In re U.A.C.

410 Mont. 493

520 P.3d 295

In the MATTER OF: U.A.C., a Youth in Need of Care.

DA 22-0311

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs: October 19, 2022

Decided: November 15, 2022

For Appellant: Kathleen A. Molsberry, Matthew B. Lowy, Lowy Law, PLLC, Missoula, Montana

For Appellee Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Cori Losing, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Scott Twito, Yellowstone County Attorney, Heather Webster Sather, Deputy County Attorney, Billings, Montana

Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 The foster parents of U.A.C., B.D. and J.D. (Foster Parents), appeal the June 28, 2021 Order of the Montana Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, denying their motion to intervene.

¶2 We affirm and restate the issues as follows:

1. Must abandonment be alleged before a foster parent is allowed to intervene pursuant to § 41-3-422(9)(b), MCA ?

2. Can foster parents establish a parent-child relationship during the pendency of a Title 41, chapter 3, MCA, proceeding?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3 The Department of Public Health and Human Services (the Department) removed U.A.C. and her older half-sister, P.R.S., for physical neglect.¹ At the time of removal, U.A.C. was 20 months old and P.R.S. was 8 years old. Both children are Indian—U.A.C. is a member of the Little Shell Tribe of Chippewa Indians, and P.R.S. is a member of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe. The Department placed U.A.C. and P.R.S. with Foster Parents on October 23, 2018, and May 18, 2019, respectively. U.A.C. and P.R.S. have remained continuously in Foster Parents’ care for the last three years while the Department has had temporary legal custody (TLC). During the period of TLC, the Department had sought reunification with U.A.C.’s natural parents.

¶4 The Department submitted an Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children for U.A.C. to be placed with her paternal grandmother in Virginia. Foster Parents opposed the placement and filed a motion to intervene, arguing that they have a conditional statutory right to intervene under M. R. Civ. P. 24 (Rule 24 ) and that the District Court denied them their fundamental right to notice and a hearing. Foster Parents also asserted that they possessed a fundamental liberty interest in the parent-child relationship under § 40-4-211, MCA.

¶5 The Department opposed the motion to intervene on two grounds: (1) § 41-3-422(9)(a), MCA, provided Foster Parents notice and the right to be heard so intervention by Foster Parents was unnecessary; and (2) § 41-3-422(9)(b), MCA, only allows intervention by one of the enumerated parties when the Department has alleged abandonment. During these proceedings, the Department did not allege that either child had been abandoned.

¶6 The District Court ruled in favor of the Department, reasoning that Foster Parents as a matter of law do not have a right to intervene, although they have the right to fundamentally fair procedures such as the rights to notice and to be heard. The District Court supported its decision by relying on this Court's order in A.G. v. Mont. Eighteenth Judicial Dist. Court , No. OP 19-0728, 399 Mont. 552, 460 P.3d 401 (Feb. 18, 2020). The District Court specifically concluded:

The prerequisite threshold to intervene under M. R. Civ. P. 24 is materially different from the prerequisite to intervene under § 41-3-422(9)(b). Therefore, the Court concludes § 41-3-422(9)(b) has modified M. R. Civ. P. 24 and displaces the Rule under § 41-3-422(4).

The District Court further reasoned that the Legislature expressly intended to allow a party to intervene under § 41-3-422(9)(b), MCA, only upon an allegation of abandonment. As such, the District Court ordered that Foster Parents were precluded from intervening under the statute because the Department did not allege abandonment.

¶7 After the District Court denied Foster Parents’ motion to intervene, it conducted a contested placement hearing on July 29, 2021, and July 30, 2021. The Department had requested the District Court find good cause to deviate from the Indian Child Welfare Act to maintain a placement with Foster Parents rather than place U.A.C. with her paternal grandmother in Virginia. The guardian ad litem agreed with the Department that U.A.C. should remain in Foster Parents’ care. On November 9, 2021, the District Court granted the Department's motions and ordered that U.A.C. remain with Foster Parents.

¶8 Subsequently, the Department petitioned for termination of parental rights regarding both U.A.C. and P.R.S. on May 9, 2022. The termination petitions are pending in the District Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶9 We normally review a district court's order granting or denying a motion to intervene for abuse of discretion.

