In re Tansley

In re A. M. M. TANSLEY, Minor.

No. 357918

Court of Appeals of Michigan

April 21, 2022

UNPUBLISHED

Macomb Circuit Court, Family Division, LC No. 2018-000329-NA

Before: Borrello, P.J., and Markey and Servitto, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent^[1] appeals as of right the order terminating his parental rights to the minor child, AT under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions of adjudication continue to exist) and (j) (reasonable likelihood child will be harmed if returned to parent's home). For the reasons set forth in this opinion we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 20, 2018, the minor child was in the park near a river while the parents were extremely intoxicated. When the police arrived, respondent took the minor child into his car and fled. He was pursued by the police while driving recklessly and arrested for Operating While Impaired. The minor child was in the vehicle while respondent was driving under the influence and attempting to flee from the police. Following his arrest, respondent was transported to the hospital with a blood alcohol content of .23.

As a result of the June 20, 2018 incident, respondent pled guilty to a number of criminal charges and was incarcerated. Mother executed a power of attorney to a family member, who began caring for the minor child. The trial court took jurisdiction of the minor child after the power of attorney expired, and respondent-mother could not be located.

The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) presented respondent with a case service and treatment plan. The treatment plan required respondent to participate in and complete a number of services including: a mental health treatment, substance abuse treatment, and parenting classes. Respondent was also required to find appropriate housing and obtain employment. During this period, respondent repeatedly failed to comply with the services and treatment plan, was arrested and incarcerated for much of the time and his visits to the minor child caused the minor child to request that respondent no longer visit, culminating in a decision to terminate respondent's parental rights.

The record reveals that the trial court conducted several hearings to determine whether statutory grounds existed to terminate respondent's parental rights. At the last hearing, on June 30, 2021, three years from the original date of these proceedings, the trial court found statutory grounds existed under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (j), holding:

As to [respondent], again[, ] however well-intentioned he may be or even loving towards his daughter, I have to review all the evidence in this case, the good and the bad, and its totality for him as well.

[Respondent's] lack of insight and unresolved substance abuse concerns do, in fact, present clear and convincing evidence that there would be a reasonable likelihood that the child would be harmed if returned to his home this date. His actions in driving under the influence with his child in the car, fleeing from police, and then not seeing that his child was at risk of harm when testifying at this trial nor in demonstrating a resolution of substance abuse issues demonstrates to the court that this ground is met at to [respondent].

As this very moment in time, I believe clear and convincing evidence that there is a reasonable likelihood that the conduct or capacity of [respondent] would cause the child to be harmed.

Again, he does not . . .presently have suitable housing to return the child into. He admits that neither he nor mother are really prepared to bring the child home right now.

And his substance abuse problem remains untreated to this day. That's over two and a half years past disposition and the adoption of the [treatment plan]. He will not even take drug screens completing only two out of 80 required screens. There is no indication that he legitimately treated and resolved domestic violence issues and he presently has a warrant for domestic violence against mother and needs [to] turn himself in on that charge.

All of these issues would place the child at reasonable likelihood for risk of harm if returned to [respondent-]father's care. And the court, again, cites In re Kaczkowski, [325 Mich.App. 69; 924 N.W.2d 1 (2018)] and, In re White, [303 Mich.App. 701; 846 N.W.2d 61 (2014)] that a parent's failure to comply with the terms and conditions of his or her service plan is evidence that the child will be harmed if returned to the parent's home.

The court, therefore, finds that ground (j) is met as to [respondent-]father by clear and convincing evidence.

Following these findings, the trial court next turned to whether termination was in the minor child's best interests. The trial court first stated its consideration of the minor child's best interests would be treated as a "separate hearing[]." It then went on to recite respondent's appellate rights, before asking the parties whether they had "any additional witnesses or evidence to present at this time[.]" The assistant prosecutor stated she did not have any additional witnesses but asked the trial court to "rely on the significant amount of testimony and evidence that was provided to the court at . [the] recent termination of parental rights trial." After conferring with respondent in a Zoom breakout room, respondent's attorney stated she did not have any additional witnesses and asked the trial court to rely on respondent's testimony when considering the minor child's best interests. The trial court's findings as to whether termination of parental rights was in the minor child's best interests was as follows:

So, the court has weighed all of these [best-interest] factors and . . . the court finds the petitioner has indeed met its burden of proof by a preponderance standard that termination of parental rights as to both [mother] and [respondent] is in [the minor child's] best interest[s].

A summary of some of the relative [sic] factors that the court has found and considered are as follows. And the court in addition, of course, adopts the finding made and placed on the record of its opinion on statutory grounds.

The court finds that the child thus has no bond with [respondent]. Neither parent has seen the child in a lengthy time due to the need to have suspended the parenting time for both parents. This child would not personally look to either parent for support, guidance, for comfort that . . . you could define a bond as some of those things. And this child would not look to either parent for any of that. And I don't believe there's a realistic prospect to reunify the child with either parent or both parents.

The parents are not able to appropriately care for the child presently nor, as stated previously, in a reasonably foreseeable timeframe in the future. This includes a lack of proper housing in more than two and a half years and, again, all the findings of concern noted in the court's previous opinion on statutory grounds.

The court also notes petitioner's exhibit that . . . was admitted which is the . . . child's trauma assessment. I'd just like to quote a little part of that, is that [the minor child's] continued placement in foster care exacerbates her risk for continued developmental and behavioral issues. She's an individual at considerable risk for increased schooling, peer, and vocational problems unless provided with the appropriate supports and programming. And I could go on and we all have the exhibit[, ] but her in foster care any longer is not in her best interest at this point, and I can't remove by her today at this point. And, so, it is in her best interest to terminate parental rights for that . . . consideration alone.

And, again, this finding is based upon a failure to substantially . . . comply with the treatment plan even after a prolonged period of time. The failure to fix the issues that brought the child into care and in the parenting ability of both parents, I believe, is still impaired as it was when the child entered care.

And it's not to say that there can't be some hope or improvement for the parents in the future, and I hope that there is but within the constraints of this case in a reasonable time in what's best for this child. And, again, I can't stress enough . . . this is a proceeding centered on the best interest of the child. And from all of those considerations I can reach no other conclusion.

From the child's view of the world, I think it would be traumatic to attempt to further reunify her with either or both birth parents because I do not believe that the parents are able to care for her at present nor in a reasonable time.

And reintroduction to the expected subsequent failure to reunify I believe would cause additional harm to the child. The child needs to have some sense of permanent belonging. And termination of parental rights with adoption would provide that for her rather than additional time spent at which I would think would expect to produce the same track record that we have seen in the past.

And on the other hand, contrary, the child is placed in a loving, clean, safe, stable, substance-free home where all her needs are met and will continue to be met for as long as needed.

With an additional identified party who is willing, it has been stated, is willing to adopt the child. That identified party is well-known to the foster parents' home.

As stated previously, the child court may consider a parent's history of domestic violence, their compliance with his or her case service plan, the parents' visitation history with the child, the child's well-being while in care where she's at now, and the possibility of adoption.

And all of those factors weigh in support of termination of both parents' parental rights. And that finding need be met by just a preponderance standard, and I think it has and

...