In re Turk

12 N.E.3d 40

In re MARRIAGE OF Iris TURK, Appellee and Steven Turk, Appellant.

No. 116730.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 19, 2014.

Howard M. Levine, Brian W. Reidy and David J. Zwaska, of Levine, Wittenberg, Shugan & Schatz, Ltd., of Tinley Park, for appellant.

Gail M. O'Connor, of O'Connor Family Law, PC, of Chicago, for appellee.

OPINION

Justice KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The issues in this case are (1) whether section 505 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/505 (West 2012) ) permits a trial court to award child support to a noncustodial parent and (2) if so, whether the circuit court abused its discretion when it awarded $600 per month in child support to the noncustodial parent here in addition to requiring the custodial parent to pay additional medical and dental expenses for the children. The appellate court held that trial courts do have authority under the statute to order custodial parents to pay child support and found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to increase the amount of medical and dental expenses the custodial parent in this case was required to pay. It concluded, however, that the record did not support the $600 per month child support award. It therefore reversed that portion of the trial court's judgment and remanded for an evidentiary hearing with instructions for the trial judge “to clearly explain the basis for any support awarded, as required by section 505 * * *.” For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part and remand to the circuit court.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Iris and Steven Turk were married in October of 1993 and have two sons, Nathaniel, born in 1997, and Jacob, born in 1999. In 2004, Iris filed a petition in the circuit court of Cook County seeking dissolution of the marriage, division of the property, sole custody of the boys, and an award of maintenance and child support. Steven, in turn, filed a counter petition for dissolution requesting, among other things, that the award of custody be joint.

¶ 4 Following various developments not relevant here, the court entered an agreed judgment dissolving the marriage. Among the provisions of the judgment, filed July 25, 2005, was that Steven would pay Iris $4,000 per month in unallocated maintenance and child support for 42 months, that the parties would have joint custody of the children, that the children would reside with Iris, and that Steven would provide the medical insurance for the children and cover 50% of their out-of-pocket medical and dental costs.

¶ 5 Over the years, Steven and Iris frequently returned to court to contest matters related to the custody and education of the children. Eventually, in October of 2010, the court granted temporary physical custody of the two boys to Steven, limited Iris to supervised visitation, and made a one-time reduction in the amount Steven was then paying for child support.

¶ 6 Shortly after being awarded physical custody and enrolling the boys in a school in his district, Steven filed a petition pursuant to section 510 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/510 (West 2012) ) asking that his obligation to pay child support to Iris be terminated completely. That petition was granted in part and denied in part pursuant to an agreed order under which Steven was required to pay $700 per month “based upon the current parenting schedule.”

¶ 7 Although the order was agreed upon, it did not end the litigation. Steven subsequently asked the court to order Iris to pay child support to him. Iris, in turn, sought to have Steven held in contempt based on “visitation abuse.” Steven then moved to temporarily terminate the $700 per month child support obligations on the grounds that Jacob, who by this time was the only child still visiting Iris, was enrolled in a residential summer camp paid for by Steven, eliminating any child care expenses Iris might otherwise have had.

¶ 8 On July 28, 2012, the circuit court entered an agreed “custody judgment and parenting order” which specified that Steven was to have “the sole care, custody, control and education” of the boys and gave him authority to make “[m]ajor decisions in connection with [their] education, health, care and religious training,” subject to various conditions involving communication and cooperation. Iris was granted regular visitation with Nathan once a week, for dinner on Wednesdays. Her regular visitation with Jacob was substantially longer, with weekly visits from Monday to Wednesday mornings, plus alternating weekends, a system which gave her nearly equal time with him. In addition, a separate schedule was set up to insure that each parent would have equal time with both boys during holidays, spring break and summer vacations.

¶ 9 When the court signed the foregoing agreed order, it also entered a separate order disposing of Steven's remaining request to completely terminate his obligation to make child support payments to Iris. Based upon the provisions of the agreed order and a determination that Steven earned approximately $150,000 per year while Iris' earnings were less than $10,000 per year, the court ordered Steven to pay Iris child support of $600 per month and made him “solely responsible for all uncovered medical, dental, orthodontia, psychological and optical expenses for the children.”

