In re Smith

643 B.R. 363

IN RE: Bobby Lee SMITH, Debtor.

Case No. 22-10494-JDL

United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Oklahoma.

Signed July 28, 2022

Elaine M. Dowling, Oklahoma City, OK, for Debtor.

Susan J. Manchester, Susan Manchester Law, Oklahoma City, OK, Trustee, Pro Se.

ORDER ON CLAIM OF EXEMPTION

Janice D. Loyd, United States Bankruptcy Judge

" ‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.’ ‘[T]he question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so many different things.’ Lewis Carroll's "Through the Looking Glass"

Here, the word in question is "motor vehicle," but, unlike Humpty Dumpty, neither a litigant nor a court may manufacture words to mean what it chooses them to mean. In a case of first impression, not only in this Court but apparently in any jurisdiction in the United States, the Debtor claims that his golf cart, his only method of transportation, is exempt from being property of the bankruptcy estate by virtue of being a "motor vehicle" under the Oklahoma exemption statute. The bankruptcy Trustee takes issue with the Debtor's claim, arguing that definitions within the Oklahoma Motor Vehicle statutes determine the issue. For consideration by the Court are the following:

1. Objection to Debtor's Claimed Exemptions [Doc. 16]; and

2. Debtor's Response to Trustee's Objection to Claimed Exemptions [Doc. 20].

Pursuant to Rules 7052 and 9014 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

Facts

On July 20, 2022, the Court held an evidentiary hearing on the issues framed by the two above pleadings. The Debtor's bankruptcy Schedule C, Property Claimed as Exempt, listed a 2005 Yamaha golf cart with a current value of $2,000 as exempt as a "motor vehicle" under 31 OS § 1(A)(13). The Debtor testified that he believed that the golf cart had a value of approximately $2,400; that it was powered by a gas engine; that he filed for bankruptcy because he was unemployed, his roofing business had failed and that he had gone through a divorce. He testified that the golf cart was his only means of transportation for shopping or to take himself and his two children to dine out. He testified that the golf cart was his only reliable means of transportation which he owned. From time to time, for more lengthy travel needs required for chores or part-time work, he borrowed his father's pickup when it was available. He testified that there was an automobile at his property; however, it was owned by his daughter (and titled and registered in her name) and had a broken transmission. He testified that the golf cart was not licensed nor registered with the Oklahoma Tax Commission Department of Motor Vehicles. He further testified that he did not drive the golf cart on the public streets (other than to perhaps cross them) but drove it on the sidewalks.¹ He does not golf.

Discussion

When determining the validity of a claimed state law exemption, bankruptcy courts look to the applicable state law. Lampe v. Williamson (In re Lampe) , 331 F.3d 750, 754 (10th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted); In re Hodes , 402 F.3d 1005, 1009 (10th Cir. 2005). Because Oklahoma has opted out of the federal bankruptcy exemption scheme, the Debtor may only claim exemptions available under Oklahoma law. In re Kretzinger , 103 F.3d 943, 945 (10th Cir. 1996) ; In re Gibson , 433 B.R. 868, 870 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2010) ; In re Crisp , 215 B.R. 476 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1997) ; see 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) ; 31 O.S. § 1.B. In the present case, the exemption claimed is the following under 31 OS § 1 (A)(13) :

A. Except as otherwise provided in this title and notwithstanding subsection B of this section, the following property shall be reserved to every person residing in the state, exempt from attachment or execution and every other species of forced sale for the payment of debts, except as herein provided:

* * * *

13. Such person's interest, not to exceed Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($7,500.00) in value, in one motor vehicle;

The Debtor claims his golf cart as exempt by virtue of being classified as a "motor vehicle" under the foregoing statute.

An exemption is presumed to be valid, and the objecting party, here the Trustee, bears the initial burden of producing evidence to rebut the presumption and establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the exemption was not properly claimed. In re Grant, 2016 WL 455416, *3 (10th Cir. BAP 2016) ; In re Hall , 441 B.R. 680, 685 (10th Cir. BAP 2009) ; See Fed.R.Bankr.P. 4003 ; See also In re Simpson, 206 B.R. 230, 232 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1997).