Connell v. Dept. of Soc. & Rehab. Servs. , 2003 MT 361, ¶ 13, 319 Mont. 69, 81 P.3d 1279. However, the interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo. Bates v. Neva , 2014 MT 336, ¶ 9, 377 Mont. 350, 339 P.3d 1265. This Court reviews a district court's interpretation of the law for correctness. In re S.B.C. , 2014 MT 345, ¶ 20, 377 Mont. 400, 340 P.3d 534.

DISCUSSION

¶10 1. Must abandonment be alleged before a foster parent is allowed to intervene pursuant to § 41-3-422(9)(b), MCA ?

¶11 The Montana Rules of Civil Procedure and the Montana Rules of Evidence apply to abuse and neglect proceedings, except as modified in Title 41. Section 41-3-422(4), MCA. Subsection (a) of Rule 24 mandates intervention to anyone who possesses a statutory unconditional right to intervene or who "claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless the existing parties adequately represent that interest." M. R. Civ. P. 24(a). Subsection (b) of Rule 24 allows intervention at a district court's discretion to a person who has a conditional, statutory right to intervene or who "has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact." M. R. Civ. P. 24(b). Title 41 also addresses intervention, §§ 41-3-422(9)(b) and 41-3-437(4), MCA, and provides procedures specific to a foster parent's intervention in child dependency and neglect actions.

¶12 The plain language of § 41-3-422(9)(b), MCA, authorizes, in pertinent part, "[a] foster parent, preadoptive parent, or relative of the child who is caring for or a relative of the child who has cared for a child ... may be allowed by the court to intervene in the action if the court, after a hearing in which evidence is presented on those subjects provided for in 41-3-437(4), determines that the intervention of the person is in the best interests of the child." Section 41-3-422(9)(b), MCA, explicitly cross references § 41-3-437(4), MCA, which provides that "[i]n a case in which abandonment has been alleged by the county attorney, the attorney general, or an attorney hired by the county, the court shall hear offered evidence, including evidence offered by a person appearing pursuant to 41-3-422(9)(a) or (9)(b)" regarding any of the following subjects:

(a) the extent to which the child has been cared for, nurtured, or supported by a person other than the child's parents; and

(b) whether the child was placed or allowed to remain by the parents with another person for the care of the child, and, if so, then the court shall accept evidence regarding:

(i) the intent of the parents in placing the child or allowing the child to remain with that person;

(ii) the continuity of care the person has offered the child by providing permanency or stability in residence, schooling, and activities outside of the home; and

(iii) the circumstances under which the child was placed or allowed to remain with that other person, including:

(A) whether a parent requesting return of the child was previously prevented from doing so as a result of an order issued pursuant to Title 40, chapter 15, part 3, or of a conviction pursuant to 45-5-206; and

(B) whether the child was originally placed with the other person to allow the parent to seek employment or attend school.

Accordingly, § 41-3-422(9)(b), MCA, "clearly modifies the circumstances under which a party may intervene in a proceeding under Title 41, chapter 3." A.G. , at *6. In A.G. , this Court instructed that § 41-3-422(9)(b), MCA, rather than Rule 24, is the standard for determining whether a district court should grant intervention in an abuse and neglect case. A.G. , at *5-*7. We must therefore read and interpret §§ 41-3-422(9)(b) and 41-3-437(4), MCA, together as a whole.

¶13 When interpreting a statute, this Court begins with the plain language of the statute. State v. Christensen , 2020 MT 237, ¶ 95, 401 Mont. 247, 472 P.3d 622. The plain meaning of a statute controls when the legislative intent can be "determined from the plain meaning of the words used in the statute." Christensen , ¶ 95. The rules of statutory construction require this Court to construe several interrelated statutes in a manner which will give effect to each of them. City of Missoula v. Fox , 2019 MT 250, ¶ 18, 397 Mont. 388, 450 P.3d 898. It is "a well-settled rule of statutory construction that the specific prevails over the general." Busch v. Atkinson , 278 Mont. 478, 483, 925 P.2d 874, 877 (Mont. 1996). "Statutory construction should not lead to absurd results if a reasonable interpretation can avoid it." Fox , ¶ 18. The legislative intent behind a statute "may not be gained from the wording of any particular section or sentence, but only from a consideration of the whole." State v. Heath , 2004 MT 126, ¶ 27, 321 Mont. 280, 90 P.3d 426.

¶14 The Legislature passed Senate Bill 257, which is now codified as § 41-3-422(9)(b), MCA, to provide protection for abandoned children by allowing caretakers to participate in the proceedings as parties. The Legislature expressly enumerated only three categories...