Ind. Dep't Of Correction v. Haley

928 N.E.2d 840

INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, Appellant-Respondent,v.Douglas HALEY, Appellee-Petitioner.

No. 56A03-0911-CR-553.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

June 9, 2010.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Kathy Bradley, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Douglas Haley, Miami Correctional Facility, Bunker Hill, IN, pro se.

OPINION

CRONE, Judge.

Case Summary

The Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”) appeals the denial of its motion to correct error, which challenged the trial court's order granting Douglas Haley's petition for educational credit time. We reverse.

Issues

DOC raises two issues, which we restate as follows:

I. Whether the trial court erred in granting Haley's petition for educational credit time; and II. Whether the Newton County Special Prosecutor has the statutory authority to represent DOC in this proceeding.

Facts and Procedural History

In 2003, Haley received a twenty-four-year sentence for a class A felony dealing in cocaine conviction. While in prison, he completed the life skills program “Thinking for a Change.” He also earned a bachelor's degree from Ball State University. He requested educational credit time for completing the life skills program from DOC but was denied. On April 3, 2009, Haley filed a motion for six months' educational credit time in the Newton Superior Court under his criminal cause number. DOC was not served with this motion.

On June 2, 2009, a hearing on Haley's motion was held. The Newton County Special Prosecutor appeared for the State. DOC did not appear. At the hearing, the trial court asked the special prosecutor whether DOC was a necessary party. Tr. at 9. The special prosecutor replied,

I would think so, but I guess we're the State.

....

And we don't normally represent DOC. We do represent the Bureau of Motor Vehicles fairly often but I have never been called in as a prosecutor or deputy prosecutor, either one, to represent the Department of Corrections. I don't know of any language authorizing that. I think that's the Attorney General's purview, not ours. My other question is that the Defendant's evidence has lacked showing us what credit time that he has earned. .... How are we to know without the DOC here with us how many credits he has received?

Id. at 9-10. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement.

On July 6, 2009, the trial court granted Haley's motion for educational credit time. On July 16, 2009, the Deputy Attorney General (“DAG”) filed a motion to intervene on behalf of DOC. DOC also filed a motion to correct error, asserting that the trial court had misinterpreted the relevant statute and that Haley was not entitled to educational credit time. A hearing on DOC's motions was held on August 25, 2009, at which both the Newton County Special Prosecutor and the DAG appeared. The Newton County Special Prosecutor objected to the motion to intervene and argued that “the State of Indiana as represented by the Prosecuting Attorney is adequate to protect the interests of the DOC at the trial level.” Id. at 28. On September 24, 2009, the trial court issued an order granting DOC's motion to intervene but denying its motion to correct error, which provided in pertinent part as follows:

The court notes that the Deputy Attorney General is requesting the granting of the Motion to Intervene and the State of Indiana represented by the Special Prosecutor in the case is objecting to the same, said Special Prosecutor believing that in the criminal case she has sufficient authority to represent the interests of the State of Indiana in regard to a criminal case in which a conviction against the petitioner was entered. At the original hearing, the Special Prosecutor consented to proceeding as the Special Prosecutor in the case and as representative for the Department of Correction. The Deputy Attorney General, in substance, is indicating that the Department of Correction is somehow different from the State of Indiana and the Special Prosecutor in this criminal case has lost the authority to represent the State of Indiana. ....A transcript of the hearing on the Motion to Correct Errors would focus on the divergent positions and the fact that the two different representatives of the State of Indiana are taking opposite positions. However, in order for this issue to potentially be addressed, the court now grants the Motion to Intervene, even though this court believes that the Department of Correction was and has continuously been represented by the Special Prosecutor.

