In re Spangler

547 P.3d 516

In the MATTER OF the Wrongful Conviction of William P. SPANGLER.

No. 126,062

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Opinion Filed April 26, 2024.

Syllabus by the Court

1. K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1)(D), part of a statutory provision allowing persons wrongfully convicted and imprisoned to bring a civil action, prohibits compensation when the claimant’s own conduct causes or brings about the conviction.

2. A defendant convicted of a lesser included offense after a second trial based on the same criminal conduct underlying the alleged wrongful conviction has engaged in illegal conduct that precludes the claimant’s recovery under K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-5004.

Appeal from Shawnee District Court; Teresa L. Watson, judge. Submitted without oral argument.

Larry G. Michel, of Kennedy Berkley, of Salina, was on the brief for appellant.

Kurtis K. Wiard, assistant solicitor general, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Luckert, C.J.:

William P. Spangler brought a civil proceeding for wrongful conviction and imprisonment after he was convicted of a lesser charge on a retrial for his role in the shooting death of Faustino Martinez. He was sentenced to time served, having already served about four and a half years longer in prison than the term of his new sentence for involuntary manslaughter. Spangler seeks compensation for those four plus years of imprisonment.

The district court held that Spangler’s own conduct caused or brought about his conviction and thus any recovery was precluded by K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1), which requires that "[t]he claimant shall establish the following by a preponderance of evidence: … (D) the claimant did not commit or suborn perjury, fabricate evidence, or by the claimant’s own conduct cause or bring about the conviction." We affirm.

Facts and Procedural Background

A jury convicted Spangler of second-degree murder for his actions in causing Martinez’ death, and the district court sentenced him to a term of 186 months and remanded him to prison. The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. See State v. Spangler, No. 112, 270, 2015 WL 3632523, at *1-2 (Kan. App. 2015) (unpublished opinion).

Later, Spangler filed a motion for relief under K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-1507, arguing he received constitutionally deficient assistance of counsel. The district court agreed, finding that Spangler’s trial counsel failed to investigate Spangler’s mental health status and its effect on his state of mind when he shot Martinez. The district court concluded that failure prejudiced Spangler, and it ordered a new trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed. See Spangler v. State, No. 120,137, 2020 WL 1222954 (Kan. App. 2020) (unpublished opinion).

The State retried Spangler in 2022. The jury on retrial convicted Spangler again, but this time of involuntary manslaughter rather than second-degree murder. At sentencing, he was released based on time served. Spangler had served about four-and-a-half years beyond the sentence imposed for his involuntary manslaughter conviction.

Spangler later filed a civil action under K.S.A 2023 Supp. 60-5004, seeking compensation for the time he spent in prison beyond his involuntary manslaughter sentence. The State moved to dismiss Spangler’s case, arguing Spangler could not meet the conditions for recovery under the statute. It cited the condition in K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1)(D), requiring a claimant to prove the claimant’s conduct did not cause or bring about the conviction. The State argued Spangler undisputedly shot Martinez, meaning he engaged in the underlying conduct that led to his second-degree murder conviction. To support its statements about the basic facts of the incident, the State attached to its motion to dismiss various documents filed in Spangler’s criminal case and his K.S.A. 60-1507 action. In response, Spangler wrote: "For purposes of the Motion to Dismiss, William [Spangler] does not dispute the Statement of Facts contained in the State’s brief."

The district court conducted a hearing on the motion during which the court asked the parties whether the State’s use of the various court filings to support its argument converted the State’s motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment. The State filed a supplemental brief to address the question and argued that "[w]hen matters outside the pleadings are proper objects for judicial notice, a motion to dismiss need not be treated as a summary judgment motion. Rodina v. Castaneda, 60 Kan. App. 2d 384, 386, 494 P.3d 172 (2021), review denied (Dec. 6, 2021)." It added that the Rodina decision had recognized that "[a] trial court may take judicial notice of specific facts ‘capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to easily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy.’ Id (quoting K.S.A. 60-409(b))."

