In re Toyota Motor Corp.

978 F.Supp.2d 1053

In re TOYOTA MOTOR CORP. UNINTENDED ACCELERATION MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION.

Case No. 8:10ML 02151 JVS.

United States District Court, C.D. California.

Oct. 7, 2013.

Todd A. Walburg, Lieff Cabraser Heimann and Bernstein LLP, San Francisco, CA, Benjamin L. Bailey, Eric B. Snyder, Rodney Arthur Smith, Robert P. Lorea, Bailey And Glasser LLP, Edgar F. Heiskell, III, Edgar F. Heiskell Attorney at Law, Charleston, WV, Peter J. Cambs, Parker Waichman Alonso LLP, Bonita Springs, FL, Lisa M. Hasselman, Steve W. Berman, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Seattle, WA, for Plaintiffs.

Harold E. Franklin, Jr., Derin B. Dickerson, Anneke J. Shepard, King & Spalding LLP, Cari K. Dawson, Kyle G.A. Wallace, Alston & Bird LLP, Atlanta, GA, Jason A. Golden, Montgomery Rennie and Jonson, Gregory A. Harrison, Dinsmore & Shohl, Cincinnati, OH, Jimmy B. Wilkins, David Lawrence Ayers, Watkins and Eager, Jennifer Ann Rogers, Watkins and Eager PLLC, Jackson, MS, Joel H. Smith, Bowman and Brooke LLP, Steven A. McKelvey, William H. Latham, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, Columbia, SC, Lawrence C. Mann, Bowman and Brooke LLP, Troy, MI, Suzanne Hero Swaner, Tanya Buler Scarbrough, J. Karl Viehman, Suzanne H. Swaner, Yesenia E. Cardenas–Colenso, Bowman and Brooke LLP, Dallas, TX, John D. Arya, Alston & Bird LLP, Nathan J. Marcusen, Bard D. Borkon, Theodore Dorenkamp, Bowman & Brooke LLP, Minneapolis, MN, Theane Evangelis Kapur, Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., Gibson Dunn and Crutcher LLP, Rachel Aleeza Rappaport, Loeb & Loeb LLP, Lisa Gilford, Michael Kevin Brown, Thomas Jerome Nolan, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Los Angeles, CA, C. Brandon Wisoff, Douglas R. Young, Farella Braun and Martel LLP, Robert A. Brundage, Bingham McCutchen LLP, San Francisco, CA, Abbey Chun Furlong, Robert V.P. Waterman, Jr., Lane & Waterman LLP, Davenport, IA, Andrew B. Cooke, Susan W. Romaine, Flaherty Sensabaugh & Bonasso, Rebecca A. Betts, Betts Hardy and Rodgers PLLC, Charleston, WV, Anne O. Hanna, Bradley M. Tanner, Curtis E. Jimerson, Kathleen A. York, Vincent Galvin, Jr., Bowman and Brooke LLP, San Jose, CA, Antonio Gnocchi–Franco, Gnocchi–Franco Law Office, San Juan, PR, Clem C. Trischler, Pietragallo Gordon Alfano Bosick and Raspanti LLP, Pittsburgh, PA, Craig Carpenito, Karl Geercken, Alston & Bird LLP, John P. Hooper, Reed Smith LLP, New York, NY, Daniel W. Olivas, J. Randolph Bibb, Jr., Lewis King Krieg & Waldrop PC, Donna La Kae Roberts, Stephen H. Price, Stites & Harbison, PLLC, Nashville, TN, David J. Russell, Keller Rohrback LLP, Seattle, WA, H. Franklin Hostetler, III, Bowman and Brooke LLP, Jimmy Yongki Park, Brendan Chan, Gregory P. Gilmer, Bowman and Brooke, Torrance, CA, J. Gordon Cooney, Jr., Morgan Lewis and Bockius LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Joel Allen Dewey, DLA Piper LLP, Baltimore, MD, Lee A. Rosenthal, Linsey W. West, Dinsmore and Shohl LLP, Lexington, KY, Mark N. Bodin, McGlinchey Stafford PLLC, New Orleans, LA, Michael Ross Tein, Kathryn Ashley Meyers, Lewis Tein PL, Coconut Grove, FL, Mike H. Madokoro, Bowman and Brooke, Gardena, CA, Patrick Darrow Wilson, Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, Little Rock, AR, Paul J. Osowski, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP, Charlotte, NC, Robert B. Anderson, May, Adam, Gerdes & Thompson, Pierre, SD, Robert L. Blank, Rumberger Kirk & Caldwell PA, Tampa, FL, Robert G. Scumaci, Gibson, McAskill & Crosby LLP, Buffalo, NY, Ross W. Johnson, Faegre and Benson LLP, Des Moines, IA, Steven R. Kramer, Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC, White Plains, NY, Thomas M. Klein, William Francis Auther, Mary Michelle Kranzow, Bowman & Brooke LLP, Phoenix, AZ, Timothy R. Bricker, Michael Hiram Carpenter, Karen M. Cadieux, Carpenter Lipps & LeLand LLP, Columbus, OH, Kendra N. Beckwith, Wheeler Trigg O'Donnell LLP, Denver, CO, Greg W. Marsh, Greg W. Marsh Law Offices, Las Vegas, NV, for Defendants.

Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motions to Exclude Expert Testimony (“ Daubert Motions”)

Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Toyota's Motion for Summary Judgment

JAMES V. SELNA, District Judge.

Table of Contents

PART ONE: THE MOTIONS TO EXCLUDE

1064

I.

Introduction—The St. John Collision

1064

II.

Admissibility of Expert Opinion Testimony and Reports

1064

III.

Motion to Exclude Expert Evidence Regarding Institutional Bias of Investigating Agency

1067

IV.

Motions to Exclude Expert Evidence Regarding Medical/Human Factors

1068

A.

Burton

1068

B.

Cassini

1069

C.

Gill

1070

D.

Pierce

1072

E.

Polydefkis

1073

V.

Motions to Exclude Expert Evidence Regarding Mechanical

Issues/Corrosion in Throttle Body

1074

A.

Anderson

1074

B.

Kitchen

1075

VI.

Motions to Exclude Opinions Regarding Software Defects

1077

A.

Muckenhirn

1077

(1)

Opinion Regarding the Full–Throttle Bug

1077

(2)

Opinion that Memory Corruption Can Cause SUA from Idle

1078

(3)

Opinion that the A/D Converter is a “Single Point of Failure”

1079

B.

Barr

1079

(1)

Opinion Regarding the Full–Throttle Bug

1080

(2)–(4)

Opinions Regarding Task Death, Disabling of Fail–Safes, and Causation

1080

(a)

Opinions Regarding Task Death

1081

(b)

Opinions Regarding Toyota's Fail–Safes

1081

(c)

Causation Opinion

1081

(5)

Other Opinions Expressed in Report

1081

(6)

Opinion Regarding Pedal Misapplication and Brake Pressure

1081

(a)

Opinion Regarding Pedal Misapplication

1081

(b)

Opinion Regarding Brake Pressure

1082

C.

Jones

1082

(1)–(3)

Opinions Regarding Task Death, Disabling of Fail–Safes, and Causation

1082

(a)

Opinion Regarding Task Death

1082

(b)

Opinion Regarding Toyota's Fail–Safes

1083

(c)

Causation Opinions

1083

(4)

Other Opinions Regarding Multiple Major

Mistakes

1083

D.

van Schoor

1084

(1)

Opinions Regarding a Brake Override System

1084

(2)

Opinions Related to Pedal Sensor Circuit

Resistance

1084

(3)

Opinion that Mrs. St. John Was Attempting to Brake

1085

(4)

Opinion Regarding Mrs. St. John's Control of the Camry

1085

(5)

Opinion Regarding Toyota's Conformance with Coding Standards

1085

(6)

Opinion Regarding the Camry's Brake Switch

1085

(7)

Opinion Related to the Camry's Vacuum Brake–Assist Booster

1085

(8)

Opinions Regarding Other Similar Incidents (“OSIs”)

1086

E.

