Indian Harbor Ins. Co. v. Willard, 1:20-cv-1207-MLB

Indian Harbor Insurance Company, Plaintiff, v. Kevin Willard, Defendant.

No. 1:20-cv-1207-MLB

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division

August 23, 2021

OPINION & ORDER

MICHAEL L. BROWN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This insurance coverage dispute arises out of an automobile collision involving Defendant Kevin Willard (a Lyft driver) Trevor Gabbidon (his passenger), and Gregory Adams (another motorist). Plaintiff Indian Harbor Insurance Company (Lyft's insurer) brought this declaratory action to limit its liability to Defendant under uninsured/underinsured motorist provisions of its agreement with Lyft. Plaintiff and Defendant now cross-move for summary judgment. (Dkts. 43; 44.) The Court denies both.

I. Background

On May 23, 2019, Defendant Willard got a ride on Lyft. (Dkts. 43-2 ¶ 1; 45 ¶¶ 1-2; 50 ¶¶ 1-2.) Mr Gabbidon was his driver. (Id.) While Mr. Gabbidon was making a turn, he collided with a vehicle driven by Mr Adams. (Dkts. 43-2 ¶ 1; 45 ¶ 1; 50 ¶ 1.) Defendant was injured in the accident and blamed both Mr. Gabbidon and Mr. Adams. (Dkts. 45 ¶¶ 45; 50 ¶¶ 4-5.)

Prior to the accident Plaintiff issued a Commercial Lines Insurance Policy to Lyft as the named insurer (“Policy”). The Policy was effective on the day of the accident. (Dkts. 43-2 ¶ 4; 45 ¶ 9; 50 ¶ 9.) It provided commercial auto liability coverage with a $1 million liability cap per incident and UM coverage according to endorsements. (Dkts. 45 ¶ 10; 50 ¶ 10.) Plaintiff initially issued the Policy with a Georgia Uninsured Motorists-Added On To At-Fault Liability Limits Endorsement that set a liability limit of $1 million per accident (“Added On UM Endorsement”). (Dkts. 45 ¶ 11; 50 ¶ 11.) Effective March 21, 2019, the Policy was amended to delete the Added On UM Endorsement and replace it with Endorsements Nos. 44 and 45 known as the “Notification to Others of Cancellation, Non-Renewal or Reduction In Limits and the Georgia Uninsured Motorists Coverage-Reduced By At-Fault Liability Limits” (“Endorsement”).^[1] (Dkts. 43-2 ¶ 5; 45 ¶ 12; 50 ¶ 12.)^[2] The Endorsement, which was effective at the time of the accident, set the limits of insurance as $1 million for each accident. (Dkts. 45 ¶ 13; 50 ¶ 13.) The Endorsement provides:

D. Limit Of Insurance

...

2. No one will be entitled to receive duplicate payments for the same elements of “loss” under this Coverage Form, any Liability Coverage Form or any Medical Payments Coverage endorsement attached to this Coverage Part.

We will not make a duplicate payment under this coverage for any element of “loss” for which payment has been made by or for anyone who is legally responsible. ...

3. The Limit of insurance under this coverage shall be reduced by all sums paid or payable by or for anyone who is legally responsible, including all sums paid under this Coverage Form's Covered Autos Liability Coverage.

(Dkt. 1-6 at 3.)

At the time of the accident Mr. Gabbidon qualified as an insured under the Policy. (Dkts. 45 ¶ 14; 50 ¶ 14.) Because he had secured a ride through Lyft's ride-sharing network, Defendant also qualified as an insured for purposes of the Policy's UM coverage. (Dkts. 45 ¶ 15; 50 ¶ 15.) In October 2019, Plaintiff paid Defendant a confidential settlement on behalf of Lyft, Mr. Gabbidon, and others from the Covered Autos Liability Coverage provided under the Policy.^[3] (Dkts. 43-2 ¶ 8; 45 ¶ 6; 50 ¶ 6.) In November 2019, Defendant sued Mr. Adams in the State Court of Cobb County, Georgia for personal injuries and damages.^[4] (Dkts. 43-2 ¶ 9; 45 ¶ 7; 50 ¶ 7.) Defendant also served a copy of the summons and complaint on Plaintiff, claiming he is entitled to uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage under the Policy as a result of the alleged negligence of Mr. Adams. (Dkts. 43-2 ¶ 9; 45 ¶ 7; 50 ¶ 7.) Mr. Adams' automobile insurer, USAA, paid Defendant $25, 000 in liability limits under the USAA policy. (Dkts. 43-2 ¶ 10; 45 ¶ 8; 50 ¶ 8.)

