In re T.P.

IN RE: T.P., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: L.P., NATURAL MOTHER

J-S13043-15

No. 1794 WDA 2014

SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

APRIL 9, 2015

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Decree entered October 3, 2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Orphans' Court, at No: TPR 100 of 2014

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MUNDY, and STABILE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:

L.P. (Mother) appeals from the decree entered October 3, 2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, which involuntarily terminated Mother's parental rights to her minor daughter, T.P. (Child), born in July of 2009.¹ We affirm.

In June of 2012, the Allegheny County Department of Human Services, Office of Children, Youth and Families (CYF) received reports that Mother was not caring for Child properly, and that she was not addressing Child's medical needs. In addition, there were concerns with respect to Mother's mental health. Child was adjudicated dependent on February 15, 2013, and placed in the care of her great-aunt, M.H., and great-uncle, D.H. (collectively, the Foster Parents).

On June 5, 2014, CYF filed a petition to involuntarily terminate Mother's parental rights to Child. A termination hearing was held on October1, 2014, during which the orphans' court heard the testimony of CYF caseworker, David Reagan; Dr. Neil Rosenblum, a psychologist who conducted evaluations of Mother, Child, and the Foster Parents; and Mother. The court entered its decree involuntarily terminating Mother's parental rights on October 3, 2014. On October 30, 2014, Mother timely filed a notice of appeal, along with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

Mother now raises the following issue for our review. "Did the [orphans'] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of law in concluding that termination of [Mother's] parental rights would serve the needs and welfare of the Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] §[]2511(b)?" Mother's brief at 5.

We consider Mother's claim mindful of our well-settled standard of review.

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court's decision, however, should not be reversed merely because the record would support a different result. We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis.

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

In this case, the orphans' court terminated Mother's parental rights pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b), which provide as follows.

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:

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(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

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(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

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(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

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(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).

Instantly, Mother concedes that CYF presented clear and convincing evidence that her parental rights should be terminated pursuant to Section 2511(a). Mother's Brief at 9 ("CYF, the petitioner, did clearly and convincing establish threshold grounds for termination pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(a)(2)."). Thus, we need only consider whether the court abused its discretion by terminating Mother's parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). See In re Adoption of R.K.Y., 72 A.3d 669, 679 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 76 A.3d 540 (Pa. 2013) (declining to address Section 2511(b) where the appellant did not make an argument concerning that section).

Section 2511(b) "focuses on whether termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child." In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). As this Court has explained, "Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and the term 'bond' is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any, between parent and child is a factor to be considered" as part of our analysis. In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2008). "While a parent's emotional bond with his or her child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the court when determining what is in thebest interest of the child." In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citing K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d at 533-36).

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability the child might have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated that the trial court should consider the importance of continuity of relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental effects on the child.

Id. (quoting In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483 (Pa. Super. 2010)); see also In re T.D., 949 A.2d 910, 920-23 (Pa. Super. 2008), appeal denied, 970 A.2d 1148 (Pa. 2009) (affirming the termination of parental rights where "obvious emotional ties exist between T.D. and Parents, but Parents are either unwilling or unable to satisfy the irreducible minimum requirements of parenthood," and where preserving the Parents' rights would prevent T.D. from being adopted and attaining permanency).

Here, the orphans' court concluded that terminating Mother's parental rights would be in the best interest of Child. Orphans' Court Opinion, 11/26/14, at 4. The court reasoned that Child is bonded with her foster family, and that Child is doing well in their care. Id. The court also found that Mother's failure to visit regularly with Child weakened Child's bond with Mother, that terminating Mother's parental rights would not adversely impact this bond, and that termination would not be a "tremendous detriment" to Child. Id. at 4-5. The court determined that Mother remains incapable ofparenting Child, and that it would not serve Child's needs and welfare to continue waiting for Mother to improve. Id. at 5. Finally, the court noted that Child's current foster placement with her great uncle and aunt will allow for Child to maintain contact with Mother. Id.

Mother argues that the court abused its discretion by focusing improperly on Mother's failings as a parent rather than Child's needs and welfare. Mother's Brief at 12-13. Mother also contends that the court "completely failed to analyze the potential effect" that termination would have on Child, and that the court instead relied on conjecture that Child will be able to maintain a...