In re Ross

547 P.3d 278

In the MATTER OF the DETENTION OF Randy Ryan ROSS.

No. 85652-9-I

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.

Filed April 29, 2024

Honorable John Mchale, Judge.

Christine Anne Jackson, Devon Vanessa Gibbs, Attorney at Law, 710 2nd Ave., Ste. 700, Seattle, WA, 98104-1724, for Petitioner.

Nami Kim, Attorney at Law, 516 3rd Ave., Ste. W554, Seattle, WA, 98104-2362, Jennifer G’Dalia Ritchie, King County Courthouse, 516 3rd Ave., Rm W400, Seattle, WA, 98104-2388, for Respondent.

Paula Tuckfield Olson, Law Office of Paula T. Olson, 4020 N Vassault St., Tacoma, WA, 98407-1106, for Guardian Ad Litem.

PUBLISHED OPINION

Díaz, J.

¶ 1 The State twice charged Ross with a sexually violent offense. Each time, the court found Ross incompetent and dismissed the charges. Following the dismissal of the second charged offense, the State filed a sexually violent predator (SVP) petition. Ross moved the court to empanel a jury to make the required preliminary determination whether he committed that crime, which motion the court denied. Ross sought, and this court granted, discretionary review. We hold that neither RCW 71.09.060(2) nor due process requires a jury, in this preliminary stage of an SVP proceeding, to determine whether Ross committed the predicate act(s). Thus, we affirm the denial of Ross’ motion, and remand this matter to proceed consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

¶ 2 In 2015, the State charged Ross with two counts of child molestation in the first degree and rape of a child in the second degree. In 2016, the trial court found Ross not competent to stand trial and his competency non-restorable. The court dismissed the charges without prejudice and committed Ross to Western State Hospital.

¶ 3 In a completely separate incident seven years later, in 2022, the State charged Ross with one count of attempted child molestation in the first degree. In 2023, the trial court dismissed the charges against Ross, finding him still unable to assist in his defense and thus incompetent. The same day, the State filed a petition to commit Ross as an SVP per chapter 71.09 RCW. The State stipulated it would bring its petition under only the 2022 charge.

¶ 4 Ross moved the court for an order empaneling a jury to make the preliminary determination required by the statute that he committed the 2022 charge. The trial court denied the motion, finding chapter 71.09 RCW envisions the court and not a jury making that determination. Ross then petitioned for discretionary review, which a commissioner of this court granted.

II. ANALYSIS

A Whether RCW 71.09.060(2) Requires a Jury to Determine Whether the Respondent Committed the Charged Act(s)

1. Overview of Sexually Violent Predator Proceedings

¶ 5 "The legislature has established a civil involuntary commitment system for individuals who are found to be an SVP." In re Det. of Reyes, 184 Wash.2d 340, 343, 358 P.3d 394 (2015). "The statute defines a ‘sexually violent predator’ as a ‘person who has been convicted of or charged with a crime of sexual violence and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility.’ " Id. (quoting RCW 71.09.020(18)).

¶ 6 There are several classes of persons who are subject to the SVP petition process. RCW 71.09.030(1). Relevant here is the class of persons "who has been charged with a sexually violent offense and who has been determined to be incompetent to stand trial [, and] is about to be released, or has been released, pursuant to RCW 10.77.086(7)." RCW 71.09.030(1)(c).

¶ 7 The charges brought by the State in Ross’ 2015 and 2022 cases qualify as sexually violent offenses under RCW 71.09.020(18).

And, thus, Ross falls within the class of persons who could be committed under RCW 71.09.030(1)(c).

¶ 8 RCW 71.09.060 lays out a three-step procedure for a court to undertake when presented with an SVP petition under RCW 71.09.030(1)(c).

¶ 9 First, under RCW 71.09.060(2), the court holds a preliminary hearing, at which:

the court shall first hear evidence and determine whether the person did commit the act or acts charged if the court did not enter a finding prior to dismissal under RCW 10.77.086(7).

RCW 71.09.060(2) (emphasis added).

¶ 10 In such a "hearing," "the rules of evidence applicable in criminal cases shall apply, and all constitutional rights available to defendants at criminal trials, other than the right not to be tried while incompetent, shall apply." Id. (emphasis added). "If, after the conclusion of the hearing on this issue, the court finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the person did commit the act or acts charged, it shall enter a final order [with specific findings to be discussed later], appealable by the person, on that issue, and may proceed to consider whether the person should be committed pursuant to this section." Id.

