In re W.K.

379 N.C. 331

864 S.E.2d 313

In the MATTER OF: W.K.

No. 530A20

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Filed November 5, 2021

Andrew L. Fitzgerald, for petitioner-appellees.

No brief for appellee Guardian ad Litem.

Peter Wood, for respondent-appellant father.

HUDSON, Justice.

¶ 1 This case involves a private termination of parental rights proceeding initiated by petitioners, the paternal grandmother and step-grandfather of W.K. (Wallace).¹ Respondent, Wallace's father, appeals from the trial court's order terminating his parental rights. We affirm.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

¶ 2 In April 2015, Wallace was born to respondent and Wallace's biological mother in Virginia. Respondent and Wallace's mother were never married. Wallace lived with his mother. Respondent did not live with them. On 25 November 2015, respondent was indicted on federal drug-related charges and subsequently pled guilty in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine. On 23 September 2016, respondent was sentenced to a term of ninety-five months imprisonment, followed by four years of supervised release. His projected release date is 4 July 2022.

¶ 3 In June 2017, petitioners were contacted by the Wythe County Department of Social Services in Virginia after Wallace's mother was arrested. A 16 June 2017 safety plan developed by the Wythe County Department of Social Services reflects allegations of physical and mental abuse and neglect of Wallace by his mother. Petitioners traveled to Virginia to pick up Wallace, and Wallace has been in petitioners’ custody in North Carolina since 16 June 2017. On 13 July 2017, petitioners were granted sole legal and physical custody of Wallace.

¶ 4 On 2 May 2019, petitioners filed a petition to adopt Wallace. That same day, petitioners filed a petition to terminate respondent's parental rights.² Petitioners alleged that in December 2015, prior to having custody of Wallace, they reported to Wallace's mother their observations that Wallace had weakness in the left side of his body and did not appear to be hitting age-appropriate milestones. However, Wallace's mother did not seek medical attention for Wallace to address their concerns. After they took custody of Wallace, petitioners immediately established medical care for Wallace, and on 29 June 2017, Wallace was diagnosed with cerebral palsy. Wallace was also diagnosed with a vision development disorder. He has numerous medical caregivers, including a primary care provider, pediatric neurologist, pediatric orthopedist, occupational therapist, physical therapist, and speech therapist, and petitioners have managed all medical care for Wallace since June 2017.

¶ 5 Petitioners further alleged as follows: respondent failed to obtain adequate medical care for Wallace; Wallace had been abused or neglected by respondent; respondent was incapable of providing for the proper care and supervision of Wallace such that Wallace was a dependent juvenile, and there was a reasonable probability that the incapacity would continue for the foreseeable future; respondent had willfully abandoned Wallace for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the petition; respondent had not had any physical contact or communication with Wallace since August 2018; and respondent had not made any payments to petitioners for the benefit of Wallace.

¶ 6 A hearing on the petition to terminate respondent's parental rights was held on 14 July 2020. The trial court entered an order on 22 September 2020 concluding that grounds existed to terminate respondent's parental rights in Wallace based on neglect, willfully leaving Wallace in a placement outside of the home for more than twelve months without making reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to his removal, failure to pay child support, and willful abandonment. The trial court also determined that it was in Wallace's best interests that respondent's parental rights be terminated, and the court terminated his parental rights. Respondent appeals.

II. Analysis

¶ 7 Initially, respondent argues that the trial court committed prejudicial error by terminating his parental rights when it failed to articulate the specific statutory grounds supporting termination. Respondent's argument is based on the failure of the trial court to state in its "CONCLUSIONS OF LAW" section of the termination order which subsection of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111 it was relying upon when determining that grounds existed to terminate his parental rights. We are not persuaded.

