In re V.R.

624 S.W.3d 289

In the MATTER OF the Expunction of V.R.

No. 08-18-00189-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, El Paso.

April 30, 2021

Amanda Frizzelle, Kevin McCary, El Paso, Donnie Keith McGilbra, Jo Anne Bernal, for Appellant.

Theresa Caballero, El Paso, for Appellee.

Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, and Alley, JJ.

OPINION

GINA M. PALAFOX, Justice

Appellants, the El Paso County Attorney's Office, El Paso County Sheriff's Office, El Paso County Clerk's Office, District Attorney's Office, District Clerk's Office, Records Management and Archives, West Texas Community Supervision and Corrections Department, El Paso County Court Administration, and Jail Magistrate (collectively, the County), appeal an order granting expunction of all records relating to an arrest of Appellee, V.R., for indecency with a child by sexual contact under cause number 20140D04367 in the 346th District Court of El Paso County, Texas. We issued our original opinion in this case on November 30, 2020. The County filed a motion for rehearing. We withdraw our original opinion and substitute this opinion in its place. The County's motion for rehearing is denied.

In a single issue, the County argues that V.R. failed to prove she was entitled to an expunction under either of the following applicable subsections of article 55.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure : (1) that the prosecution of the offense for which she was arrested was no longer possible because the statute-of-limitations period had expired, pursuant to article 55.01(a)(2)(B) ; or (2) that the presentment of her indictment had been made because of mistake, false information, or other similar reason indicating the absence of probable cause at the time of the dismissal to believe she committed the offense, pursuant to article 55.01(a)(2)(A)(ii)(d). See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.01(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(A)(ii)(d). Finding no error, we affirm the trial court's order of expunction.¹

BACKGROUND

V.R. worked as a homecare provider taking care of children and adults. Employed with an agency, V.R. was assigned to work in a private residence caring for a child who was physically disabled. The child, a 10-year-old boy, was not able to walk or perform many daily activities without assistance due to a condition that weakened the muscles of his body. Three other children lived in the home, two of whom were also disabled and received like care from other caretakers. The mother of the children always remained present while an aunt took care of the oldest child, V.R. took care of the middle child, and another person took care of the youngest girl. While working, V.R. fed the child under her care, changed his diaper, if needed, and moved him back and forth from his wheelchair to his bed.

At the expunction hearing, V.R. testified she was falsely accused of molesting the child under her care. She described that her supervisor had simply stopped her job. After two years went by, she was detained by immigration when she returned to El Paso from a trip to Juarez, Mexico. Until then, she was unaware that an arrest warrant had been issued against her. Following her arrest, V.R. was indicted. The State of Texas, as the prosecuting authority, charged V.R. with indecency with a child by sexual contact. The charge included three paragraphs alleging the following alternatively pleaded acts: (1) touching the male complainant's genitals; (2) causing him to touch her breast; or (3) causing him to touch her genitals.

Later, the State moved to dismiss the charge filed against V.R. The State's motion to dismiss reflected it had moved for a dismissal because "[Complaining Witness's] family does not want to cooperate with prosecution." Granting the motion, the trial court dismissed the charge for the reasons stated by the motion.

Following dismissal of her case, and pursuant to article 55.01(a)(2) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, V.R. filed a petition for expunction of records relating to her arrest for indecency with a child by sexual contact. The County filed a general denial, and the trial court held a hearing on the petition. At the hearing, V.R. was the sole witness to testify, and the only other evidence consisted of the following three exhibits relating to the charge against V.R.: (1) the indictment; (2) the State's motion to dismiss the charge; and (3) the police reports and affidavit from the investigating officer.

At the hearing, V.R. testified she never molested the child under her care, never made him kiss her, never touched his genitals in a sexual manner, nor made him touch her breasts. She further stated that she was never left alone with any child as the other two caretakers were present with her the entire time. On cross-examination, when asked how she knew the accusations were false, V.R. replied: "Because I'm completely innocent. I didn't do anything." Asked a second time about being charged with indecency with a child, V.R. responded, "[t]hat's false on my part. I mean, I didn't do it."

