Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal. v. City of L. A.

205 F.Supp.3d 1105

INDEPENDENT LIVING CENTER OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.CITY OF LOS ANGELES, et al., Defendants.

Case No. CV 12-0551 FMO (PJWx)

United States District Court, C.D. California.

Signed August 31, 2016

David O. Iyalomhe, David Iyalomhe And Associates, Odion L. Okojie, Law Offices of Odion L. Okojie, Autumn M. Elliott, Maronel Barajas, Panchalam Seshan Srividya, Disability Rights California, Los Angeles, CA, D. Scott Chang, Jennifer I. Klar, John P. Relman, Laura Gaztambide-Arandes, Michael G. Allen, Relman Dane and Colfax PLLC, Washington, DC, Dara L. Schur, Protection and Advocacy, Oakland, CA, David Grant Geffen, David Geffen Law Firm, Santa Monica, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Deborah J. Breithaupt, Michael C. Heinrichs, Robert P. Moore, Los Angeles City Attorney's Office, Melissa T. Daugherty, Kelsey Elizabeth Fisher, Melissa T. Daugherty, Robert Michael Collins, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard and Smith LLP, Roberto Lara, Lara Ibarra and Davis LLP, Derrick S. Lowe, Phillip A. Baker, Baker Keener and Nahra LLP, John R. Benson, Law Office of John R. Benson, Dimitrios Peter Biller, Paficia Palisades, Leo D. Plotkin, Levy Small and Lallas, Los Angeles, CA, Theresa L. Kitay, Theresa L. Kitay Attorney at Law, Marina Del Rey, CA, Megan Kathleen Garibaldi, Mark Jason Austin, Rutan and Tucker LLP, Costa Mesa, CA, William Jeffrey Goines, Alice Chu, Greenberg Traurig LLP, East Palo Alto, CA, Christopher P. Warne, Warne Law Firm, A Professional Corporation, Woodland Hills, CA, Scott Parrish Moore, Anthony Domenic Todero, Baird Holm LLP, Omaha, NE, Barry Clifford Snyder, Snyder Law LLP, Santa Barbara, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER RE: MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Fernando M. Olguin, United States District Judge

INTRODUCTION

Having reviewed and considered all the briefing filed with respect to defendant CRA/LA Designated Local Authority's ("CRA/LA") Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, (Dkt. 494, "Motion"), the court finds that oral argument is not necessary to resolve the Motions, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 78 ; Local Rule 7-15; Willis v. Pac. Mar. Ass'n , 244 F.3d 675, 684 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2001), and concludes as follows.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Independent Living Center of Southern California, Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley, and Communities Actively Living Independent and Free (collectively, "plaintiffs") filed this action on January 13, 2012, alleging that the City of Los Angeles ("City") and the Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles ("CRA") "engage[d] in a pattern or practice of discrimination against people with disabilities" in violation of: the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701, et seq. ; the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. ; and Cal. Gov't Code § 11135. (See Dkt. 1, Complaint at ¶ 85). On February 1, 2012, the CRA was dissolved by California Assembly Bill No. 26 (2011), codified at Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 34161 -91 (the "Dissolution Law"), which "transferr[ed] to successor entities all authority, rights, powers, duties and obligations previously vested with the former redevelopment agencies[.]" (Dkt. 98, Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") at ¶ 44). Plaintiffs filed the operative SAC on August 20, 2012, asserting an additional claim under the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, et seq. , (see id. at ¶¶ 245-48), and adding CRA/LA as a defendant. (See id. at ¶¶ 46-52).

LEGAL STANDARD

"After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). "Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the moving party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., Inc. , 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989). The court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Fleming v. Pickard , 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). "[T]he same standard of review applicable to a Rule 12(b) motion applies to its Rule 12(c) analog[,]" because the motions are "functionally identical [.]"

Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. , 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir.), cert. denied , 493 U.S. 812, 110 S.Ct. 59, 107 L.Ed.2d 26 (1989).

As with a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss, a Rule 12(c) motion should be granted if the plaintiff fails to proffer "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ; Cook v. Brewer , 637 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2011). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 ; see also Cook , 637 F.3d at 1004 ; Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc. , 590 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 2010). In considering a Rule 12(c) motion, the court "generally is limited to the pleadings and may not consider extrinsic evidence [,]" Shame on You Prods., Inc. v. Banks , 120 F.Supp.3d 1123, 1143–44 (C.D. Cal. 2015), but may rely on exhibits attached to the complaint and documents subject to judicial notice. See id. at 1144.

