In re S.R.F.

376 N.C. 647

853 S.E.2d 415

In the MATTER OF: S.R.F.

No. 214A20

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Filed February 5, 2021

Mary Ann J. Hollocker, for petitioner-appellee Transylvania County Department of Social Services.

Susan H. Boyles, Winston-Salem, for appellee Guardian ad Litem.

Robert W. Ewing, Clemmons, for respondent-appellant mother.

MORGAN, Justice.

¶ 1 Respondent-mother appeals from the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to "Sarah,"¹ a minor child born in September 2014. Although the trial court also terminated the parental rights of Sarah's father, he is not a party to this appeal. Because we conclude that the trial court properly adjudicated the existence of grounds to terminate respondent-mother's parental rights based on her neglect of Sarah, we affirm.

Factual Background and Procedural History

¶ 2 On 28 March 2018, Transylvania County Department of Social Services (DSS) obtained nonsecure custody of Sarah and filed a juvenile petition alleging that she was neglected and dependent. The trial court held an adjudicatory hearing on 30 May 2018 at which the parties stipulated to the following facts:

12. On or about October 17, 2017, [DSS] received a Child Protective Services report that [Sarah] had been exposed to a physical altercation between [respondent-mother] and a man named Casey.

13. [Sarah] was in the presence of the domestic violence incident when Casey hit, smacked, and choked [respondent-mother].

14. On or about October 18, 2017, [DSS] received a Child Protective Services report alleging [respondent-mother] was using meth and leaving [Sarah] with who[m]ever and drugs are being sold out of the home where the child lives.

15. ... Law enforcement went to the home and found methamphetamine. [Respondent-mother] was charged with Felony Possession [of] Methamphetamine. Charges are currently pending. [Sarah] was at the home during the raid.

16. On or about October 19, 2017, [respondent-mother] made [a] plan for [Sarah] to reside with her grandmother ... and then later changed the plan to her father, David .... David and [his wife] are unable to continue to provide care for [Sarah] at this time.

17. On or about October 21, 2017, [a DSS] Social Worker ... met with [respondent-mother] in Transylvania County jail and [respondent-mother] agreed to [a] safety assessment....

.... 22. [Respondent-mother] did not contact the social worker upon release from jail. [She] has not completed a substance abuse assessment. [She] has not complied with drug screen requests from the Department.

....

24. On or about March 5, 2018, [respondent-mother] was charged with Felony Breaking and/or Entering and Felony Larceny after Breaking/Entering for stealing items from her grandmother's home. Charges are currently pending.

25. [Respondent-mother] admitted to the social worker that drugs were sold out of the home where the juvenile was residing.

26. [Respondent-mother] admitted to the social worker that she has an addiction problem and was using methamphetamine.

....

29. ... [Respondent-mother] was incarcerated at the time of the petition.

30. [Sarah] has been exposed to an injurious environment while in her mother's care. The juvenile has been exposed to domestic violence and substance abuse.

31. [Respondent-mother's] substance abuse has impeded her ability to provide appropriate care and supervision of the juvenile.

Based on these stipulated facts, the trial court entered an order on 12 June 2018 adjudicating Sarah to be a neglected and dependent juvenile.

¶ 3 The trial court held a dispositional hearing on 13 June 2018 and subsequently entered a "Disposition Order" on 2 August 2018. As a result of the hearing and the order, the trial court granted custody and placement authority over Sarah to DSS and specifically sanctioned Sarah's transfer from kinship care into a foster placement recommended by DSS. The trial court provided one hour of supervised visitation per week with Sarah to respondent-mother and ordered respondent-mother to contact DSS in order to establish a case plan and to "follow any and all parts" thereof. Respondent-mother signed her DSS case plan on 14 June 2018.

¶ 4 After a permanency planning hearing on 14 November 2018, the trial court established a primary permanent plan for Sarah of reunification, with a secondary plan of adoption and termination of parental rights. However, the trial court discontinued respondent-mother's visitation with Sarah due to respondent-mother's repeated failure to attend scheduled visits and the resulting distress caused to Sarah. The trial court offered the prospect of future visitation if respondent-mother would "reengage."

