In re Sterman

306 A.3d 79

IN RE ESTATE OF Allen T. STERMAN; Paul A. Sterman, Appellant.

Nos. 21-PR-0658, 22-PR-0574 & 22-PR-0974

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Submitted September 19, 2023

Decided December 21, 2023

Appeals from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (2021-ADM-000029), (Hon. Maurice A. Ross and Hon. Carmen G. McLean, Trial Judges)

Paul A. Sterman, pro se.

Elizabeth Richardson, Washington, pro se appellee.

Before Easterly and McLeese, Associate Judges, and Ruiz, Senior Judge.

McLeese, Associate Judge:

Appellant Paul A. Sterman challenges the denial of several motions seeking the removal of his sister, appellee Elizabeth Richardson, as the personal representative of their father’s estate. Mr. Sterman also challenges several other rulings of the trial court with respect to the administration of the estate. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Certain basic facts appear to be largely undisputed. Mr. Sterman’s father executed a will leaving sixty percent of his estate to Mr. Sterman and forty percent of his estate to Ms. Richardson. The sixty percent left to Mr. Sterman was to be put in trust for Mr. Sterman’s welfare. Ms. Richardson has been determined to be the trustee of that trust, so although Mr. Sterman sometimes refers to himself as "trustee," he is actually a beneficiary of the trust. The principal asset of the estate is a house valued at over $1.3 million.

Ms. Richardson is the personal representative of the estate. Mr. Sterman has filed numerous motions seeking to have Ms. Richardson removed as personal representative. In his motions, Mr. Sterman argued that Ms. Richardson violated her duties as personal representative in numerous respects. The trial court denied Mr. Sterman’s motions in three orders that are at issue in these consolidated appeals.

A. The July 2021 Order

Mr. Sterman first sought removal of Ms. Richardson as personal representative in July 2021, arguing among other things that Ms. Richardson mismanaged the property, failed to pay property taxes on the house, failed to serve a notice of appointment upon Mr. Sterman, and failed to file an accurate accounting of the estate as required under D.C. Code § 20-711 (directing personal representative to file, within three months of appointment, "a verified inventory of property owned by the decedent at the time of his death").

Ms. Richardson denied that her filings and notices were late or inaccurate. She contended that her failure to pay one tax bill timely occurred because Mr. Sterman had gone through her mail and prevented her from obtaining notice of the taxes owed.

After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, concluding that there were some "technical problems" with Ms. Richardson’s administration but that those problems did not amount to grounds for removal. See D.C. Code § 20-526(a) (listing several factors providing cause for removal of personal representative, including willfully disregarding court order, mismanaging estate property, and unreasonably failing to perform material duty of office). The trial court did convert the estate from an unsupervised estate to a supervised estate.

B. The July 2022 Order

In the following months, Mr. Sterman submitted several filings again seeking removal of Ms. Richardson. During this time, Ms. Richardson indicated her intention to sell the house making up the bulk of the estate. Mr. Sterman argued among many other things that Ms. Richardson was mismanaging the property; that Ms. Richardson should sell the house to him; and that Ms. Richardson’s verified inventory was untimely, incomplete, and incorrectly served.

Ms. Richardson denied mismanaging the property, claiming that instead she had paid out of her pocket to prepare the house for sale. Ms. Richardson also denied that the inventory was untimely or incomplete.

After a hearing, the trial court again declined to remove Ms. Richardson as personal representative. Specifically, the trial court concluded that Ms. Richardson’s filings were timely and that "Mr. Sterman seems to muddle what Ms. Richardson is required to do as personal representative with what Mr. Sterman would like her to [do]." The trial court also credited Ms. Richardson’s testimony regarding the inventory, concluding that "any omission by Ms. Richardson regarding the inventory was based on a misunderstanding." The trial court did direct Ms. Richardson to file an amended inventory.

The trial court also authorized Ms. Richardson to sell the house but gave Mr. Sterman a right of first refusal to buy the house, if he exercised that right within twenty-four hours of receiving notice of an offer, by "submit[ting] an offer that is equal to the highest offer in terms of monetary amount and conditions."

