In re T.K.

IN RE: T.K.

No. 60-21

Court of Appeals of Maryland

July 28, 2022

Circuit Court for Howard County Case No. C-13-JV-20-000175

Fader C.J., Watts, Hotten, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, JJ.

Fader C.J. Hotten, J., dissents.

OPINION

Parents have a fundamental right to rear their children without unwarranted interference by the State. That right "occupies a unique place in our legal culture, given the centrality of family life as the focus for personal meaning and responsibility." In re Adoption/Guardianship No 10941, 335 Md. 99, 113 (1994) (quoting Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 38 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). That interest, however, is not absolute, and must be balanced against society's obligation to protect the welfare of children. See In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 568-69 (2003).

The General Assembly has adopted a statutory scheme to balance the fundamental right of parents to raise their children with the State's obligation and prerogative to protect a child who requires court intervention for protection. Md. Code Ann., Cts. &Jud. Proc. §§ 3-801 - 3-830 (2020 Repl.; 2022 Supp.). Under that statutory scheme, a child is in need of assistance if the child requires court intervention because, as relevant here, (1) the child has been abused or neglected and (2) the child's parents, guardian, or custodian are unable or unwilling to properly care for the child. Id. § 3-801(f)(1), (2). Unless both of those prongs are proven by a preponderance of the evidence, id. § 3-817(c), court intervention is unavailable and a court ordinarily must dismiss the child in need of assistance ("CINA") case without further involvement.

The General Assembly, however, has authorized a limited but important exception to that general rule when (1) the allegations of a CINA petition are proven against only one of the child's parents, and (2) another parent is able and willing to provide care for the child's needs. Id. § 3-819(e). In that circumstance, ongoing court intervention is still unavailable, but the juvenile court, before dismissing the case, is authorized to "award custody to the other parent." Id. Section 3-819(e) thus permits a juvenile court that is not otherwise able to intervene in a family's affairs to determine the most appropriate custody arrangement for the child as between the child's parents.

We have not previously had the opportunity to provide guidance concerning the mechanics of the application of § 3-819(e) to situations in which a local department of social services has limited knowledge about one of a child's parents until after a CINA adjudicatory hearing has concluded. We now take the opportunity to provide that guidance. Specifically, we are called upon to clarify: (1) when a juvenile court has the discretion to make an award of custody under § 3-819(e); (2) what standard applies to the exercise of that discretion; and (3) when a juvenile court must afford a parent who stands to lose custody as a result of an application of § 3-819(e) an opportunity to present evidence relevant to the court's exercise of authority under that provision. We hold that:

1. A juvenile court has discretion to award custody under § 3-819(e) only if the court, by a preponderance of the evidence: (a) sustains allegations in a CINA petition that are sufficient to support a CINA disposition against one, but only one, parent; and (b) finds that the other parent is able and willing to care for the child;

2. If those prerequisites are established, the best interest of the child is the standard that applies to the court's decision whether and, if so, how to exercise that discretion; and

3. A juvenile court must afford a parent who stands to lose custody as a result of an application of § 3-819(e) an opportunity to present evidence if, after consideration of the evidence already presented or stipulated at an adjudicatory hearing, there are factual disputes as to any consideration that is material to (a) whether the parent to whom the court is considering awarding custody is able and willing to provide proper care for the child, or (b) the juvenile court's determination of whether it is in the child's best interest to leave the current custody arrangement in place or to award custody (legal, physical, or both) to the parent against whom allegations were not sustained.

Here, the Circuit Court for Howard County, sitting as a juvenile court, made an award of custody under § 3-819(e) to a previously non-custodial father, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. However, the record before the juvenile court did not contain evidence that the father was able and willing to care for the child, nor was there a stipulation to that effect, and the mother was not afforded the opportunity to present evidence to inform the court's best interest analysis. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remand to that court with instructions to vacate the juvenile court's order and remand for further proceedings described below.

