In re Univ. of Miami Covid-19 Tuition & Fee Refund Litig.

649 F.Supp.3d 1245

IN RE: UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI COVID-19 TUITION AND FEE REFUND LITIGATION

CASE NO. 20-60851-CIV-SINGHAL

CASE NO. 20-22207-CIV-SINGHAL

CASE NO. 20-22316-CIV-SINGHAL

CASE NO. 20-22594-CIV-SINGHAL

United States District Court, S.D. Florida

Signed December 30, 2022

Eric David Isicoff, Jordan Daniel Isicoff, Matthew Lee Lines, Teresa Ragatz, Christopher Michael Yannuzzi, Isicoff Ragatz, Miami, Florida, for Defendants.

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

RAAG SINGHAL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (DE [130]). Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment shortly after Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Class Certification. After reviewing both the Motion for Summary Judgment and the Motion for Class Certification, the Court has determined that judicial efficiency and economy are best served by first ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment. That Motion is fully briefed. For the reasons discussed below, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs' claims arise from a situation that never occurred before: in response to a pandemic, public health measures forced the temporary closure of institutions, including institutions of higher learning,¹ but technology allowed schools and universities to continue to educate their students through online/remote/distance learning environments. Plaintiffs filed suit because they expected to attend classes at the University of Miami (hereinafter, "the University" or "UM") in person but, due to the pandemic public health requirements, attended classes online from March 25, 2020, to the end of the semester. Plaintiffs claim that UM should have refunded a portion of their tuition and/or fees because the students lost the benefit of their bargain when UM transitioned from in-person classes to virtual. Plaintiffs allege breach of contract, breach of implied contract, and unjust enrichment (DE [49]) on behalf of themselves and the putative classes.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment "is appropriate only if 'the movant shows that there is no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' " Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656-57, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) (per curiam) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a));² see also Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 344, 130 S.Ct. 2295, 176 L.Ed.2d 1070 (2010). "By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue is "genuine" if a reasonable trier of fact, viewing all of the record evidence, could rationally find in favor of the nonmoving party in light of his burden of proof. Harrison v. Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288, 1298 (11th Cir. 2014). And a fact is "material" if, "under the applicable substantive law, it might affect the outcome of the case." Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (11th Cir. 2004). "[W]here the material facts are undisputed and do not support a reasonable inference in favor of the non-movant, summary judgment may properly be granted as a matter of law." DA Realty Holdings, LLC v. Tenn. Land Consultants, 631 Fed. Appx. 817, 820 (11th Cir. 2015).

The Court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. SEC v. Monterosso, 756 F.3d 1326, 1333 (11th Cir. 2014). However, to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, "the nonmoving party must offer more than a mere scintilla of evidence for its position; indeed, the nonmoving party must make a showing sufficient to permit the jury to reasonably find on its behalf." Urquilla-Diaz v. Kaplan Univ., 780 F.3d 1039, 1050 (11th Cir. 2015). "[T]his, however, does not mean that we are constrained to accept all the nonmovant's factual characterizations and legal arguments." Beal v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 20 F.3d 454, 459 (11th Cir. 1994).

III. DISCUSSION

UM moves for summary judgment on several grounds: (1) Plaintiffs' claims are essentially claims for educational malpractice, which is not a recognized cause of action; (2) Plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence of an express or implied contract to provide in-person classes or an on-campus experience; (3) the University Student Handbook contains express reservations of the right to alter or amend its procedures and policies and the right to "at any time deny, revoke, or modify authorization to use an University facility or premises;" (4) Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrine of impossibility due to the governmental public health orders requiring the University to close its facilities; (5) Plaintiffs acquiesced in the transition to online education; and (6) Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim fails because there is no evidence that UM was unjustly enriched and the Financial Responsibility Statement is an express contract that precludes a claim for unjust enrichment.

The Court notes that several evidentiary issues remain pending. UM has moved to strike several webpages submitted by Plaintiffs in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that they are not properly authenticated and are hearsay. (DE [153]) UM also filed a Daubert motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs' damages expert, Charles D. Cowan, Ph.D, which remains pending. See (DE [148]). Furthermore, UM argues Plaintiffs cannot rely on Cowan's expert report (DE [148]) in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment because the report is unsworn and not supported by an affidavit as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). These issues need not, however, be resolved at this time because neither the webpages nor Dr. Cowan's report alter the Court's conclusion that summary judgment is appropriate.

A. Factual Background

Plaintiffs were enrolled as undergraduate students at UM during the Spring 2020 semester. (DE [131] ¶¶ 1). In March 2020, state and local officials in Florida declared a public health emergency due to the spread of the COVID-19 virus. (Id. ¶¶ 15-21). Both the state of Florida and the local government issued emergency orders mandating closure of universities for all purposes except for facilitating virtual learning and providing living quarters for students who could not return home. (Id. ¶¶ 21-24). Beginning March 25, 2020, UM implemented partial closure of its campus housing and transitioned classes to virtual classrooms for the remainder of the semester. (Id. ¶¶ 25-26).

Plaintiffs continued their coursework online and accepted UM's offer to switch their classes to a pass/fail (credit/no credit) basis. (Id. ¶ 29). Plaintiffs received credit for the classes they took that semester. (Id. ¶ 29-31). Neither Plaintiff could state in deposition that their degrees are worth less because part of the semester was taught remotely. (Id. ¶ 30). Plaintiffs contend, however, in their Statement of Facts (DE [140]) that "they received a less valuable education than they paid for Spring 2020 semester when Defendant transitioned online." (Id. ¶ 77).

UM did not offer a rebate of tuition after it transitioned to remote learning, but it did provide prorated refunds for the fees and services that could not be provided in an online or virtual format. (Id. ¶ 32). These refunds included fees for housing, dining, parking, student center, wellness center, health and counseling, student activities, and athletic fees. (Id.). The amount of the refund was based on the number of days that were left in the Spring 2020 semester when the University was forced to transition its classes online by government order, from March 25 to May 6, 2022. (DE [150] ¶ 66; DE [140] ¶ 78).

B. Legal Analysis

Plaintiffs filed suit to recover a portion of the tuition and various fees they paid for the Spring 2020 semester. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint alleges breach of express and implied contract and unjust enrichment on behalf of students who paid tuition for the Spring 2020 semester (Counts I, II, and III) and breach of express and implied contract, breach of implied covenant, and unjust enrichment on behalf of students who paid mandatory fees for the Spring 2020 semester (Counts IV, V, and VI). Plaintiffs also allege breach of contract and unjust enrichment on behalf of themselves seeking a pro rata refund of fees for housing and meal plans (Counts VII and VIII).

1. Tuition Claims

Plaintiffs allege UM breached an express or implied contract to provide only in-person classes and a full on-campus experience when the University transitioned to online learning for the second half of the Spring 2020 semester. UM argues that there is no genuine dispute of fact that would support a finding that such a contract existed. The Court agrees with UM.

To state a claim for breach of contract under Florida law, a party must "establish: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) a material breach of that contract; (3) and damages resulting from the breach." Villard v. Capella Univ., 2017 WL 9253388, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 2011433 (Apr. 30, 2018) (citing Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1272 (11th Cir. 2009)). "In Florida, whether a contract is implied in fact is 'inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case.' " Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1326 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Eskra v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 125 F.3d 1406, 1413 (11th Cir. 1997)). For a contract to exist, "there must be reciprocal assent to certain and definite propositions." Acosta v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Miami-Dade Comm. Coll., 905 So. 2d 226, 228 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).

Florida law recognizes "that colleges and...