now “appropriate” to terminate that guardianship. Upon making that appointment, the court ordered that, after Dr. Nay's report was completed, a hearing be held on Ms. Rosenberg's motion to terminate guardianship. The court then declared that, at that hearing, Dr. Nay's report would be admitted as substantive evidence and that no testimony from Dr. Nay or any other person need be taken, though, it added, Dr. Nay could be “subpoenaed by any party.”

In late September 2010, four weeks before the scheduled hearing, Dr. Nay submitted her independent medical evaluation. In the summary of that report, Dr. Nay opined:

Mrs. Rosenberg has dementia secondary to Parkinson's disease and self neglect. She has impaired executive functioning. Her overall situation is exacerbated by her narcissism.

She can make and communicate only simple and limited decisions concerning her person and property.

She requires a guardian of property and a guardian of person.

She requires 24–hour supervision in a structured environment at this time to keep her safe and meet her needs. If that is her apartment, then she requires 24–hour private duty caregivers.

She does not have the mental capacity to understand the nature of a guardianship of person or property and cannot consent to the appointment of a guardian.

Several days after the submission of that evaluation, Ira E. Zimmerman, Esquire, entered his appearance on behalf of Ms. Rosenberg, and, shortly thereafter, at the scheduled motions hearing, he indicated that he wanted to call Dr. Hyde to the stand. To enable him to do so, the hearing was then re-scheduled for January 4, 2011. At that hearing, Dr. Hyde opined that, although Ms. Rosenberg “has some cognitive limitations,” they do not “rise to the level of incompetency” and that she does not presently suffer from dementia. Rather, in Dr. Hyde's view, Ms. Rosenberg's “poor judgment is not any worse than multiple people in our society who are deemed not to be incompetent.” He did caution, however, “that she needs assistance” and that she should “maintain the aide ... and the case worker.”

Cheryl Floyd, Esquire, a trial attorney employed by the United States Department of Justice and a friend of Ms. Rosenberg for nearly thirty years, also testified at the hearing. Ms. Floyd stated that she would be willing to serve as attorney-in-fact for Ms. Rosenberg, “in the event that Ms. Rosenberg was hospitalized or for some other reason could not continue to handle her finances.” She declined, however, to offer to serve as a guardian of Ms. Rosenberg's property.

At the conclusion of the January 4th hearing, the circuit court denied Ms. Rosenberg's motion to terminate...

5 cases
Document | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland – 2018
Ibru v. Ibru
"... ... Indeed, the General Assembly made clear that the law was to apply to "all powers of attorney." Various other provisions codified within the Estates and Trusts Article also apply to actions involving guardianships and fiduciary relationships. See, e.g. , In re Rosenberg , 211 Md. App. 305, 320–21, 65 A.3d 203 (2013) (interpreting ET §§ 13-201 and 13-221 to reject a claimant's argument that the circuit court should have considered "less restrictive alternatives to a guardianship of the [claimant's] property"). 22 Peter also argues that the circuit court ... "
Document | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland – 2013
Youmans v. Douron, Inc.
"..."
Document | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland – 2017
In re Johnson
"... ... Sandra is incorrect.         Section 13-201 permits, but does not require, courts to consider less restrictive alternatives when appointing a guardian of property. Accordingly, a trial court's failure to consider less restrictive alternatives is not error. In re Rosenberg , 211 Md. App. 305, 320-21 (2013). Here, even if the trial court did not consider Sandra's less restrictive alternatives to the extent she wished, same is not a basis for reversal. Page 14          II. The Selection of Guardians         Linda and Sandra both contend that by ... "
Document | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland – 2017
Allen v. Johns Hopkins Hosp.
"... ... Page 13 Unlike the appointment of a guardian of the person, "there is no statutory requirement that a circuit court consider any less restrictive alternatives to a guardianship of the property." In re Rosenberg , 211 Md. App. 305, 321 (2013).         In appointing a guardian of the property, the trial court here stated, "As to the guardianship of property, I do find by clear and convincing evidence that for the same reasons [that the court appointed a guardian of the person], that the ... "
Document | Appeals Court of Massachusetts – 2014
In re Guardianship (And
"... ... 1997) (holding that under the Maine guardianship statute, whose language is similar to the Massachusetts statute, the party seeking termination of guardianship bears the burden of proof throughout the termination proceeding), with Matter of Rosenberg, 211 Md. App. 305, 319-320 (2013) (concluding that the invasion of liberty occasioned by a guardianship requires a burden-shifting approach; after petitioner files a valid medical certificate, the burden of proof shifts to and remains with the party opposing termination).        7. As ... "

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5 cases
Document | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland – 2018
Ibru v. Ibru
"... ... Indeed, the General Assembly made clear that the law was to apply to "all powers of attorney." Various other provisions codified within the Estates and Trusts Article also apply to actions involving guardianships and fiduciary relationships. See, e.g. , In re Rosenberg , 211 Md. App. 305, 320–21, 65 A.3d 203 (2013) (interpreting ET §§ 13-201 and 13-221 to reject a claimant's argument that the circuit court should have considered "less restrictive alternatives to a guardianship of the [claimant's] property"). 22 Peter also argues that the circuit court ... "
Document | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland – 2013
Youmans v. Douron, Inc.
"..."
Document | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland – 2017
In re Johnson
"... ... Sandra is incorrect.         Section 13-201 permits, but does not require, courts to consider less restrictive alternatives when appointing a guardian of property. Accordingly, a trial court's failure to consider less restrictive alternatives is not error. In re Rosenberg , 211 Md. App. 305, 320-21 (2013). Here, even if the trial court did not consider Sandra's less restrictive alternatives to the extent she wished, same is not a basis for reversal. Page 14          II. The Selection of Guardians         Linda and Sandra both contend that by ... "
Document | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland – 2017
Allen v. Johns Hopkins Hosp.
"... ... Page 13 Unlike the appointment of a guardian of the person, "there is no statutory requirement that a circuit court consider any less restrictive alternatives to a guardianship of the property." In re Rosenberg , 211 Md. App. 305, 321 (2013).         In appointing a guardian of the property, the trial court here stated, "As to the guardianship of property, I do find by clear and convincing evidence that for the same reasons [that the court appointed a guardian of the person], that the ... "
Document | Appeals Court of Massachusetts – 2014
In re Guardianship (And
"... ... 1997) (holding that under the Maine guardianship statute, whose language is similar to the Massachusetts statute, the party seeking termination of guardianship bears the burden of proof throughout the termination proceeding), with Matter of Rosenberg, 211 Md. App. 305, 319-320 (2013) (concluding that the invasion of liberty occasioned by a guardianship requires a burden-shifting approach; after petitioner files a valid medical certificate, the burden of proof shifts to and remains with the party opposing termination).        7. As ... "

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  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

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