BACKGROUND

The CINA Statutory Scheme A child in need of assistance is a child who requires court intervention because:

(1) The child has been abused, has been neglected, has a developmental disability, or has a mental disorder;^[1] and

(2) The child's parents, guardian, or custodian are unable or unwilling to give proper care and attention to the child and the child's needs.

Cts &Jud. Proc. § 3-801(f)(1), (2). Notably, the definition contains two prongs separated by the conjunctive "and," requiring that both prongs be met before a child can be determined to be in need of assistance. See In re Samone H., 385 Md. 282, 316 n.13 (2005) (explaining that for a test conjunctive in nature, each element must be met for the test to be satisfied). Thus, although a finding of abuse or neglect can inform a court's decision concerning a parent's ability or willingness to give proper care, the two prongs are distinct, and both must be satisfied before a court can determine that a child is in need of assistance.

Upon receipt of a complaint of possible abuse or neglect, an investigating local department of social services may file a CINA petition if it determines that the court has jurisdiction^[2] and that doing so is in the child's best interest. Cts. &Jud. Proc. § 3-809(a). A CINA petition must "allege that [the] child is in need of assistance and shall set forth in clear and simple language the facts supporting that allegation." Id. § 3-811(a)(1).

A CINA case proceeds in two phases.^[3] First, the juvenile court holds an adjudicatory hearing "to determine whether the allegations in the [CINA] petition, other than the allegation that the child requires the court's intervention, are true." Id. § 3-801(c). The rules of evidence apply at an adjudicatory hearing, and the local department must prove its allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. § 3-817(b), (c).

Second, unless the CINA petition is dismissed, the court must "hold a separate disposition hearing . . . to determine whether the child is [in need of assistance]." Id. § 3-819(a)(1). At a disposition hearing, the juvenile court has the discretion to decline to require the strict application of the rules of evidence. In re M.H., 252 Md.App. 29, 43 (2021) (citing Md. Rule 11-115(b)); see also Md. Rule 5-101(c)(5).

If at a disposition hearing the juvenile court determines that the child is in need of assistance, it may take either of two actions: (1) "Not change the child's custody status;" or (2) "Commit the child on terms the court considers appropriate to the custody of" a parent, a relative or other individual, a local department of social services, or the Maryland Department of Health. Id. § 3-819(b)(1)(iii). On the other hand, if the juvenile court determines that the child is not in need of assistance, it must, "except as provided in subsection (e) of this section, dismiss the case." Id. § 3-819(b)(1)(i).

Subsection (e) of § 3-819, which is at the center of the present dispute, provides:

If the allegations in the petition are sustained against only one parent of a child, and there is another parent available who is able and willing to care for the child, the court may not find that the child is a child in need of assistance, but, before dismissing the case, the court may award custody to the other parent.

That subsection thus provides a juvenile court with express authority to make an award of custody as between the child's parents, if the statutory prerequisites are met, notwithstanding that the child (1) cannot be determined to be in need of assistance and (2) therefore cannot be subject to ongoing court intervention. If a juvenile court decides to exercise that authority, its custody order "[r]emains in effect" even "[a]fter the court terminates jurisdiction[]" Id. § 3-804(c)(1).

With that statutory background in mind, we turn to the facts of this case.

The Department's Involvement with the K. Family

This case concerns the custody of T.K., born in late 2015 or 2016.^[4] The other primary parties involved are T.K.'s mother, N.K. ("Mother"); father, T.R. ("Father"); and older sister, Ta.K. Ta.K. is not a party to this appeal, and her custody is not in dispute.^[5]

The Howard County Department of Social Services (the "Department") became involved with the K. family in May 2020 to assist Mother, T.K., and Ta.K. in obtaining stable housing. At the time, Father was living in Georgia and was not involved in T.K.'s care. In October 2020, the Department filed petitions seeking to have both children declared in need of assistance, which the Department later amended. The Department did not seek to place T.K. in shelter care. As a result, T.K. resided with Mother throughout the CINA proceedings.

Adjudication

An...