Loudon

1086

(1)–(2)

Opinions Regarding Toyota's Understanding

1087

(3), (6) & (7)

Causation Opinions

1087

(4)

Opinions Regarding the STP Brake Switch or

Sensor Design

1087

(5)

Opinions Regarding Toyota's Software Development Process and the Resulting Defective Nature of the Software Developed Pursuant to that Process

1087

(8)

Opinion that the Lack of a Brake Override or Panic Braking System Makes the Camry Design Negligent

1088

F.

Koopman

1088

G.

Arora

1089

VII.

Motions to Exclude Opinions Regarding Braking System

1090

(1)

Opinion that Mrs. St. John Was Applying the Brakes

1090

(2)

Opinions Regarding Brake Pedal Application Forces

1090

(3)

Opinions that Flow from Hannemann's Brake Testing

1090

PART TWO: THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1091

I.

Summary Judgment Standard

1091

II.

Statement of Uncontroverted Facts

1092

III.

Claims Asserted and Governing State–Law Legal Standards

1094

A.

Design and Manufacturing Defects—Statutory Claim

1095

(1)

Elements of a Design Defect Claim

1095

(2)

Elements of a Manufacturing Defect Claim

1096

(3)

Burden of Proof and the Role of Circumstantial Evidence

1096

B.

Negligent Product Design and Manufacturing

1100

C.

Failure to Warn

1100

IV.

Discussion

1100

A.

Design Defect

1101

B.

Manufacturing Defect

1102

C.

Negligence

1102

D.

Failure to Warn

1102

V.

Conclusion

1103

The St. John case is a member case in the multi-district litigation (“MDL”), and arises out of a single-vehicle collision (“the collision”) involving a 2005 Toyota Camry (“the Camry”) that allegedly resulted from an incident of sudden, unintended acceleration (“SUA”). Defendants in this action are Toyota Motor Corporation (“TMC”), Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (“TMS”), and Toyota Engineering & Manufacturing America, Inc. (collectively, “Toyota” or “the Toyota Defendants”). Plaintiff is the estate of the driver of the Camry, the now-deceased Ida Starr St. John,¹ and the present action is brought by and through the executor of the estate, William Curtis Grasty, Jr.² In the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Plaintiff brings claims for strict products liability and negligence. ³ ( St. John Docket No. 43.)

This matter is before the Court on sixteen Motions to Exclude Expert Testimony. Toyota moves to exclude all or portions of the testimony and/or opinions of thirteen of Plaintiff's experts; Plaintiff moves to exclude all or portions of the testimony and/or opinions of three of Toyota's experts. This matter is also before the Court on Toyota's Motion for Summary Judgment. The parties filed extensive evidentiary records in support of and in opposition to the present Motions, and they filed timely Opposition and Reply briefs to every Motion.

As set forth herein, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Toyota'sMotions to Exclude Expert Testimony, and the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiff's Motions to Exclude Expert Testimony. The Court GRANT IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Toyota's Motion for Summary Judgment. Summary judgment is granted as to the manufacturing defect claim and the negligence claim, but summary judgment is denied as to the design defect claim and the failure to warn claim.

Because much of the expert evidence forms the underpinning of both sides' positions on summary judgment, the Court addresses the Daubert motions first.

PART ONE: THE MOTIONS TO EXCLUDE

I. Introduction—The St. John Collision

As detailed more fully infra, Part Two, Section II, the collision at issue here occurred after the driver, Mrs. St. John, was stopped and ready to turn right at a stop sign in front of an elementary school. Before her death, Mrs. St. John testified in both a discovery and a trial deposition that when she removed her foot from the brake pedal, the Camry immediately accelerated without her depressing the accelerator pedal. She testified that application of the brakes did nothing to stop or slow the Camry, and that she struggled to control the Camry...