¶ 11 Second, if the person "did commit" the acts charged as determined in the hearing above, RCW 71.09.060(1) then permits "a court or a jury" to determine whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, an individual meets the statutory definition of an SVP; someone who "would be likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility" because of a mental health disorder. RCW 71.09.060(1) (emphasis added). The statute implicitly refers to this second determination as a "trial." Id.

¶ 12 Third and finally, "[i]f the court or jury determines that the person is a sexually violent predator, the person shall be committed to the custody of the department of social and health services for placement in a secure facility operated by the department of social and health services for control, care, and treatment," unless a less restrictive option is in the best interest of the person and community safety. Id.

2. Principles of Statutory Interpretation

[1, 2] ¶ 13 When reviewing a statute, "[w]e begin with the statute’s plain language. ‘If the plain language is subject to only one interpretation, our inquiry ends because plain language does not require construction.’ " Matter of C.AS., 25 Wash. App. 2d 21, 26, 522 P.3d 75 (2022) (quoting HomeStreet, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 166 Wash.2d 444, 451, 210 P.3d 297 (2009)). "A statute is ambiguous if ‘susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations,’ but ‘a statute is not ambiguous merely because different interpretations are conceivable.’ " HomeStreet, 166 Wash.2d at 452, 210 P.3d 297 (quoting State v. Hahri, 83 Wash. App. 825, 831, 924 P.2d 392 (1996)).

[3] ¶ 14 Our goal in reviewing statutory language is " ‘to ascertain and carry out the intent of the Legislature.’" In re Det. of Anderson, 185 Wash.2d 79, 85, 368 P.3d 162 (2016) (quoting In re Det. of Martin, 163 Wash.2d 501, 506, 182 P.3d 951 (2008)). We discern the meaning "of a statutory provision … ‘from all that the Legislature has said in the statute and related statutes which disclose legislative intent about the provision in question.’ " Id. at 87, 368 P.3d 162 (quoting Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 11, 43 P.3d 4 (2002)).

[4] ¶ 15 Taking these principles together, "it is settled that the plain meaning of a statute is determined by looking not only ‘to the text of the statutory provision in question,’ but also to "the context of the statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole.’ " State v. Hurst, 173 Wash.2d 597, 604, 269 P.3d 1023 (2012) (quoting State v. Ervin, 169 Wash.2d 815, 820, 239 P.3d 354 (2010)).

[5] ¶ 16 "Another well-settled principle of statutory construction is that ‘each word of a statute is to be accorded meaning.’ " State v. Roggenkamp, 153 Wash.2d 614, 624, 106 P.3d 196 (2005) (quoting State ex rel. Schillberg v. Barnett, 79 Wash.2d 578, 584, 488 P.2d 255 (1971)). " ‘[T]he drafters of legislation … are presumed to have used no superfluous words and we must accord meaning, if possible, to every word in a statute.’ " Id. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. J.P., 149 Wash.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003)).

[6, 7] ¶ 17 In examining such laws, we must keep in mind that "statutes that involve a deprivation of liberty must be strictly construed." In re Det. of Hawkins, 169 Wash.2d 796, 801, 238 P.3d 1175 (2010). "Strict construction requires that, ‘given a choice between a narrow, restrictive construction and a broad, more liberal interpretation, we must choose the first option.’ " Id. (quoting Pac. Nw. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church v. Walla Walla County, 82 Wash.2d 138, 141, 508 P.2d 1361 (1973)).

¶ 18 Finally, we review such questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Echo Global Logistics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 22 Wash. App. 2d 942, 946, 514 P.3d 704 (2022).

3. Discussion

[8] ¶ 19 Ross argues that strict construction of RCW 71.09.060 "guarantees" Ross a trial by jury at the preliminary stage of SVP proceedings. Specifically, he avers that, because the proceeding described in RCW 71.09.060(2) mandates that "all constitutional rights available to defendants at criminal trials … shall apply," he is entitled to a jury determining that issue in the same way any criminal defendant is entitled to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment. Ross claims the court and State’s interpretation of the statute, which permits a judge alone to make that determination, effectively adds the word "bench" to the requirement that "all constitutional rights available to defendants at criminal trials" applies to these proceedings. (Emphasis added). We disagree for three overarching but interrelated reasons.

[9] ¶ 20 First, RCW 71.09.060 does not define the term "court." RCW 71.09.060. "When a statutory term is undefined, the court may look to a dictionary for its ordinary meaning." In re Estate of Blessing, 174 Wash.2d 228, 231, 273 P.3d 975 (2012). Merriam-Webster defines "court" as "a judge or judges in session." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (last visited April 10,...