In re Van Dyke

313 Ga. 53

867 S.E.2d 124

In the MATTER OF Jason Lee VAN DYKE.

S22Y0046

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: December 14, 2021

Jason Lee Van Dyke, The Marsala Law Group, 1417 E. McKinney St., Ste. 110, Denton, Texas 76209, for Appellant.

William Van Hearnburg, Jr., State Bar of Georgia, 104 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 100, Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3592, Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel, Jenny K. Mittelman, William Dallas NeSmith, III, Deputy General Counsel, State Bar of Georgia, 104 Marietta Street, N.W., Suite 100, Atlanta, Georgia 30303-2934, for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on Jason Lee Van Dyke's (State Bar No. 851693) Third Petition for Voluntary Discipline. In his petition, Van Dyke again admits that he violated Rule 8.4 (a) (3) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, found at Bar Rule 4-102 (d), by virtue of his conviction of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude related to his fitness to practice law. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (3) is disbarment. After the State Bar initiated a disciplinary action against Van Dyke pursuant to Bar Rule 4-106, Van Dyke filed his first Petition for Voluntary Discipline, which sought discipline ranging from a public reprimand to six months’ suspension. The State Bar opposed that petition, and the Special Master, Daniel S. Reinhardt, rejected it, noting this Court's general practice of rejecting proposed discipline that ends prior to the completion of a criminal sentence. Van Dyke next sought an indefinite suspension until such time as his criminal sentence was discharged. The State Bar did not oppose that proposed discipline, so long as the lifting of the suspension was conditioned on Van Dyke's providing satisfactory evidence of the final release and discharge of his criminal sentence. The Special Master then submitted a report and recommendation recommending the acceptance of that proposed discipline under the stated condition. But on April 5, 2021, we rejected Van Dyke's Second Petition for Voluntary Discipline. See In the Matter of Van Dyke , 311 Ga. 199, 857 S.E.2d 194 (2021).

In that opinion, we noted that because of the posture of this case, no hearing had yet been held before the Special Master. See id. at 200, 857 S.E.2d 194. After recounting the somewhat complex factual background leading up to this case, we stated, "We are also troubled by several aspects of this case that, we believe, warrant additional factfinding." Id. at 202, 857 S.E.2d 194. Specifically, we noted that "Van Dyke's conduct in the criminal proceeding reflects a level of disrespect for the law and legal process that warrants serious consideration" and that "beyond the passing mention of these issues in Van Dyke's petition, we know nothing about the particulars of this conduct." Id. We also noted that it appeared that the Texas Bar had suspended Van Dyke for 12 months in an entirely separate matter; that it was unclear what conduct gave rise to that sanction; that this Court was not made aware of that sanction and that it was unclear whether Van Dyke complied with his obligation under Rule 9.4 (b) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct as to that sanction; and that "[u]ntil that question is answered, and this Court is apprised of the conduct underlying that sanction, we are unable to make any determination of an appropriate level of discipline in this case." Id. at 203, 857 S.E.2d 194. Therefore, we rejected Van Dyke's second petition for voluntary discipline and

remand[ed the matter] to the Special Master for additional factfinding regarding (1) all disciplinary

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