Individually ex rel. Situated v. Hawai`i

ALEXANDRIA GREGG Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. THE STATE OF HAWAII, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, et al., Defendants.

CIV. NO. 14-00056 JMS-KSC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII

August 18, 2014

ORDER (1) GRANTING DEFENDANTS STATE OF HAWAII, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, TED SAKAI IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, STATE OF HAWAII, AND NEAL WAGATSUMA, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS WARDEN OF THE KAUAI COMMUNITY CORRECTIONAL CENTER, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, STATE OF HAWAII, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY'S MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, DOC. NO. 19; AND (2) GRANTING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, DOC. NO. 27

I. INTRODUCTION

On January 31, 2014, Plaintiff Alexandria Gregg ("Plaintiff"), individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, brought this civil rights class action against Defendants State of Hawaii, Department of Public Safety ("DPS"); Ted Sakai in his official capacity as Director of DPS ("Sakai"); and Neal Wagatsuma ("Wagatsuma") in both his individual and official capacity as Warden of the Kauai Community Correctional Center ("KCCC"). Plaintiff alleges that while she was incarcerated at KCCC in March 2011 and June to November 2011, she experienced cruel and unusual punishment and other unlawful treatment when Wagatsuma subjected Plaintiff and others similarly situated to harassment, sexual psychological humiliation, and public sexual degradation.

Currently before the court are (1) DPS, Sakai, and Wagatsuma in his official capacity's (collectively "State Defendants") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), Doc. No. 19, and (2) Wagatsuma, in his individual capacity's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Doc. No. 27. State Defendants argue that the Eleventh Amendment bars certain aspects of Plaintiff's claims, and all Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Based on the following, the courtGRANTS the Motions and dismisses Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), without leave for Plaintiff to amend.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff's claims are based on events that occurred while she was detained at KCCC during various periods from March to November 2011. See Doc. No. 7, FAC ¶ 8.

1. March 2011 Incarceration at KCCC

When Plaintiff was first detained at KCCC in March 2011, she was placed in the Life Time Stand ("LTS") housing, where conditions are less restrictive for detainees. Id. ¶ 18. While in custody, Plaintiff asserts that Wagatsuma repeatedly forced her and other female inmates to stand at a podium and speak about their private, intimate, and traumatizing sexual experiences. Id. ¶ 19. During these sessions, Wagatsuma asked Plaintiff questions such as whether she had sex while on drugs, how many sexual partners she had, whether she had been raped, and the circumstances of her rape. Id. Wagatsuma also allowed male detainees to question and harass Plaintiff and other class members, and Plaintiff felt pressured and forced into answering improper questions. Id. ¶ 21. Wagatsumahad male detainees videotape these sessions, which would then be shown to KCCC's detainee population. Id. ¶ 19.

After Plaintiff was released from KCCC on March 28, 2011, she requested that Wagatsuma return the videotapes documenting Plaintiff's statements. Id. ¶ 24. In response, Wagatsuma refused, asserting that they were destroyed. Id.

2. June to November 2011 Incarceration KCCC

Plaintiff returned to KCCC in June 2011, when she was pregnant. Id. ¶¶ 25-26. Plaintiff asserts that Wagatsuma became upset when he learned the identity of the father, and placed Plaintiff in KCCC's regular module units instead of LTS housing. Id. ¶¶ 26-27. It was not until Plaintiff's child was born in September 2011 and she began pumping breast milk that Wagatsuma transferred Plaintiff to LTS housing. Id. ¶ 28.

While Plaintiff was in LTS housing, Wagatsuma allegedly resumed his public questioning of Plaintiff regarding her private sexual matters. Id. ¶ 29. During these sessions in which male detainees and KCCC staff were present, Wagatsuma would ask Plaintiff, for example, how many males in the group Plaintiff slept with and would call her a "batuna," a local slang word for a woman who engages in sex for drugs. Id. Wagatsuma subsequently transferred Plaintiffback to the regular module units when he learned that she had stopped pumping breast milk, and Plaintiff became severely depressed. Id. ¶¶ 30-31.

Plaintiff asserts that "[s]ometime in November of 2011, Plaintiff could not tolerate Wagatsuma's continued harassment, sexual psychological humiliation, and improper treatment." Id. ¶ 32. As a result, Plaintiff requested and was granted a transfer to federal custody at the Federal Detention Center ("FDC") in Honolulu. Id. Plaintiff was detained at the FDC from November 2011 until her release on May 15, 2012. Id. ¶ 33.

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed this action on January 31, 2014, and filed her FAC on March 21, 2014. Doc. No. 7. The FAC asserts claims titled (1) Cruel and Unusual Punishment Under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution; (2) Violations of Due Process of Law Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; (3) Failure of the State of Hawaii to Properly Oversee and Supervise Mental Health Treatment/Services at KCCC; (4) Violations of the Right to Freedom of Speech Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution (incorrectly labeled as a second "Third Claim for Relief"); (5) Violation of Equal Protection Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution; (6) Violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983; and(7) Violations of Hawaii State Constitution.

On May 1, 2014, State Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss. Doc. No. 19. On May 20, 2014, Wagatsuma filed his Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Doc. No. 27. Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on June 9, 2014, Doc. No. 29, and an Opposition to the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on June 16, 2014. Doc. No. 36. Replies were filed on June 16 and 2014. Doc. Nos. 35, 37. Pursuant to the court's July 1, 2014 Entering Order, Doc. No. 38, Defendants filed a Supplemental Memorandum on July 2, 2014. Doc. No. 39. A hearing was held on July 7, 2014.

On July 8, 2014, a status conference was held in which the parties agreed for the court to hold in abeyance its determination on the Motions to allow Plaintiff forty-five days to seek leave to amend the FAC. See Doc. No. 42. In an August 18, 2014 letter, Plaintiff's counsel notified the court that she would not be filing a motion seeking to name a replacement class representative such that the Motions are ripe for adjudication. Doc. No. 44.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) authorizes a court to dismiss claims over which it lacks proper subject matter jurisdiction. The court maydetermine jurisdiction on a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) so long as "the jurisdictional issue is [not] inextricable from the merits of a case." Kingman ReefAtoll Invs., L.L.C. v. United States, 541 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2008). The moving party "should prevail [on a motion to dismiss] only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law." Casumpang v. Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, 269 F.3d 1042, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation and quotation marks omitted); Tosco Corp. v. Cmtys. for a Better Env't, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2001).

B. Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c)

Rule 12(b)(6) motions are virtually identical to Rule 12(c) motions, with the only practical difference being the time of filing, and the court therefore applies the same standard of review to both motions. See Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that Rule 12(c) and Rule 12(b)(6) motions differ in time of filing but are otherwise "functionally identical," and applying the same standard of review). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a motion to dismiss a claim for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]" Similarly, in considering a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court must accept as true all factual allegationsin the complaint, and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009).

To survive either of these motions, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see Weber v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 521 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008). This tenet -- that the court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint -- "is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) ("[A]llegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.").

Rather, "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In other words, "the factual allegations that are takenas true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it...