DISCUSSION

I. MOTION TO STRIKE.

CRA/LA argues that the City lacks standing to oppose the Motion because it has no active cross-claims against CRA/LA. (See Dkt. 514, Motion to Strike at 2). Some courts have held that co-defendants lack standing to oppose each other's motions unless a cross-claim is pending. See , e.g. , Eckert v. City of Sacramento , 2009 WL 3211278, *3 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that where "there is no crossclaim between the Defendants ... [they] are not adverse parties and the City therefore does not have standing to oppose [co-defendant's] motion"); Blonder v. Casco Inn Residential Care, Inc. , 2000 WL 761895, *1 (D. Me. 2000) (holding that "one codefendant [may] be the sole, successful, opposition to another codefendant's motion for summary judgment" in the "absence of cross-claims," relying on "principles underlying Rule 56" to avoid trial when appropriate). Other courts have rejected this approach as "unnecessarily myopic[,]" Stone v. Marten Transport, LLC , 2014 WL 1666420, *4 (M.D. Tenn. 2014), and have considered a co-defendant's opposing brief even when the parties are not "on opposite sides of the ‘v.’ " Id. ("Because [co-defendants] certainly ‘have a dog in this fight,’ the court finds that they have standing to challenge the motion."); see also Helen of Troy, L.P. v. Zotos Corp. , 235 F.R.D. 634, 640 (W.D. Tex. 2006) (rejecting overly narrow construction of "adverse party" in the context of Rule 56). Here, the court is persuaded that the City has a strong interest in the outcome of the Motion and will therefore consider its opposition.¹

II. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS.

"In the aftermath of World War II, the [California] Legislature authorized the formation of community redevelopment agencies in order to remediate urban decay." Cal. Redevelopment Ass'n v. Matosantos , 53 Cal.4th 231, 245, 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 683, 267 P.3d 580 (2011) (describing the history of redevelopment agencies). By 2011, nearly 400 redevelopment agencies were active in the state. See id. at 246, 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 683, 267 P.3d 580. In June of that year, the legislature passed, and Governor Jerry Brown signed, the Dissolution Law, which "dissolve[d] all redevelopment agencies ... and transfer[red] control of redevelopment agency assets to successor agencies, which [we]re contemplated to be the city or county that created the redevelopment agency [.]" Id. at 250–51, 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 683, 267 P.3d 580.

The Dissolution Law "provide[s] a detailed scheme for winding down the activities" of the former redevelopment agencies. See Macy v. City of Fontana , 244 Cal.App.4th 1421, 1428, 198 Cal.Rptr.3d 867 (2016). Specifically, the scheme divided each redevelopment agency's assets, liabilities, and responsibilities between two distinct entities: a "successor agency" and a "housing successor." See id. at 1428, 198 Cal.Rptr.3d 867 (explaining that, "other than a [redevelopment agency's] housing assets, all assets and liabilities of individual [redevelopment agencies] would be assumed by individual ‘successor agencies' and that the [redevelopment agency's] housing assets would be assumed by individual ‘housing successors.’ "). The Dissolution Law "gave any municipality that created [a redevelopment agency] the option to become either the [agency's] ‘successor agency,’ ‘housing successor,’ or both [.]" Id. at 1428–29, 198 Cal.Rptr.3d 867 ; see also Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 34173(d) & 34176(a) -(b). If a municipality elected not to become the housing successor, the Dissolution Law "permitted [the] local housing authority to become [the] ‘housing successor[ ]’ " instead. See Macy , 244 Cal.App.4th at 1428, 198 Cal.Rptr.3d 867 ; see also Cal. Health & Safety Code § 34176(b). If the municipality elected not to become the successor agency, the Dissolution Law automatically created a successor agency in the former redevelopment agency's place. See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 34173(d)(3)(A).

The CRA was a redevelopment agency created "to conduct redevelopment and revitalization activities using public and private funds in designated areas of the City of Los Angeles." (Dkt. 98, SAC at ¶ 36). It was overseen by "a Board of Commissioners appointed by the Mayor of the City of Los Angeles and confirmed by the Los Angeles City Council[,]" (id. at ¶ 40), and its "every action" was subject to City Council approval. (See id. at ¶ 41). As a result, when the Dissolution Law was enacted, the City was required to decide whether it would become the CRA's housing successor,...