In re S.E.J.

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.E.J., A MINOR,

APPEAL OF: I.A.J., FATHER, Appellant

J-S45015-14

No. 517 EDA 2014

SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

AUGUST 13, 2014

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Order January 8, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Civil Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0001379-2011, DP-51-AP-0000710-2013

BEFORE: BOWES, WECHT, and FITZGERALD,^* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:

I.A.J. ("Father") appeals from the order entered January 8, 2014, wherein the trial court involuntarily terminated his parental rights to his five-year-old daughter, S.E.J.¹ We affirm.

On June 14, 2011, the Philadelphia Department of Human Services ("DHS") investigated a General Protective Services ("GPS") report alleging that D.D. ("Mother") had been involuntarily hospitalized for mental health treatment following a psychotic episode. The report further alleged that Mother chronically abused drugs, angered easily, yelled at the children, and physically abused S.E.J.'s older half-sister. The report was substantiated.

Father was not involved with the family at that juncture. He resided with his father ("Paternal Grandfather"). Following Mother's hospitalization, maternal grandmother initially cared for S.E.J. and the older half-sister. However, on July 7, 2011, the children were removed from maternal grandmother's care and started to reside with their maternal aunt, K.S. Then, during March 2012, they were relocated to a pre-adoptive foster home. They have remained together throughout DHS's involvement.

Meanwhile, approximately one month after DHS opened the GPS report, the juvenile court adjudicated S.E.J. and her sister dependent pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302(1) involving children who are without proper parental care or control. Father attended the hearing and expressed his desire to care for his daughter and her half-sister at Paternal Grandfather's home. DHS performed a home assessment, approved the proposed placement, and initiated a transition plan. The plan was thwarted, however, after Father was arrested and incarcerated on a probation detainer. He has remained incarcerated since that time.

DHS fashioned a family service plan ("FSP") for Father even though he remained incarcerated. Father's objectives included contacting the agency so that it could determine what services Father could obtain while incarcerated. DHS mailed the FSP to Father, and it later corresponded with him in prison. The caseworker twice attempted to contact Father's prison counselor, but her efforts were fruitless. However, DHS was able to contact Father directly and eventually created the additional FSP objectives thatFather was to participate in parent training and drug and alcohol treatment while incarcerated.

Likewise, the agency that administered S.E.J.'s foster care, Jewish Family and Children Services ("JFCS"), drafted an individual service plan ("ISP") that mirrored Father's FSP objectives. The agency explored providing supervised visitations between Father and S.E.J. at the prison, however, Father rejected that idea based upon his daughter's kidney condition. Father's compliance with the FSP and ISP goals was modest. He maintained contact with DHS and JFCS, and while he alleged that he completed parent classes and substance abuse treatment in prison, he failed to provide any written documentation to substantiate that claim.

On December 20, 2013, DHS filed petitions for the involuntary termination of Father's parental rights to S.E.J. and to change her placement goal to adoption. Following a hearing on January 8, 2014, the trial court terminated Father's parental rights to S.E.J. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and (8) and (b). This timely appeal ensued. Father complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) by filing a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal simultaneously with his notice of appeal.

Father presents two questions for our review:

1. Did the trial court err in determining that DHS presented clear and convincing evidence that grounds for involuntary termination exist?

2. Did the trial court err in determining that the best interest of the child would be served by terminating Father's parental rights?

Father's brief at 5.

We review the trial court's order to grant or deny a petition to involuntarily terminate parental rights for an abuse of discretion. In re C.W.U., Jr., 33 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa.Super. 2011). "We are limited to determining whether the decision of the trial court is supported by competent evidence." In re R.L.T.M., 860 A.2d 190, 191 (Pa.Super. 2004) (quoting In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1199 (Pa.Super. 2000)). However, "[w]e must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record in order to determine whether the trial court's decision is supported by competent evidence." In re C.W.U., Jr., supra at 4. If the trial court's findings are supported by competent evidence of record, we must affirm even if the record could support the opposite result. In re R.L.T.M., supra at 191-192.

Although it is not apparent from his statement of questions presented, Father's primary complaint is that DHS did not utilize reasonable efforts to reunify him with his daughter. He argues that DHS ignored his request that S.E.J. reside with Paternal Grandfather and delayed securing the required FBI clearances. He also asserts that DHS failed to keep track of Father's accomplishments while in prison, and faults the agency for failing to make contact with his prison counselor. In sum, Father complains that the foregoing examples demonstrate DHS's deficient reunification efforts. We reject this position.

Initially, we observe that DHS's efforts are irrelevant to the determination of whether the agency established the statutory grounds to terminate Father's parental rights. We recently reiterated, "the focus of a termination proceeding is on the parents' conduct, and the adequacy of the agency's reunification efforts is not a valid consideration . . . Thus, [an agency's reunification effort's] alone is not a basis to disturb [a] trial court's order terminating . . . parental rights." In re A.D., ___A.3d ___, 2014 WL 2566284 (Pa.Super. 2014) citing In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 n.1 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc) ("the adequacy of CYS's efforts toward reunification is not a valid consideration at the termination of parental rights stage, as the law allows CYS to give up on the parent once the service plan goal has been changed to adoption") (internal quotes and brackets omitted).

However, that conclusion does not end our examination of Father's argument. While DHS's efforts are not pertinent to our review of the statutory grounds for termination, the agency's effort is relevant to the propriety of its decision to pursue termination in the first place. The following principles are applicable to this aspect of Father's position.

Before filing a petition for termination of parental rights, the Commonwealth is required to make reasonable efforts to promote reunification of parent and child. However, the Commonwealth does not have an obligation to make such efforts indefinitely. The Commonwealth has an interest not only in family reunification but also in each child's right to a stable, safe, and healthy environment, and the two interests must both be considered. A parent's basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his or her child is converted, upon the parent's failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child's right tohave proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment. When reasonable efforts to reunite a foster child with his or her biological parents have failed, then the child welfare agency must work toward terminating parental rights and placing the child with adoptive parents. The process of reunification or adoption should be completed within eighteen (18) months. While this time frame may in some circumstances seem short, it is based on the policy that a child's life simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.

In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 507 (Pa.Super. 2006) (emphasis, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted).

In In re D.C.D., 91 A.3d 173 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal granted, ___ A.3d ___, 2014 WL 2503618 (Pa. 2014), this Court found that an agency's utilization of reasonable efforts was a prerequisite to filing a petition to terminate parental rights. In that case, an orphans' court found that "the Agency has simply failed to assist Father," but it nevertheless terminated parental rights due to the father's parental incapacity. Id. at 177. Without addressing the father's parental incapacity, this Court concluded that reversal was warranted because the certified record supported the orphans' court's finding that the agency's pre-petition efforts were deficient. Id. at 174 ("the orphans' court erred as a matter of law by terminating Father's parental rights in spite of its finding that CYS failed to provide him with reasonable efforts to promote reunification prior to filing its termination petition"); see also id. at 182-183.

Instantly, however, any potential application of our holding in In re D.C.D. is dubious at best. Unlike the orphans' court in In re D.C.D., thetrial court in the present case did not find that DHS's efforts were deficient. Thus, In re D.C.D. is facially inapplicable. What is more, even if we force a strained application of our holding in In re D.C.D. to the facts of this case, the record will not sustain the conclusion that DHS's efforts were wanting.

Preliminarily, we observe that Father's contentions relating to DHS's efforts relate primarily to the level of the agency's interactions with Paternal Grandfather. As those arguments do not challenge DHS's efforts to promote Father's reunification with S.E.J., they are unpersuasive. Simply stated, despite Father's preoccupation with the...