¶ 5 Following a hearing on 15 May 2019, the trial court changed Sarah's primary permanent plan to termination of parental rights and adoption. The trial court found that respondent-mother was incarcerated and had not "made any attempts to work on her [case] plan" since the previous hearing.

¶ 6 DSS filed a motion to terminate the parental rights of both respondents to Sarah on 15 July 2019. After a series of continuances, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to terminate parental rights on 15 January 2020 and entered an order terminating respondents’ parental rights on 12 February 2020.

¶ 7 The trial court adjudicated the existence of two statutory grounds for terminating respondent-mother's parental rights: (1) respondent-mother's neglect of Sarah under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (2019), and (2) respondent-mother's willful failure to make reasonable progress to correct the conditions leading to Sarah's removal from the home in March 2018 under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) (2019). The trial court then considered the dispositional factors in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019) and concluded that it was in Sarah's best interests to terminate respondent-mother's parental rights. Respondent-mother gave timely notice of appeal from the termination of parental rights order.

¶ 8 In her appeal to this Court, respondent-mother challenges both of the grounds for termination of her parental rights which were adjudicated by the trial court.² She contends the court's adjudications are unsupported by its findings of fact and based on findings not supported by the evidence. Respondent-mother does not separately contest the trial court's determination of Sarah's best interests at the dispositional stage of the proceeding under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). We thus limit our review to the court's adjudicatory findings and conclusions.

Adjudication

¶ 9 Under this Court's well-established standard of review,

[w]e review a district court's adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) to determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law. Unchallenged findings of fact are deemed supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal. Moreover, we review only those findings needed to sustain the trial court's adjudication.

The issue of whether a trial court's findings of fact support its conclusions of law is reviewed de novo. However, an adjudication of any single ground for terminating a parent's rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) will suffice to support a termination order. Therefore, if this Court upholds the trial court's order in which it concludes that a particular ground for termination exists, then we need not review any remaining grounds.

In re J.S. , 374 N.C. 811, 814–15, 845 S.E.2d 66, 70–71 (2020) (extraneity omitted).

¶ 10 In the instant case, the trial court adjudicated grounds to terminate respondent-mother's parental rights for neglecting Sarah under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). A juvenile is deemed "neglected" if the child is denied "proper care, supervision, or discipline" by the child's parent or caretaker, if the juvenile "lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile's welfare[,]" or if the juvenile "has been abandoned[.]" N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15) (2019).

¶ 11 When termination of parental rights is based on neglect, "if the child has been separated from the parent for a long period of time, there must be a showing of ... a likelihood of future neglect by the parent." In re D.L.W. , 368 N.C. 835, 843, 788 S.E.2d 162, 167 (2016) (citing In re Ballard , 311 N.C. 708, 713–15, 319 S.E.2d 227, 231–32 (1984) )³ . "When determining whether such future neglect is likely, the district court must consider evidence of changed circumstances occurring between the period of past neglect and the time of the termination hearing." In re Z.V.A. , 373 N.C. 207, 212, 835 S.E.2d 425, 430 (2019) (citing Ballard , 311 N.C. at 715, 319 S.E.2d at 232 ).

¶ 12 Respondent-mother challenges several of the trial court's findings of fact on the basis that they are unsupported by the evidence introduced at the termination hearing. She first claims that the evidence does not support Finding of Fact 14(6), which states that the trial court's initial Disposition Order entered on 2 August 2018 required her and respondent-father to "[o]btain a domestic violence assessment and follow any recommended treatment[.]"

¶ 13 We agree with respondent-mother that the Disposition Order did not contain an express directive to address the issue of domestic violence, even though exposure to domestic violence in respondent-mother's home was one of the reasons for Sarah's adjudication as a neglected juvenile on 13 June 2018. However, in light of the uncontested portions of Findings of Fact 16 and 17, which state that respondent-mother signed a case plan with DSS on 14 June 2018 and that her DSS case plan required her "to engage in domestic violence treatment which she has failed to do," we conclude that the trial court's erroneous finding about the terms of the Disposition Order on this subject and respondent-mother's failure to comply in this area constitute harmless error. As respondent-mother does not contest Findings of Fact 16 and 17, they are binding on appeal. Koufman v. Koufman , 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991). Since the...