Appellant's App. at 38. DOC appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Educational Credit Time

DOC contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion to correct error, arguing that the trial court misinterpreted the applicable statute regarding Haley's motion for educational credit time. Generally, we review rulings on motions to correct error for an abuse of discretion. Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Charles, 919 N.E.2d 114, 116 (Ind.Ct.App.2009); ¹ Supervised Estate of Williamson v. Williamson, 798 N.E.2d 238, 241(Ind.Ct.App.2003). However, where there is a question of law, our standard of review is de novo. Miller v. Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 878 N.E.2d 346, 351 (Ind.Ct.App.2007); Young v. Ind. Dep't of Natural Res., 789 N.E.2d 550, 554 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) trans. denied. In this case, the issue presented is one of statutory interpretation, and therefore our review of the trial court's ruling is de novo.

The primary goal in statutory construction is to determine, give effect to, and implement the legislature's intent. To effectuate legislative intent, we read the sections of an act together in order that no part is rendered meaningless if it can be harmonized with the remainder of the statute. The statute or regulation must be construed as a whole looking to its object and policy. Words and phrases are taken in their plain, ordinary, and usual meaning unless a different purpose is manifested by the statute. Further, we presume that the legislature intended logical application of the language used in the statute, so as to avoid unjust or absurd results.

Dev. Servs. Alternatives, Inc. v. Ind. Family & Social Servs. Admin., 915 N.E.2d 169, 181 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted) trans. denied (2010).

An interpretation of a statute by an administrative agency charged with the duty of enforcing the statute is entitled to great weight, unless this interpretation would be inconsistent with the statute itself. .... Deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute becomes a consideration when a statute is ambiguous and susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation. When a court is faced with two reasonable interpretations of a statute, one of which is supplied by an administrative agency charged with enforcing the statute, the court should defer to the agency.

Pierce v. State Dep't. of Corr., 885 N.E.2d 77, 89 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

Educational credit time is governed by Indiana Code Section 35-50-6-3.3, ² which provides in relevant part as follows:

(a) In addition to any credit time a person earns under subsection (b) or section 3 of this chapter, a person earns credit time if the person:

(1) is in credit Class I;

(2) has demonstrated a pattern consistent with rehabilitation; and

(3) successfully completes requirements to obtain one (1) of the following:

(A) A general educational development (GED) diploma under IC 20-20-6, if the person has not previously obtained a high school diploma.

(B) A high school diploma, if the person has not previously obtained a general educational development (GED) diploma.

(C) An associate's degree from an approved postsecondary educational institution (as defined under IC 21-7-13-6(a)).

(D) A bachelor's degree from an approved postsecondary educational institution (as defined under IC 21-7-13-6(a)).

(b) In addition to any credit time that a person earns under subsection (a) or section 3 of this chapter, a person may earn credit time if, while confined by the department of correction, the person:

(1) is in credit Class I;

(2) demonstrates a pattern consistent with rehabilitation; and

(3) successfully completes requirements to obtain at least one (1) of the following:

....

(C) A certificate of completion of a literacy and basic life skills program approved by the department of correction.

....

(c) The department of correction shall establish admissions criteria and other requirements for programs available for earning credit time under subsection (b). A person may not earn credit time under both subsections (a ) and (b ) for the same program of study.

(d) The amount of credit time a person may earn under this section is the following:

....

(4) Two (2) years for completion of a bachelor's degree.

....

(7) Not more than a total of six (6 ) months credit, as determined by the department of correction, for the completion of one (1) or more literacy and basic life skills programs approved by the department of correction.

(Emphases added.)

Haley sought educational credit pursuant to 35-50-6-3.3(b). The source of the parties' dispute lies in subparagraph (b)(3)(C); namely, what constitutes an acceptable course of study that fulfills the “literacy and basic life skills program.” The parties agree that the “Thinking for a Change” program satisfies the basic life skills component, but they do not agree regarding the literacy component. Haley asserts that his bachelor's degree satisfies the literacy component, and the trial court agreed. DOC contends that the literacy component is satisfied by the adult basic education programs offered in their facilities.

In support of its argument, DOC relies on Executive Directive # 04-32, adopted by the DOC on June 8, 2004, which provides in pertinent part,

This Executive Directive is in reference to Executive Directive # 03-55 and is to clarify and supersede that Executive Directive. Executive Directive # 03-55

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