In re Rudolph Auto., LLC

674 S.W.3d 289

IN RE RUDOLPH AUTOMOTIVE, LLC d/b/a Rudolph Mazda and Rudolph Chevrolet, LLC, Relators

No. 21-0135

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued December 1, 2022

OPINION DELIVERED: June 16, 2023

Charles T. Frazier Jr., Wilson C. Aurbach, Dallas, Wallace B. Jefferson, Austin, Adolfo Ruiz Rodriguez Jr., Meredith Gerber, for Relators.

Sara B. Churchin, Amy Leila Prueger, Maxey Marie Scherr, Craig T. Enoch, Austin, James F. Scherr, Elana S. Einhorn, for Real Parties in Interests Villegas, Irma Vanessa, Juarez, Andrea.

Donna Peavler, for Amicus Curiae Brookshire Grocery Co., The Kroger Co., Kroger Texas LP, QuikTrip Corporation, Omni Hotels Management Corp., Camden Prop. Trust, Combined Group Insurance Services.

Justice Young delivered the opinion of the Court.

After the jury returned its verdict in the underlying negligence and premises-liability suit, the district court granted a motion for new trial. This mandamus action challenges that order. When a trial court perceives a problem to be so serious that only the strong medicine of a new trial can cure it, the court may order a new trial if it provides an adequate explanation that the appellate courts can review. In this case, the district court gave four reasons. We conclude that, taken individually or collectively, those reasons do not justify setting aside the results of the three-week trial. The record does not show that the jury was impaired in fulfilling its constitutional function or that any error in the conduct of the trial warrants retrying the case rather than proceeding in the ordinary course with the remaining post-trial stages of litigation. We therefore conditionally grant mandamus relief and direct the district court to withdraw its new-trial order.

I

As 2013 approached its close, Rudolph Mazda's sales team was working eleven-hour shifts (or longer, if closing a sale required it), six days a week, in pursuit of strong year-end results. Irma Villegas and Christian Ruiz, two of the sales employees, finally completed their work and clocked out shortly after 8:00 p.m. on December 27. Their sales manager, Marcelo Flores, sought to encourage morale by sending Ruiz to buy beer, at Flores's expense, and bring it back for the remaining employees to enjoy together after customers had departed. Both Ruiz and Villegas, among others, consumed beer on Rudolph's premises. At the conclusion of their short end-of-day celebration, Flores sent Villegas and Ruiz home.

The festive atmosphere, however, ended in tragedy. Villegas initially walked toward her car but changed course and walked over to a different area of the dealership. At the same time, Ruiz got into his truck and headed for the exit. But in doing so, he accidentally struck Villegas in the parking lot. Villegas sustained serious physical harm, including a traumatic brain injury. The effects were permanent. Villegas was paralyzed on one side and left with a severe facial deformity. She was confined to a nursing home for seven years before passing away in 2020 at the age of 64.

Real party in interest Andrea Juarez, Villegas's daughter,¹ sued Rudolph (and related entities) and several of Rudolph's employees. Juarez's claims included negligence, failure to train, and premises liability. The case proceeded to a jury trial, which lasted three weeks.

Because of the nature of the case, the district court granted a motion in limine that prohibited references to Villegas's drinking habits aside from the day of the accident.² Near the end of the trial, Rudolph called Dr. Gary Wimbish, a toxicologist, as an expert witness—the last one to testify at trial. During cross-examination, Wimbish responded to a question from plaintiffs’ counsel regarding Rudolph's allowance of alcohol on its premises and the source of the alcohol on the day of the tragedy. Counsel asked Wimbish if "the information that [he had] includes that the alcohol was allowed by Rudolph's head person in charge on that night[.]" Wimbish responded: "My information is a bit different from that." Counsel then asked, "What information do you have that's different from that?" Wimbish replied that "in the information that I have received, she brings alcohol with her to work, and ... had been drinking out of her cup on her own supply of alcohol that day." He admitted that he "d[id]n't remember the exact person" who told him that. At that point, counsel asked to approach the bench.

The district judge was understandably frustrated by what he perceived as a serious threat to the integrity of the trial just as it was coming to an end. His order in limine had sought to eliminate prejudicial and unreliable hearsay about the sensitive topic of Villegas's drinking habits. The judge considered granting a mistrial. But after substantial discussion with counsel, he ultimately made what he described as a "tough decision" and instead issued an instruction to the jury. That instruction castigated Wimbish, declaring that his testimony "is not credible, is unreliable, and not evidence in this case." The judge continued: "You are instructed to disregard the witness's testimony" as to the topics at issue. He polled the jurors, who each individually confirmed that they understood and would follow the instruction. The trial resumed and the court submitted the case to the jury.

