In re Tomczik

976 N.W.2d 143

In the MATTER OF the ESTATE OF: Mathew Joseph TOMCZIK, Deceased.

A21-1420

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Filed May 23, 2022

Granted August 9, 2022

Richard L. Hendrickson, Osseo, Minnesota; and Karen R. Cole, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants Calvin and Patricia Headley)

Chad M. Roggeman, Matthew W. Moehrle, Rajkowski Hansmeier, Ltd., St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent Michael Tomczik)

Considered and decided by Segal, Chief Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Slieter, Judge.

SLIETER, Judge

This is an appeal of the district court's judgment concluding that appellants—parents of decedent's former wife—are not devisees pursuant to decedent's will. Appellants argue they are devisees pursuant to the unambiguous residual clause of the will, which devises one-half of the residual estate to the heirs of decedent's former spouse. Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 524.2-804, subd. 2 (2020), a former spouse who remains named in a will is deemed to have died immediately before the dissolution of the marriage. Additionally, the residual-beneficiary terms of the will unambiguously devise one-half of the residual estate to the former spouse's heirs. Therefore, we reverse and remand.

FACTS

The facts of this case are not disputed. Decedent Mathew Joseph Tomczik (Mathew) and Sara Headley (Sara) married in 1992, and the district court dissolved their marriage in 2019. Mathew did not remarry and had no children before his death on January 31, 2021. Sara is currently living, has no children, and her heirs, pursuant to the intestate-succession statute, would be her parents, appellants Calvin and Patricia Headley (the Headleys). Minn. Stat. § 524.2-103(2) (1994).¹ In February 1995, Mathew executed a will, which remained unchanged until his death.

The will names Sara, if she survives Mathew, as the primary beneficiary of the residue of his estate. If she does not survive Mathew, the residue of his estate is to be distributed as follows:

3.4 If any interest is not effectively disposed of by the preceding provisions of this article, one half (1/2) to my heirs-at-law and one-half (1/2) to my wife's heirs-at-law. The heirs-at-law of each of us shall be determined (as of the date of death of the survivor of my husband² and me) under, and take the shares prescribed by, Minnesota statutes of intestate succession in force at the execution of this Will, applied as if each of us had then died intestate.³

(Emphasis added.)

The will nominates Mathew's brother, respondent Michael Tomczik (Michael) as personal representative. Following Mathew's death, Michael petitioned the district court for a formal probate of the will and for his appointment as personal representative. The petition identified Mathew's siblings as heirs and devisees,⁴ identified Sara as having no legal interest, and did not identify the Headleys. The Headleys objected to the petition because, as Sara's heirs, they had been wrongfully omitted as devisees.

The Headleys and Michael cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court granted Michael's motion for summary judgment based on its determination that the will's devise of one-half of the residue of the estate to the Headleys as Sara's heirs failed as a matter of law. The Headleys appeal.

ISSUE

Does the statutory revocation of a devise to a former spouse pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 524.2-804, which requires the probate court to consider the former spouse to have died immediately before the dissolution, also cause the unambiguous residual devise to the heirs of the former spouse to fail?

ANALYSIS

"[Appellate courts] review the grant of summary judgment de novo to determine whether there are genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in its application of the law." Montemayor v. Sebright Prods., Inc. , 898 N.W.2d 623, 628 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). Questions of law involving the interpretation of a statute are reviewed de novo. In re Est. of Jotham , 722 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Minn. 2006).

Similarly, this court reviews de novo whether the language of a will is ambiguous. In re Zagar , 491 N.W.2d 915, 916 (Minn. App. 1992) ("Whether the language of a will is ambiguous is a question of law which the reviewing court may determine."); Novack v. Nw. Airlines, Inc. , 525 N.W.2d 592, 596 (Minn. App. 1995) (concluding that questions of law are reviewed de novo ). "It is the cardinal rule of will construction that the intention of the testator, as expressed in the language used in the will, shall be controlling if it is not inconsistent with the rules of law." McNiff v. Olmsted Cnty. Welfare Dep't , 287 Minn. 40, 176 N.W.2d 888, 891 (1970) (citing In re Ordean's Will , 195 Minn. 120, 261 N.W. 706, 708 (1935) ). "[I]ntention which the testator may have had, but did not express in his will, cannot be considered." In re Cosgrave's Will , 225 Minn. 443, 31 N.W.2d 20, 25 (1948). When the intent of the testator is clear from the language of a will, we do not consider "what he meant to say and did not or what he might have said if he had thought of it." In re Silverson's Will , 214 Minn. 313, 8 N.W.2d 21, 23 (1943). Doing so would add words to the will, and "the court cannot supply words to bring about a claimed result." In re Lutzi's Est. , 266 Minn. 294, 123 N.W.2d 618, 624 (1963).