The district court issued a memorandum decision, citing the standard set out in K.S.A. 60-212(b)(6) for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In the Statement of Facts section of the decision the court wrote:

"Because this matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss, the Court considers the facts as stated in Spangler’s petition along with some additional facts which, for purposes of the instant motion, are acknowledged as true by both parties.

"Spangler had a verbal confrontation with Faustino Martinez outside Spangler’s apartment building. Spangler went to his apartment and got his loaded AR-15 rifle. Spangler came out of his apartment and encountered Martinez. Spangler tried to scare Martinez with his rifle. When that didn’t work, Spangler ‘fired a warning shot.’ When that didn’t work, Spangler fired off another shot, stating that he was ‘aiming for [Martinez’] leg.’ Spangler missed Martinez’s leg and hit Martinez in the abdomen. Spangler fled the scene. Martinez died from the shooting."

The court then discussed the meaning of K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1)(D)’s requirement that Spangler prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not cause or bring about the conviction. It concluded that "Spangler’s behavior in retrieving a loaded semi-automatic rifle from inside his apartment, leaving the apartment, encountering Martinez, brandishing the weapon, firing a warning shot,’ and then purposely shooting Martinez, clearly constitutes Spangler’s own conduct that caused or brought about the conviction for second-degree murder." This meant that "[o]n the agreed facts here, Spangler cannot prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not, by his own conduct, cause or bring about the conviction."

Spangler timely appealed directly to this court as permitted by K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-5004(l): "The decision of the district court may be appealed directly to the supreme court pursuant to the code of civil procedure."

Analysis

A claimant seeking damages under K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1)(D) must establish by a preponderance of evidence that the claimant’s own conduct did not "cause or bring about the conviction." Spangler argues the district court improperly divorced the phrase "cause or bring about his conviction" from its statutory context of subparagraph (D) ("[T]he claimant did not commit or suborn perjury, fabricate evidence, or by the claimant’s own conduct cause or bring about the conviction."). Spangler reads the phrase "cause or bring about the conviction" as pertaining to conduct similar in character to that immediately preceding it in the statute, namely committing or suborning perjury or fabricating evidence.

We disagree. We read the phrase to reflect the Legislature’s intent to impose a commonsense limitation: Only someone innocent of the criminal conduct supporting the underlying conviction may pursue a claim for damages under K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1)(D). Based on this interpretation, a claimant like Spangler who stands convicted of a lesser included offense based on the same charge as a previous conviction is not eligible to seek relief under K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-5004.

Standard of Review

We consider this issue after the district court granted the State’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. We note that the procedural question asked by the district court about whether the State’s motion should be treated as a summary judgment motion has not been presented to us on appeal. Both parties recite the motion to dismiss standard as the standard we should apply, and they do not disagree with the district court’s reliance on undisputed facts gleaned through judicial notice. We thus proceed using that procedural posture to frame our standard of review without addressing the procedural question the district court posed to the parties.

[1–3] The appellate standard of review builds on the district court’s standard for considering a motion to dismiss, so we begin there. A district court deciding a motion to dismiss considers the well-pleaded factual allegations, resolving factual disputes in the plaintiff’s favor, to determine "whether the petition states any valid claim for relief." Williams v. C-U-Out Bail Bonds, 310 Kan. 775, 784, 450 P.3d 330 (2019). Appellate courts reviewing the district court’s decision also assume well-pleaded facts to be true and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. 310 Kan. at 784, 450 P.3d 330. Whether the district court erred in granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is a question of law subject to unlimited review. In re M.M., 312 Kan. 872, 873, 482 P.3d 583 (2021).

[4] Another consideration frames our review. The district court’s ruling rested on its interpretation of K.S.A 2023 Supp. 60-5004. This also presents an issue of statutory interpretation subject to unlimited review. See In re M.M., 312 Kan. at 873-84, 482 P.3d 583.

Discussion

[5, 6] We apply a well-established rubric to our de novo statutory interpretation of K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-5004. The touchstone of statutory interpretation is that ...