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed this federal action in March 2020, seeking a declaration that (1) the limits of the uninsured motorist coverage provided in the Policy are offset by the money it previously paid Defendant and that USAA paid Defendant and (2) Defendant is not entitled to receive duplicate payments for the same elements of his loss, or his alleged injuries and damages from the accident, under the Covered Autos Liability Coverage provided in the Policy or by the USAA liability policy issued to Mr. Adams. (Dkt. 1 at 9.) On February 19, 2021, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. (Dkts. 43; 44.) II. Standard of Review

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” W. Grp. Nurseries, Inc. v. Ergas, 167 F.3d 1354, 1360 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A factual dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 1361 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing a court, by reference to materials in the record, that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004). The nonmoving party then has the burden of showing that summary judgment is improper by coming forward with “specific facts” showing a genuine dispute. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). Ultimately, there is no “genuine issue for trial” when “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Id. “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48 (emphasis in original).

Throughout its analysis, the Court must “resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-movant[] and draw all justifiable inferences in his or her favor.” Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc)). “It is not the court's role to weigh conflicting evidence or to make credibility determinations; the non-movant's evidence is to be accepted for purposes of summary judgment.” Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996).

The standard of review for cross-motions for summary judgment does not differ from the standard applied when only one party files a motion. “In practice, cross motions for summary judgment may be probative of the nonexistence of a factual dispute, but this procedural posture does not automatically empower the court to dispense with the determination whether questions of material fact exist.” Georgia State Conference of NAACP v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 775 F.3d 1336, 1345 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal citation omitted). The Court applies the standard outlined above to each party's motion.

III. Discussion

A. Amount of UM Coverage

The sole issue before the Court is the amount of uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage provided by the Policy to Defendant for injuries and damages arising from his claim against Gregory Adams. (Dkt. 12 at 4.) Defendant does not contest that Plaintiff may reduce the available uninsured coverage by the $25, 000 paid by Mr. Adams' insurance coverage. (Dkt. 43-1 at 9 n.1.) The Court will thus solely address whether Plaintiff can reduce the available underinsured motorist coverage by the sum it paid Defendant in the settlement of his claim against the Lyft driver.

“[I]nsurance in Georgia is a matter of contract, and this Court has long held that such contract disputes are well suited for adjudication by summary judgment because construction of a contract is ordinarily a matter of law for the court.” Goldeagle Ventures, LLC v. Covington Specialty Ins. Co., 825 S.E.2d 881, 884 (Ga.Ct.App. 2019) (quoting S. Tr. Ins. Co. v. Cravey, 814 S.E.2d 802, 803 (Ga.Ct.App. 2018)). The central rule of contract interpretation is to find the parties' intent. O.C.G.A. § 13-2-3 (“The cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain the intention of the parties.”). To do so, the Court starts with the contract's plain meaning. See Goldeneagle Ventures, 825 S.E.2d at 884. If unambiguous, the Court applies that meaning. See id. But if the contract is ambiguous (that is, its provisions are susceptible to more than one meaning) the Court uses the rules of contract construction to resolve the ambiguity. See id.; First Acceptance Ins. Co. of Ga., Inc. v. Hughes, 826 S.E.2d 71, 75 (Ga. 2019) (“Ambiguity is defined as duplicity, indistinctness, an uncertainty of meaning or expression used in a written instrument, and also signifies of doubtful or uncertain nature; wanting clearness or definiteness; difficult to comprehend or distinguish; of doubtful purport; open to various interpretations.”). And if the contract remains ambiguous after application of those rules, the Court can examine extrinsic evidence. See Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Snipes, 680 S.E.2d 438, 441 (Ga.Ct.App. 2009).

Plaintiff asserts, and the Court agrees, the plain language of the Policy's Endorsement unambiguously states the UM limit is reduced by all sums paid or payable by or for anyone who is legally responsible. Plaintiff says this means the $1 million limit is reduced by sums paid...