The police department's investigation report detailed the responding officer's interview with the child's mother and with the child himself. The child's mother told the responding officer that, after V.R. had been employed for about three months, her son had reported to her that he had been "sexually abused by [V.R.]." When the boy's mother asked her son what he meant, he responded that V.R. had been touching him on his private parts and had also made him touch V.R.'s breast and vaginal area. The officer further noted that the child's mother reported that her child had no mental disabilities whatsoever; instead, his disabilities were strictly physical. The police report also included a typed summary of an interview with the child conducted by a forensic interviewer at the Advocacy Center. The child repeated the allegations against V.R. when interviewed. As part of their investigation, the report also reflected that the officers contacted V.R.'s attorney in an unsuccessful attempt to speak with V.R. with her attorney present.

After closing arguments, the trial court rendered an order granting V.R.'s petition for expunction "as provided by Article 55.01(a)(2), Texas Code of Criminal Procedure...." The County filed a motion for new trial, requested findings of fact and conclusions of law from the trial judge, and upon the expiration of that deadline, notified the trial court of its past due findings of fact and conclusions of law.² No findings of fact or conclusions of law were entered by the trial court, no further hearings were held, and no other orders were entered. Subsequently, the County timely filed its notice of appeal from the expunction order.

DISCUSSION

In a single issue, the County appeals the trial court's order granting V.R.'s petition for expunction and argues V.R. failed to prove the only ground of the two grounds on which expunction could have been granted. In granting the expunction, the trial court's order stated, "as provided by Article 55.01(a)(2), Texas Code of Criminal Procedure." The County frames the two possible grounds at issue as follows:

[V.R.] was indicted and the case was subsequently dismissed; therefore, there are two ways she may have qualified for an expunction. First, she could have shown that the statute of limitations ran.... Second, [V.R.] could have proven that the grand jury's indictment was dismissed due to mistake of fact (or some similar reason), indicating a lack of probable cause.

Of the two grounds stated, we need only address the second ground because it alone is sufficient to uphold the trial court's order. See TEX.R.APP.P. 47.1.

Standard of Review

The right to an expunction is neither a constitutional nor common-law right, but rather a statutory privilege. In re Expunction of J.R. , 578 S.W.3d 272, 274 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.). An expunction cannot be granted unless the statutory requirements are satisfied. Id. ; see also State v. T.S.N. , 547 S.W.3d 617, 620 (Tex. 2018) ("A person is not entitled to expunction until all of the statutory conditions are met."). An expunction proceeding is civil in nature, and accordingly, the petitioner bears the burden of proving that all statutory requirements have been met. In re Expunction of J.R. , 578 S.W.3d at 274.

A trial court's ruling on a petition for expunction is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Ex parte E.H. , 602 S.W.3d 486, 489 (Tex. 2020) ; State v. T.S.N. , 547 S.W.3d 617, 620 (Tex. 2018). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to guiding rules and principles or it its actions were arbitrary and unreasonable. See In re S.S.A. , 319 S.W.3d 796, 798 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, no pet.). When an appellant asserts that a petitioner failed to prove entitlement to expunction, as was argued here, we apply the traditional legal sufficiency standard of review. In re Expunction of J.A. , 186 S.W.3d 592, 595 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2006, no pet.).

We may sustain a legal sufficiency challenge only if the record discloses one of the following situations: (a) a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (b) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; or (d) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of the vital fact. In Matter of Expunction of A.M. , 511 S.W.3d 591, 594–95 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.) (citing City of Keller v. Wilson , 168 S.W.3d 802, 810 (Tex. 2005) ). In conducting our review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, crediting favorable evidence if a reasonable fact finder could and disregarding contrary evidence unless a reasonable fact finder could not. In Matter of Expunction of A.M. , 511 S.W.3d at 594–95 ; see also City of Keller v. Wilson , 168 S.W.3d at 810. Further, we indulge every reasonable inference that would support the ruling. In Matter of Expunction of...