¶ 10 Steven appealed, arguing that because he has been designated as the custodial parent, the circuit court had no authority under section 505 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/505 (West 2012) ) to order him to pay child support to Iris, a noncustodial parent. Steven further contended that even if the circuit court did have statutory authority to order him to make child support payments, it abused its discretion in ordering him to pay the support it did.

¶ 11 As noted at the outset of this opinion, the appellate court rejected the contention that section 505 does not authorize a circuit court to order custodial parents to pay child support to noncustodial parents. 2013 IL App (1st) 122486, ¶ 42, 374 Ill.Dec. 615, 996 N.E.2d 62. The appellate court further concluded that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Steven to pay child support and the full amount of the children's health care expenses not covered by insurance. Id. ¶¶ 49–50. It held, however, that the particular amount of support ordered in this case, $600 per month, was not supported by the record. It therefore reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine “what monies Iris pays when she has visitation with the children,” and directed the circuit court “to clearly explain the basis for any support awarded, as required by section 505.” Id. ¶ 48.

¶ 12 Steven filed a petition for leave to appeal from the appellate court's judgment. Ill. S.Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2013). His primary argument is that the appellate court's interpretation of section 505 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act is novel, unsupported by the language of the statute itself and contrary to the Fifth District Appellate Court's decision in Shoff v. Shoff, 179 Ill.App.3d 178, 128 Ill.Dec. 280, 534 N.E.2d 462 (1989). We granted Steven's petition.

¶ 13 ANALYSIS

¶ 14 In Illinois, the support of a child is the joint and several obligation of both the husband and the wife. In re Marriage of Schuster, 224 Ill.App.3d 958, 974, 167 Ill.Dec. 73, 586 N.E.2d 1345 (1992). If the couple's marriage dissolves, the court may apportion child support obligations between them. The standards governing court-awarded child support are set forth in section 505 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/505 (West 2012) ). As we have just indicated, Steven's principal challenge to the appellate court's decision is that it misconstrued the provisions of section 505 when it concluded that he could be required to pay child support. Statutory construction is a question of law. Our review of this issue is therefore de novo. In re Estate of Wilson, 238 Ill.2d 519, 552, 345 Ill.Dec. 583, 939 N.E.2d 426 (2010).

¶ 15 The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. The best evidence of legislative intent is the language used in the statute itself, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill.2d 455, 466, 250 Ill.Dec. 758, 739 N.E.2d 521 (2000). When the language of the statute is clear, it must be applied as written without resort to aids or tools of interpretation. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Earth Foods, Inc., 238 Ill.2d 455, 461, 345 Ill.Dec. 644, 939 N.E.2d 487 (2010).

¶ 16 Steven interprets section 505 to mean that the obligation to pay child support may be imposed only on noncustodial parents and that a custodial parent may never be ordered to pay child support to a noncustodial parent. The terms of the statute do not support such a view. In contrast to the child support laws of some states which single out noncustodial parents for payment of child support (see, e.g., Rubin v. Salla, 107 A.D.3d 60, 964 N.Y.S.2d 41, 47 (2013) (applying New York law) ; Daigrepont v. Daigrepont, 458 So.2d 637, 638–39 (La.Ct.App.1984) (applying the law of Louisiana)), section 505 expressly confers on courts the option to “order either or both parents owing a duty of support to a child of the marriage to pay an amount reasonable and necessary for the support of the child, without regard to marital misconduct.” (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 5/505(a) (West 2012). The statute further provides that in addition to support, the court may, in its discretion, “order either or both parents owing a duty of support to a child of the marriage to contribute to [various] expenses, if determined by the court to be reasonable,” including health needs not covered by insurance. (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(2.5) (West 2012).

¶ 17 That Illinois law does...