As always, the starting point in any case of statutory construction is to look at the language of the statute itself. In re Overland Park Financial Corp. , 236 F.3d 1246, 1251 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Chickasaw Nation v. United States , 208 F.3d 871, 876 (10th Cir. 2000). However, where adherence is urged to the "strict letter" of the statute and a literal interpretation would lead to an inconsistency or incongruity between different parts of the statute and would produce consequences clearly beyond legislative contemplation, judicial interpretation becomes necessary to avoid such incongruity and to ascertain the true meaning of the particular words in accord with the legislative intent. McNeill v. City of Tulsa , 953 P.2d 329 (Okla. 1998) ; State ex rel. Rucker v. Tapp, 380 P.2d 260 (Okla. 1963).

To determine the common, ordinary meaning of the undefined terms using contracts, statutes, and other legal documents, "we typically look first to their dictionary definitions and then consider the term's usage in other statutes, court decisions, and similar authorities." Texas State Board of Examiners of Marriage & Family Therapists v. Texas Medical Association , 511 S.W.3d 28, 35 (Tex. 2017). Dictionaries generally define the term "golf cart" to refer to a motorized cart designed to transport golfers around a golf course.² That definition is of little help in the present case. The fact that the cart was "designed" for use on a golf course is of little benefit because while it might have been designed for a specific purpose it is obviously, as here, capable of transporting people and property for many other purposes other than on a golf course. On the other hand, if one parses the term "motor vehicle" by dictionary definitions the "golf cart" may fit into that definition. For example, the Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 11th ed. defines "motor vehicle" as "an automotive vehicle not operated on rails," an "automobile" as "a four-wheeled automotive vehicle designed for passenger transportation," and "vehicle" as "a means of carrying or transporting something: (a) motor vehicle (b) a piece of mechanized equipment." Those definitions, along with the use of the golf cart in the present case, appear to bring the Debtor's golf cart within the definition of a "motor vehicle." But again, the definition of words in isolation, however helpful, is not necessarily controlling in statutory construction. Dolan v. U.S. Postal Service, 546 U.S. 481, 486, 126 S.Ct. 1252, 163 L.Ed.2d 1079 (2006). The "interpretation of a word or phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory text, considering the purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or authorities that inform the analysis." Id.

The Court begins with the premise, true under state and federal law, that to affect their humanitarian purposes exemption laws must be liberally construed in favor of the claimant of an exemption. Lampe v. Williamson (In re Lampe) , 331 F.3d 750, 754 (10th Cir. 2003) ; Carbaugh v. Carbaugh (In re Carbaugh) , 278 B.R. 512, 522 (10th Cir. BAP 2002). The Court is mindful of the purpose of all exemption statutes as set forth by the Oklahoma Supreme Court:

The purposes of the exemption statute are to prevent improvident debtors from becoming subjects of charity by preserving to them sufficient definitely classified property that they maintain a home for themselves, and to prevent inconsiderate creditors from depriving them of the necessities of life. It is the duty of the court to so apply these exemption statutes to accomplish these purposes.

In re Sims , 241 B.R. 467, 471 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1999) (quoting Security Building & Loan Ass'n v. Ward , 1935 OK 996, 174 Okla. 238, 50 P.2d 651, 657 (1935) ). The Court believes that its decision today is consistent with the oft-cited maxim that the Oklahoma exemption laws are to be liberally construed in favor of the exemption. See, e.g., In re Siegmann, 1988 OK 59, 757 P.2d 820 (1988) ; Nelson v. Fightmaster , 1896 OK 26, 4 Okla. 38, 44 P. 213, 214 (1896) ; Phelan v. Lacey , 51 Okla. 393, 394, 151 P. 1070, 1071 (1915) ; In re Fisher , 11 B.R. 666, 668 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981) ; See, 25 O.S. § 29 ("The rule of the common law, that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly construed, has no application to the laws of this state, which are to be liberally construed with a view to effect their objects and to promote justice."). The purposes of the exemption statutes strengthen the conclusion that a golf cart used as testified to by the Debtor is a "motor vehicle" within the purview of 31 O.S. § 1(A)(13).

The Trustee relies upon various definitions of "motor vehicle" or "vehicle" under provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code, Title 47 Okla. Stat., the Oklahoma Vehicle License and Registration Act, 47 O.S. § 1101 et seq. , and the Motor Vehicle Dealers, Salespersons, Distributors, and Manufacturers Etc. Act, 47 O.S. § 561 et seq. The Court has to define "motor vehicle" within the statutory context and purposes under Title 47 just as it has to define it within the statutory context and purpose of the Title 31 exemption statutes. The term "motor vehicle" within much of Title 47 must be viewed as part of the regulatory scheme for motor vehicles which is essential to ensure traffic safety on the public roadways...