¶ 8 It is well established that in order to terminate a respondent's parental rights, the trial court must "adjudicate the existence ... of any of the circumstances set forth in G.S. 7B-1111." N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(e) (2019). "[T]he trial court must enter sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to reveal the reasoning which led to the court's ultimate decision." In re D.R.B. , 182 N.C. App. 733, 736, 643 S.E.2d 77 (2007). Whether a trial court classifies statements as findings of fact or conclusions of law, "that classification decision does not alter the fact that the trial court's determination concerning the extent to which a parent's parental rights in a child are subject to termination on the basis of a particular ground must have sufficient support in the trial court's factual findings." In re N.D.A. , 373 N.C. 71, 77, 833 S.E.2d 768 (2019).

¶ 9 Under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), a trial court may terminate parental rights if it concludes that the parent has neglected the juvenile within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7B-101. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (2019). A neglected juvenile is defined, in pertinent part, as a juvenile "whose parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker does not provide proper care, supervision, or discipline; or who has been abandoned; ... or who lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile's welfare." N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15) (2019).

Termination of parental rights based upon this statutory ground requires a showing of neglect at the time of the termination hearing or, if the child has been separated from the parent for a long period of time, there must be a showing of a likelihood of future neglect by the parent. When determining whether such future neglect is likely, the district court must consider evidence of changed circumstances occurring between the period of past neglect and the time of the termination hearing.

In re R.L.D., 375 N.C. 838, 841, 851 S.E.2d 17 (2020) (cleaned up).

¶ 10 Here, the trial court stated in finding of fact 88 that "[a]s to the ground of neglect in the for [sic] termination of parental rights, this Court has found herein neglect in the past in 2017." Wallace was placed with petitioners in 2017 due to respondent's and Wallace's mother's drug addictions and the injurious environment in which Wallace was living. The trial court further found that there was a high probability of future neglect by respondent because he had not demonstrated that he had overcome his drug habit through completing substance abuse treatment in prison, by attending Narcotics Anonymous, or by receiving negative drug tests, and he had not completed any significant substance abuse treatment for methamphetamine use. In addition, the trial court found that respondent's pattern of inconsistent contact and lack of interest in Wallace, both before and after incarceration, revealed "a pattern of neglectful behavior and a higher likelihood of neglect in the future." These findings clearly reveal the trial court's reasoning which led to its ultimate determination to terminate respondent's parental rights for neglect under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). Moreover, as later discussed, this determination is supported by ample evidence and findings. Thus, any potential error is harmless. See In re Bluebird , 105 N.C. App. 42, 51, 411 S.E.2d 820 (1992) (holding that although "[t]he more efficient and prudent practice for trial courts is to delineate the specific grounds for termination," the error is harmless when the findings of fact support a legal conclusion that grounds for termination exist).

¶ 11 Next, respondent argues that the trial court erred in concluding that grounds existed to terminate his parental rights based on neglect. We disagree.

¶ 12 "Our Juvenile Code provides for a two-step process for termination of parental rights proceedings consisting of an adjudicatory stage and a dispositional stage."

In re Z.A.M. , 374 N.C. 88, 94, 839 S.E.2d 792 (2020) (citing N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109, -1110 (2019)). "At the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner bears the burden of proving by ‘clear, cogent, and convincing evidence’ the existence of one or more grounds for termination under section 7B-1111(a) of the General Statutes." In re A.U.D. , 373 N.C. 3, 5–6, 832 S.E.2d 698 (2019) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f) (2019) ). If the trial court finds the existence of one or more grounds to terminate the respondent's parental rights, the matter proceeds to the dispositional stage where the court must determine whether terminating the parent's rights is in the juvenile's best interests. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a).

¶ 13 We review a trial court's adjudication of grounds to terminate parental rights "to determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law." In re E.H.P. , 372 N.C. 388, 392, 831 S.E.2d 49 (2019) (quoting In re Montgomery , 311 N.C. 101, 111, 316 S.E.2d 246 (1984) ). "A trial court's finding of fact that is supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence is deemed conclusive even if the record contains evidence that would support a contrary finding." In re B.O.A. , 372 N.C. 372, 379, 831 S.E.2d 305 (2019). Unchallenged findings are deemed to be supported by the evidence and are binding on appeal. In re Z.L.W. , 372 N.C. 432, 437, 831 S.E.2d 62 (2019). "The trial court's...