Ing v. Eddins (In re Eddins)

342 Mich.App. 529

995 N.W.2d 604

IN RE Alondra EDDINS.

Daniel Ing, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Alondra Eddins, formerly known as Hurtlean Eddins, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 360060

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted June 7, 2022, at Grand Rapids.

Decided August 11, 2022, 9:00 a.m.

Eli Savit, Prosecuting Attorney, and Jadd Harajli, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for petitioner.

Jon Luker, Ypsilanti, for respondent.

Before: Ronayne Krause, P.J., and M. J. Kelly and Yates, JJ.

M. J. Kelly, J. Respondent appeals by right the probate court's order finding that she required continued treatment on the basis of mental illness. Respondent contends that the most-recent petition for continuing mental health treatment was deficient because it did not set forth all the factual information required by MCL 330.1473 of the Mental Health Code, MCL 330.1001 et seq. She argues that because the petition did not strictly comply with the applicable statutory requirements, the probate court was deprived of subject-matter jurisdiction. Alternatively, she asserts that the probate court should have granted her summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) because the petition for continuing mental health treatment failed to state a claim. Because there are no errors warranting reversal, we affirm.

I. BASIC FACTS

Respondent has a long history of receiving involuntary mental health treatment. The initial petition seeking involuntary mental health treatment for respondent was filed on August 18, 2014. It alleged that respondent was experiencing visual hallucinations of figures and bugs, had gone two months without psychiatric medications, had increased paranoia, believed that she was possessed by demons, and had homicidal ideation toward the individuals that she believed had used "witchcraft" on her. On November 5, 2014, the probate court entered an order requiring respondent to undergo 60 days of hospitalization and 90 days of alternative treatment. Thereafter, in response to subsequent petitions seeking continuing involuntary mental health treatment for respondent, the probate court entered additional orders requiring respondent to be hospitalized and/or receive outpatient treatment. Those orders were entered in January 2015, February 2016, January 2017, December 2017, November 2018, October 2019, and October 2020.

On September 15, 2021, the petition at issue in this case was filed, and, as required by MCL 330.1473, it was accompanied by a clinical certificate. ¹ A hearing on the petition was held on January 5, 2022. At the hearing, respondent's lawyer made an oral motion to dismiss the petition under MCR 2.116(C)(4). Respondent's lawyer argued that because the petition did not exactly comply with the requirements stated in the Mental Health Code, the trial court lacked jurisdiction pursuant to MCL 330.1403. ² The probate court decided that it would continue with the proofs and rule on respondent's motion at the end of the hearing.

The court heard testimony from the doctor who filed the clinical certificate submitted with the 2021 petition. The doctor recounted that respondent's history of mental illness dated back to 1992. He explained that medication provided to her had improved her situation but had not entirely eliminated her delusions. The treatment team continued to be worried about respondent's threats to kill her sister-in-law. He noted that "this delusion has gone on for 30 years," that they had tried "probably 10 different oral medications," and that they had simply not been able to convince respondent that many of her beliefs were symptoms and not real. He explained that respondent did not believe she had an illness. The doctor opined that respondent's conduct for the past 22 years supported his determination that respondent would not take her medication without a court order. On cross-examination, respondent's lawyer suggested that respondent's beliefs were actually just aspects of her religion or culture. The doctor disagreed, explaining that many of respondent's delusional beliefs had no religious aspect and that respondent was actually paranoid and threatening the safety of others.

After the doctor testified, petitioner moved to amend the petition. The court granted the motion, stating:

Okay. So we're dealing with a petition that was filed September 15th, 2021. And I am going to allow amendment to conform to the proofs. I do not believe that the admission of the evidence would prejudice [inaudible—background noise] defending this case on the merits. I think it was very clear after 30 years of having this illness and having petitions being filed on a regular basis why this case was brought and why we are here. So I am preempting that motion to amend.