C. The December 2022 Order

Mr. Sterman subsequently renewed his request that Ms. Richardson be removed. He reiterated prior objections and also argued that a proper inventory had still not been filed; that property taxes and estate taxes had not been paid; and that Ms. Richardson had not given Mr. Sterman a fair opportunity to purchase the property.

Ms. Richardson contended that Mr. Sterman failed to submit a timely matching offer for the property. Ms. Richardson stated that she had been unable to pay taxes because the estate had no cash and she had been unable to sell the house because of Mr. Sterman’s litigation. At the time of the hearing, the house was under contract with a third party for over $1.3 million. Ms. Richardson represents that that contract subsequently fell through.

The trial court denied the request to remove Ms. Richardson, without addressing that request on the merits. Rather, the trial court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to rule on Mr. Sterman’s renewed request to remove Ms. Richardson, because Mr. Sterman had pending appeals challenging the July 2021 and July 2022 orders declining to remove Ms. Richardson. The trial court authorized Ms. Richardson to sell the property and removed Mr. Sterman’s right of first refusal.

II. Analysis

A. This Court Has Jurisdiction to Review the Trial Court’s Decisions Declining to Remove Ms. Richardson

[1] We first address whether the decision not to remove a personal representative is a final, appealable order. Although neither party raised that issue in this court, we are obliged to consider our jurisdiction sua sponte. See, e.g., Mathis v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 124 A.3d 1089, 1101 n.21 (D.C. 2015) ("Where a substantial question exists as to this court’s subject matter jurisdiction, it is our obligation to raise it, sua sponte, even though, as here, no party has asked us to consider it.") (internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude that we have jurisdiction over these appeals.

[2] Generally, an order is final for purposes of appeal when the order "resolves the case on its merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Nash-Flegler, 272 A.3d 1171, 1177 (D.C. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). Orders declining to remove a personal representative are not final in that sense. Nevertheless, in a decision that is binding on this court, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that an order declining to remove a personal representative is appealable under the collateral-order doctrine. Collins v. Miller, 198 F.2d 948, 950-51 (D.C. Cir. 1952) ("On final distribution of the estate it will be too late effectively to review the order, and the rights conferred by the Code to prompt and proper administration of the estate will be lost, probably irreparably."); see M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C. 1971) (D.C. Circuit decisions before February 1, 1971, are binding on divisions of the D.C. Court of Appeals); Taylor v. First Am. Title Co., 477 A.2d 227, 230 (D.C. 1984) (relying on M.A.P., treating prior decision of D.C. Circuit holding that order was appealable under collateral-order doctrine as binding authority on division of court).

B. Mr. Sterman Has Standing to Seek Ms. Richardson’s Removal

[3] Ms. Richardson argues that Mr. Sterman does not have standing to seek her removal because he is not an "interested person." D.C. Code § 20-107(a) allows "[a]n interested person" or "the beneficiary of a trust" to "petition the Court for an order … to resolve a question or controversy arising in the course of a supervised or unsupervised administration of a decedent’s estate." We need not decide whether Mr. Sterman is an "interested person." Rather, it suffices under § 20-107(a) that Mr. Sterman is "the beneficiary of a trust" created by the will at issue. Mr. Sterman therefore has standing to seek Ms. Richardson’s removal as personal representative.

C. The Trial Court’s July 2021 and July 2022 Orders Declining to Remove Ms. Richardson

A personal representative must be removed upon a determination by the court that the personal representative:

(1) misrepresented material facts in the proceedings leading to the appointment; (2) willfully disregarded an order of the Court; (3) is unable, for any reason, to discharge the duties and powers effectively; (4) has mismanaged property; or (5) has failed, without reasonable excuse, to perform any material duty of such office; provided, that the Court may continue the personal representative in office following a finding in accordance with paragraph (5) if the Court finds that such continuance would be in the best interests of the estate and would not adversely affect the rights of interested persons or creditors.

D.C. Code § 20-526(a).

[4] In its July 2021 and July 2022 orders, the trial court concluded that Mr. Sterman did not establish statutory grounds for removing Ms. Richardson. When reviewing a trial court’s determination regarding whether statutory cause for removal of a personal representative exists, we decide independently whether the trial court committed errors of law, and we uphold the trial court’s factual...