When a marriage ends in dissolution and "[e]xcept as provided by the express terms of a governing instrument," the Minnesota Uniform Probate Code "revokes any revocable: disposition, beneficiary designation, or appointment of property made by an individual to the individual's former spouse in a governing instrument" which was executed prior to a dissolution of marriage. Minn. Stat. § 524.2-804, subd. 1. The effect of this revocation is that "[p]rovisions of a governing instrument are given effect as if the former spouse died immediately before the dissolution or annulment." Id. , subd. 2 (emphasis added). Wills, defined by the probate code as a "governing instrument," are subject to these provisions. Minn. Stat. § 524.1-201(26) (2020).

The district court ruled that Mathew's will is unambiguous, and this conclusion is not challenged on appeal. Additionally, the district court concluded that the phrase "my wife" was an express term indicating an intent that the devise to "my wife's heirs" was contingent on Mathew and Sara remaining married. Because the will unambiguously expresses Mathew's intent that Sara's heirs are to receive a devise, the district court erred by concluding otherwise.

Article three of the will states that Mathew "give[s] the residue of my estate ... [t]o my wife, if she survives me.... If my wife does not survive me ... one-half (1/2) to my heirs-at-law and one-half (1/2) to my wife's heirs-at-law." The will defines "my wife" as follows: "My wife's name is Sara Tomczik [now Headley] and all references in this Will to my wife or my spouse are to her only."

Because Minn. Stat. § 524.2-804, subd. 2, requires the will to be "given effect as if the former spouse died immediately before dissolution," the devise to Sara's heirs becomes operative. Because heirs are defined as "the decedent's parents equally if both survive" when there are no surviving descendants, Minn. Stat. § 524.2-103, and it is undisputed that the Headleys are Sara's parents, the Headleys are devisees of one-half of Mathew's residual estate.

Michael argues that Mathew's contrary "intent is made clear by the fact that he described this class of persons [his wife's heirs] only in relation to his marital status, as opposed to listing the names of such persons." It is this fact, Michael claims, which distinguishes this matter from the basis of our conclusion in In re Est. of Kerr , 520 N.W.2d 512, 514 (Minn. App. 1994), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 14, 1994). Because the reasoning in Kerr is consistent with our conclusion, we are not persuaded.

In Kerr , a will made a devise to "my stepdaughter, Dawn M. Valentine." 520 N.W.2d at 513-14. Kerr's son argued that "stepdaughter" expressed an intent "to make a devise to a person occupying a particular position," a position which, due to the dissolution of Kerr's marriage to the stepdaughter's mother, the stepdaughter no longer occupied when Kerr died. Id. at 514. In rejecting that argument, we reasoned: "nowhere in the fifteen-page will or codicil is an intent expressed to exclude the stepdaughter if she ceased to be a stepdaughter because her mother was not married to the testator at the time of his death." Id. Similarly, Mathew's will unambiguously defines his wife as Sara, and expresses his intent that, if she predeceases him, her heirs are to receive a devise. Again, a testator's intention is "to be gathered from the language of the will itself ... [and] intention which the testator may have had, but did not express in his will, cannot be considered." Cosgrave's Will , 31 N.W.2d at 25.

Moreover, we are not persuaded by Michael's argument that a failure to specially name Sara's heirs in the will, as Kerr's stepdaughter was, is critical. A "principal attribute" of class gifts is "that the number of beneficiaries in the class may increase by birth or decrease by death between the time the instrument is executed and the time it takes effect." Lichter v. Bletcher , 266 Minn. 326, 123 N.W.2d 612, 615 (1963). "Where an immediate gift is made to a class and the right exists to have the property distributed at once on the death of the testator, the persons constituting the class are determined as of the death of the testator." In re Schmidt's Will , 256 Minn. 64, 97 N.W.2d 441, 458 (1959) (quotation omitted).

Naming "my wife's heirs" would have been impossible when Mathew executed the will because the members of the class were determined on his death, when the will took effect. And, because we must give this provision of the will "effect as if the former spouse died immediately before the dissolution," we determine Sara's heirs no differently than if she had died without the marriage ending in dissolution. Minn. Stat. § 524.2-804,...