Thereafter, respondent moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), asserting that "the petition in this case, as stated above, fails to include the fact statements required by the statute," which "not only deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction, but it also defeats Petitioner's claim." The trial court denied the motion, stating that it was allowing amendment of the pleadings. The court also noted that, in light of the case's history, respondent was aware of why the petition was brought. Ultimately, the trial court concluded that respondent continued to need treatment. ³

II. SUMMARY DISPOSITION

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Respondent argues that summary disposition was warranted under MCR 2.116(C)(4) or MCR 2.116(C)(8). We review de novo a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition. Barnard Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Gates Performance Engineering , Inc. , 285 Mich.App. 362, 369, 775 N.W.2d 618 (2009). Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4) is mandated when "[t]he court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter." "Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction presents a question of law that this Court reviews de novo." Reynolds v Robert Hasbany, MD PLLC , 323 Mich App 426, 431, 917 N.W.2d 715 (2018). Summary disposition is warranted under MCR 2.116(C)(8) if petitioner has "failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." A (C)(8) motion "tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint on the basis of the pleadings alone." Beaudrie v Henderson , 465 Mich. 124, 129, 631 N.W.2d 308 (2001). A petition filed in the probate court is a pleading. See MCR 5.001(B)(2) ("References to ‘pleadings’ in the Michigan Court Rules also apply to petitions, objections, and claims in probate court proceedings."). "A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) may only be granted when a claim is so clearly unenforceable that no factual development could possibly justify recovery." El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc , 504 Mich. 152, 160, 934 N.W.2d 665 (2019).

B. ANALYSIS

The underlying premise of respondent's arguments on appeal is that the 2021 petition for continuing mental health treatment did not strictly comply with the requirements stated in MCL 330.1473, ⁴ and, as a result, the probate court was deprived of subject-matter jurisdiction. We first address whether the petition was defective under MCL 330.1473.

Under MCL 330.1473, a petition for continuing involuntary mental health treatment must

contain a statement setting forth the reasons for the hospital director's or supervisor's or their joint determination that the individual continues to be a person requiring treatment, a statement describing the treatment program provided to the individual, the results of that course of treatment, and a clinical estimate as to the time further treatment will be required. The petition shall be accompanied by a clinical certificate executed by a psychiatrist.

Based on our review of the 2021 petition, it is apparent that it did not comply with every requirement stated in MCL 330.1473.

In particular, although the statute requires the petition to include "a statement setting forth the reasons for the ... determination that the individual continues to be a person requiring treatment," see MCL 330.1473, the 2021 petition does not include any information describing respondent's current condition. Instead, the petition had a check in the box next to a boilerplate paragraph stating that "the individual's judgment is so impaired by that mental illness and whose lack of understanding of the need for treatment has caused him or her to demonstrate an unwillingness to voluntarily participate in or adhere to treatment that is necessary ... to prevent a relapse or harmful deterioration of his or her condition, and presents a substantial risk of significant physical or mental harm to the individual or others." In further form fields, the petition stated that the above conclusions were based upon the fact that "[respondent] was last hospitalized in Aug. 2014 due to an increase in her psychiatric symptoms." No further details were provided. Thus, although the 2021 petition certainly includes details supporting the inference that respondent was initially a person requiring treatment, there is no statement setting forth the reasons that she continued to be a person who requires treatment. As a result, the 2021 petition failed to comply with MCL 330.1473. Moreover, the 2021 petition was also deficient under that statute because, although the 2021 petition provided details on the treatment that was provided to respondent, ⁵ it did not include "the results of that course of treatment[.]" Id.

Having determined that the 2021 petition failed to comply with the mandatory requirements in MCL 330.1473, we turn to respondent's argument that the failure to strictly comply with the statute deprived the court of subject-matter jurisdiction.

"Subject-matter jurisdiction is the right of the court to exercise judicial power over a class of cases, not the particular case before it." Teran v Rittley , 313 Mich App 197, 205, 882 N.W.2d 181 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "It is the abstract power to try a case of the kind or character of the one pending, but not to determine whether the...