In re Singler

73 Cal.Rptr.3d 864

161 Cal.App.4th 281

In re Ronald SINGLER on Habeas Corpus.

No. C054634.

Court of Appeal, Third District.

March 26, 2008.

Michael Satris, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, Bolinas, for Petitioner.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Jennifer A. Neill, Heather M. Heckler and Andrew R. Woodrow, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.

SCOTLAND, P.J.

In September 1982, Ronald Singler murdered his wife with a shotgun during a heated domestic argument. He was convicted of second degree murder and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life in state prison.

In 2006, the Board of Parole Hearings (the Board) found that Singler was not suitable for parole. Members of the Board acknowledged that what Singler has "been doing while ... in prison is very impressive," i.e., his conduct as a prisoner has been "extremely positive" "both for self-enhancement and for the enhancement of other people's lives" in that Singler has benefited, as have others, from "all the things that [he has] done" while incarcerated. Nevertheless, because of the "terrible" manner in which he murdered his wife, (after arguing with her, he went into the garage, loaded a shotgun, and fatally shot her in the living room while their two young children were in the house) and then disposed of the body (by dumping it in a rural area), Board members concluded Singler had not persuaded them that he has demonstrated sufficient "insight" regarding what caused him to deal with his anger in such a violent way to convince them that, if released on parole, he would not react in a violent manner if future events cause him to become angry. In other words, the Board found that Singler would pose a danger to public safety if released on parole at that time.

On February 1, 2007, Singler's petition for writ of habeas corpus was summarily denied by this court. In concluding Singler did not make a prima facie showing for relief, we strictly construed the California Supreme Court's holding in In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 128 Cal. Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174 as compelling us to deny the petition. This was so, we believed, because the Supreme Court said in no uncertain terms that (1) the Board may deny parole to an inmate with an indeterminate prison term who has reached the minimum eligible parole release date if "it determines that public safety requires a lengthier period of incarceration," (2) in making this determination, the Board has great, indeed almost unlimited, discretion based on its "attempt to predict by subjective analysis whether the inmate will be able to live in society without committing additional antisocial acts" (id. at pp. 654, 655, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174), (3) judicial review of the denial of parole is "extremely deferential" to the Board's decision (id. at p. 665, 128 Cal. Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174), (4) a court does not independently assess the merits of the Board's analysis (ibid.), (5) a court engages only in "limited judicial review" (id. at pp. 626, 657, 658, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174) to determine whether the Board's decision was "based upon an individualized consideration of all relevant factors" (id. at p. 655, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174) and is "supported by some evidence" (id. at pp. 625, 658, 677, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174), such that the decision is not "arbitrary and capricious" (id. at pp. 626, 657, 677, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174), (6) "[o]nly a modicum of evidence is required" (id. at pp. 626, 677, 128 Cal. Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174) and "the weight to be given the evidence" is a matter within the Board's discretion (id. at p. 677, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174), (7) consequently, "[i]t is irrelevant that a court might determine that evidence in the record tending to establish suitability for parole far outweighs evidence demonstrating unsuitability for parole" (id. at p. 677, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174), (8) as long as the Board's decision "reflects due consideration" of all the factors bearing on parole suitability and is supported by some evidence, the decision must be upheld (id. at p. 677, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174), (9) the manner in which the crime was committed is one of the factors bearing on parole suitability (id. at p. 653, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174), (10) the "nature of the [inmate's] offense, alone, can constitute a sufficient basis for denying parole" if "certain circumstances" of the offense "involve particularly egregious acts beyond the minimum necessary to sustain a conviction" (id. at pp. 682, 683, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174), (11) although the fact that the inmate's "emotional stress and motivation for the crime" might be viewed as reducing his or her culpability, "the importance attached to this circumstance is left to the judgment of the [Board]" (id. at p. 679, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174), (12) accordingly, judicial review "strictly is limited to whether some evidence supports the [Board's] assessment of the circumstances of [the] crime— not whether the weight of the evidence conflicts with that assessment or demonstrates that [the inmate] committed the offense because of extreme stress" (id. at p. 679, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174).

Our review of the record and application of legal principles that were articulated by the California Supreme Court prior to our initial review of Singler's petition for writ of habeas corpus led us to conclude the Board undertook an individualized assessment of all the factors bearing upon suitability for parole and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in finding that, despite his conduct while incarcerated, his crime involved egregious acts beyond the minimum acts necessary to support his conviction and demonstrated he remained a danger to the public (the Board viewed the crime as a calculated shooting in the living room of the couple's home while their young children were present in the house, followed by a callous disposal of the body). Hence, we summarily denied the petition on the merits.

The California Supreme Court granted Singler's petition for review and transferred the matter to this court, with directions to vacate our denial of the petition and to order the Board to show cause why it "did not abuse its discretion and violate due process in finding petitioner unsuitable for parole in June 2006, and why petitioner remains a danger to public safety. (See, Pen.Code, § 3041; In re Rosenkrantz[, supra,] 29 Cal.4th [at p.] 683[, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174]; In re Elkins (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 475, 496-498; In re Lee (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1408; In re Scott (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 573, 594-595.)" (Order granting petn. review, Apr. 25, 2007.) This court issued the order to show cause, as directed, and the Board has filed its return.

The Supreme Court's order—signed by the author of In re Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th 616, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174 and five other members of the court (only Justice Baxter did not endorse the order)—indicates to us the Supreme Court has endorsed subsequent Court of Appeal decisions that give courts greater leeway in reviewing the Board's determination that an inmate remains a danger to public safety.

No longer giving the Board the deference to which we thought it was entitled (In re Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 655, 665, 677, 679, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174), we must now conclude that its decision finding Singler unsuitable for parole is not supported by the evidence presented at the time of the hearing.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On the night of September 3, 1982, during an argument with his wife, Gayle, Singler got a shotgun from the garage, loaded it, and fatally shot Gayle in the living room while their children were asleep in the house.¹ According to Debbie G., who was Gayle's friend and a neighbor, Singler and Gayle had been having marital difficulties for months, Singler had been mentally and physically abusive, and he had previously threatened Gayle with a shotgun. The two women planned to leave their husbands and live together.

According to Singler's statement in the probation report prepared for the sentencing hearing, the couple had been having marital difficulties due to Gayle's compulsive spending and her unusual attachment to Debbie G. On the night of the murder, Gayle and Debbie G. returned from Sacramento about 9:00 p.m. An argument ensued, and Gayle told Singler about a recent sexual affair and her plans to divorce him, take the children, and leave Singler destitute. All of the emotions and anxieties that had been building "just went to a point of no control," and he shot Gayle. When their daughter awakened upon hearing the gunshot, Singler told her he had shot a skunk. Singler then drove the children to a friend's house, returned home for Gayle's body, and dumped it in a rural area.

On the night of the murder, Debbie G. attempted to telephone Gayle, who did not answer the call. Debbie G. later saw Singler's truck backed up against the front steps of the residence. When she telephoned again, Singler answered the phone but would not let her speak to Gayle, stating they had worked everything out and she was asleep and could not be awakened. When Debbie G. went to the house, Singler's truck was gone, the children were missing, and the front porch appeared wet. Debbie G. returned home and telephoned the police.

The responding officers found bloodstain on the deck and in the house. While they were examining the residence, Singler arrived and explained that his wife was spending a week in Lake Tahoe. He stated he had left the children with friends because his wife and he had been arguing. After being informed of his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694), Singler initially denied any wrongdoing...