In re E.S.-R.

IN THE INTEREST OF: E.S.-R., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: E.S.-R., A MINOR

J-A01003-21

No. 1668 EDA 2020

SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

APRIL 12, 2021

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Dispositional Order Entered August 26, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-45-JV-0000082-2020

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.^*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:

E.S.-R., a minor ("the Juvenile"), appeals from the dispositional order entered on August 26, 2020, following a delinquency adjudication for the offense of terroristic threats.¹ The Juvenile challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his adjudication, as well as the admission of the victim's prior inconsistent statements into evidence. After careful review, we affirm.

The juvenile court summarized the relevant facts and history of this matter in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, as follows:

On July 24, 2020, at approximately 9:00 p.m., the Juvenile left his house after his stepfather, the named victim in this case, told him to stay home. The Juvenile's stepfather followed him down the street and the Juvenile attempted to run off. His stepfather was able to ascertain where the Juvenile had gone and waited until [he] made his way home. On the way home[,] the Juvenilenoticed his stepfather behind him and called the police. He told the police that he might go on a killing spree and that there was a pedophile following him.

As this episode was unfolding, Pennsylvania State Troopers[,] Zachary Andress and Scott Wysocky[,] responded to the call initiated by the Juvenile—a call which indicated that a teenage male, with a knife, was threatening to go on a killing spree. When the troopers arrived, the Juvenile was standing at the end of the driveway to his residence, next to the street, with his arms out and a knife in his right hand. The Juvenile's stepfather was standing on the opposite end of the driveway at the bottom of the porch steps. The troopers activated their tasers and gave the Juvenile several verbal commands to drop the knife. In response, the Juvenile pulled out his cell phone and began recording the troopers, hoping he would be able to show his friends a video of him getting tased. Ultimately, after several more commands, the Juvenile laid on the ground with his arms out to the side.

Once the Juvenile was disarmed and detained, he told the officers that his stepfather had been following him and tried to grab his backpack. In response, the Juvenile pulled out a knife and threatened his stepfather. The Juvenile also related to the troopers that he had punched his stepfather in the ribs and attempted to kick him in his groin area.

The Juvenile was arrested, detained, and charged with terroristic threats, a misdemeanor of the first degree; simple assault, a misdemeanor of the second degree; and harassment, a summary offense. On July 28, 2020, a detention hearing was held. The Juvenile's stepfather participated in and testified during the hearing. At the detention hearing, the stepfather testified that the Juvenile pulled a knife on him and struck him during the course of the incident. After the hearing, the Juvenile was returned to detention pending his adjudication hearing.

The adjudication hearing was scheduled for August 7, 2020. The day before the adjudication hearing, the Juvenile's stepfather told the district attorney's office that he did not want to testify because he was concerned that the Juvenile would be taken from his home and placed in detention.

The next day, the adjudication hearing was held, as scheduled. The Juvenile's stepfather and Trooper Wysocky testified.

When the stepfather was called to testify, he claimed that the Juvenile never pulled the knife out of his backpack and[,] while the Juvenile may have swung at him, the Juvenile ... did not actually hit him. The stepfather also stated that the Juvenile did not make any threats to physically harm him. The Commonwealth then asked the stepfather about his contradictory statements from the prior hearing. After admitting that he was afraid that his [step]son would get "locked away," he claimed that his previous statements were inaccurate because he was unable to hear or understand the questions that were asked during the detention hearing. At that point, the Commonwealth moved to incorporate the detention hearing testimony. Ultimately, over the Juvenile's objection, the detention hearing testimony was incorporated.

At the conclusion of the adjudication hearing, the undersigned, who also presided over the detention hearing, found that the Juvenile had committed terroristic threats. The remaining charges were dismissed. A broad summary of the reasons for the adjudication was given [on the record. See N.T. Hearing, 8/7/20,] at 30-33.

On August 26, 2020, we issued an order of disposition placing the Juvenile at a residential facility.

Juvenile Court Opinion ("JCO"), 10/30/20, at 1-3 (unnecessary capitalization and citations to the record omitted).

On August 27, 2020, the Juvenile filed a timely notice of appeal and subsequently complied with the court's directive to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. The juvenile court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on October 30, 2020. The Juvenile now presents the following questions for our review:

A. Whether the juvenile court erred by denying the Juvenile's motion for judgment of acquittal for terroristic threats pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.[] § 2706(a)(1)[,] where the Commonwealth failed to present evidence sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the Juvenile communicated a threat or possessed the requisite intent to terrorize[?]

B. Whether the juvenile court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion by considering testimony from a previous hearing as substantive evidence when there was no transcript for the prior hearing and the judge indicated that he does not have an eidetic memory[?]

Juvenile's Brief at 8 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

We begin by noting that, "[t]he Juvenile Act² grants juvenile courts broad discretion when determining an appropriate disposition.... We will disturb a juvenile court's disposition only upon a showing of a manifest abuse of discretion." In re C.A.G., 89 A.3d 704, 709 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted). Moreover, it is clear that "[i]n a juvenile proceeding, the hearing judge sits as the finder of fact." In re L.A., 853 A.2d 388, 391 (Pa. Super. 2004). "The weight to be assigned the testimony of the witnesses is within the exclusive province of the fact finder." Id.

When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence following an adjudication of delinquency, we must review the entire record and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.

In determining whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to meet its burden of proof, the test to be applied is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom, there is sufficient evidence to find every element of the crime charged. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by wholly circumstantial evidence.

In the Interest of J.G., 145 A.3d 1179, 1188 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations omitted).

In his first issue, the Juvenile challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his delinquency adjudication for terroristic threats. The Crimes Code provides, in relevant part, that "[a] person commits the crime of terroristic threats if the person communicates, either directly or indirectly, a threat to ... commit any crime of violence with intent to terrorize another[.]" 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(1). The result threatened by the speaker need not be specifically articulated if it "may be inferred from the nature of the statement and the context and circumstances surrounding the utterance of the statement." In re B.R., 732 A.2d 633, 636 (Pa. Super. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). With regard to the element of intent, "the harm sought to be prevented by the statute is the psychological distress that follows from an invasion of another's sense of personal security." Commonwealth v. Kline, 201 A.3d 1288, 1290 (Pa. Super. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). As such, "neither the ability to carry out the threat nor a belief by the person threatened that it will be carried out is an essential element of the crime." Id. (internal brackets omitted).

Instantly, the Juvenile claims that the Commonwealth failed to present evidence sufficient to establish that he had, beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) communicated, either directly or indirectly, a threat to commit any crime of violence; and/or (2) did so with the intent to terrorize another. Juvenile's Brief at 13. Regarding the first component of the crime, he asserts that the Commonwealth failed to present any evidence that he communicated a threat to his stepfather, either directly or indirectly. In support of this argument, hesolely points to self-serving, contradictory testimony, e.g., his stepfather's testimony at the adjudication hearing that the Juvenile never threatened him, and his victim impact statement, in which he stated: "I am not a victim[. The Juvenile] thought there was a pedophile." Id. at 14-15 (citing N.T. Hearing at 7, 10, 13-15). The Juvenile completely ignores his stepfather's detention hearing testimony, casting the evidence in a light most favorable to himself.

Although he phrases this portion of his argument as a sufficiency claim, it instead attacks the weight of the evidence. See Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 43 (Pa. Super. 2014) ("An argument regarding the credibility of a witness's testimony goes to the weight of the evidence, not the sufficiency of the evidence."); Commonwealth v. Trinidad, 96 A.3d 1031, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating that "variances in testimony go to the...