The jury ultimately returned a substantial verdict that awarded plaintiffs over $4 million in damages. Several features of the verdict are relevant to our resolution of the case. First, with respect to the event leading to the injury, the jury found that Flores (the manager who paid for the beer and allowed the employees to drink it at the end of the day) was acting in the scope of his employment with Rudolph, but Villegas and Ruiz were not. Second, the jury found that the negligence of Flores, Ruiz, and Villegas—but not Rudolph—was "a proximate cause of the occurrence in question." Indeed, it twice answered "no" to Rudolph's negligence—first generally and then specifically as to Rudolph's status "as an owner or occupier of the premises."³ Third, the jury was asked to "find the percentage of responsibility attributable" to "each person you found caused or contributed to cause the occurrence," and it allocated that responsibility as follows: Rudolph (10%); Flores (25%); Ruiz (35%); Villegas (30%). That is, despite twice having failed to find Rudolph negligent, it nevertheless assigned Rudolph 10% responsibility. Fourth, the jury awarded the following damages for Villegas:

• $630,000 for past medical expenses;

• $2,500,000 for future medical expenses;

• $25,000 for past physical pain and suffering;

• $25,000 for future pain and suffering;

• $25,000 for past physical impairment;

• $25,000 for future physical impairment;

• $0 for past disfigurement;

• $200,000 for future disfigurement;

• $150,000 for past lost earning capacity;

• $240,000 for future lost earning capacity;

• $25,000 for past mental anguish; and

• $25,000 for future mental anguish.

Finally, the jury awarded the following amounts to Juarez for her own losses attributable to Villegas's injuries:

• $0 for past household services and personal care provided by Juarez for Villegas's benefit;

• $150,000 for future household services and personal care to be provided by Juarez for Villegas's benefit; • $0 for past lost parental consortium; and

• $0 for future lost parental consortium.

The court discharged the jury without objection from either party. A few weeks later, Rudolph filed a motion to disregard the jury's findings as to the apportioned-responsibility question. Several weeks after that, Juarez filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, on grounds of mistrial, for a new trial.

The district court granted Juarez's motion and signed an order, drafted by Juarez's counsel, which identified four reasons that it thought "[c]ollectively or individually ... warrant a new trial":

1. "[T]he jury determination of comparative responsibility of Rudolph Mazda ... is error that cannot be reconciled nor disregarded, and prevents the 100% total comparative responsibility required by law...."

2. "[T]he determination of Zero (-0-) Damages for past disfigurement of Irma Vanessa Villegas ... as well as Zero (-0-) Damages for daughter Andrea Juarez for Past household services ... and for Past and future loss of parental consortium ... completely ignore the undisputed facts, and the other damages" for Villegas's past and future pain and suffering and past and future physical impairment "fix an amount neither authorized nor supported by the evidence and is contrary to the great weight of the evidence...."

3. This Court's "decision in [ Painter v. Amerimex Drilling I, Ltd. , 561 S.W.3d 125 (Tex. 2018) ] rendered ... the day of this Jury Verdict, was important law that affected [the court's rulings and the parties’ positions].... Based on the Painter opinion ... it appears to this Court that it needs to reconsider whether [Villegas and Ruiz] were injured in the course of employment as a matter of law ...."

4. "[D]efense expert Gary Wimbish intentionally injected unreliable double hearsay ... in an attempt to inject an improper inference before the jury." Despite the court's best attempts to eliminate the harm, "it is obvious to this Court that the harm done could not be eliminated or removed. The Court finds this improper evidence and behavior to impugn the character of Irma Vanessa Villegas [caused] the rendition of an incorrect verdict by the Jury as the evidence showed Irma Vanessa Villegas was a hardworking dependable and responsible mother, grandmother and sister; there was no negative evidence or detracting evidence other than expert Wimbish's testimony."⁴

Rudolph petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus. In a divided ruling, that court denied relief, holding that the district court had not abused its discretion in granting a new trial. 616 S.W.3d 171 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, orig. proceeding).

Rudolph then filed a mandamus petition in this Court. We set the case for...