Ingle v. Matteucci

371 Or. 413

537 P.3d 895

Matthew Daniel INGLE, Petitioner on Review,

v.Dolores MATTEUCCI, Superintendent, Oregon State Hospital, Respondent on Review.

CC 18CV09971 (SC S069222)

Supreme Court of Oregon.

Argued and submitted September 30, 2022.

October 12, 2023

Lindsey Burrows, O'Connor Weber LLC., Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review.

Jordan R. Silk, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.

Before Flynn, Chief Justice, and Duncan, Garrett, DeHoog, and James, Justices, and Balmer and Walters, Senior Judges, Justices pro tempore.^**

DUNCAN, J.

This case concerns the statute of limitations for petitions for post-conviction relief, ORS 138.510(3). That statute includes a limitations period and an exception to that period. It provides that a petition "must be filed within two years" of the date the challenged conviction became final unless the ground for relief "could not reasonably have been raised" within those two years. The exception to the time limit is commonly known as the "escape clause." If a petitioner files their petition after the limitations period, the petitioner must establish that the escape clause applies. That is, the petitioner must establish that their ground for relief could not reasonably have been raised within two years of the date their conviction became final.

In the criminal case underlying this post-conviction case, petitioner waived his right to a jury trial and raised an insanity defense. The trial court found petitioner "guilty except for insanity" on all charges and placed him under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board and committed him to the Oregon State Hospital.

More than eight years after his convictions became final, petitioner initiated this case by filing a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner requested and received court-appointed counsel, who amended the petition. In the operative petition, petitioner acknowledged that the limitations period had run but asserted that the escape clause applied. Specifically, he asserted that the escape clause applied because, during the limitations period, he was disabled by "diagnosed schizophrenia" and the "forced consumption of extremely powerful psychotropic medications" and that those conditions "deprived him of the ability" to file a timely petition. The state¹ moved to dismiss the petition, asserting that petitioner's mental impairments were irrelevant to whether the escape clause applied. The post-conviction court agreed and granted the state's motion to dismiss.

Petitioner appealed, and, in a split decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Ingle v. Matteucci , 315 Or App 416, 501 P.3d 23 (2021). We allowed review. On review, the parties dispute (1) whether a post-conviction court may consider a petitioner's mental impairments when determining whether the statute of limitations’ escape clause applies and, if so, (2) whether petitioner's allegations were sufficient to raise a triable issue regarding the applicability of the escape clause.

For the reasons explained below, we hold that, in addition to other circumstances, the escape clause applies in circumstances where, during the limitations period, the petitioner had mental impairments that were so severe—both in degree and duration—that the petitioner was incapable of raising their ground for relief in a timely petition. We further hold that the petitioner's allegations in this case are sufficient to raise a triable issue regarding the applicability of the escape clause. Consequently, we conclude that the post-conviction court erred in granting the state's motion to dismiss on the pleadings, and we reverse and remand to the post-conviction court for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

When this court reviews a post-conviction court's ruling on a motion to dismiss a petition, we assume that the allegations in the petition and its attachments are true, and we state the facts consistently with those allegations. Chavez v. State of Oregon , 364 Or. 654, 656, 438 P.3d 381 (2019) ; Verduzco v. State of Oregon , 357 Or. 553, 555 n. 1, 355 P.3d 902 (2015).

A. Underlying Criminal Case

In the underlying criminal case, the state charged petitioner with two counts of second-degree manslaughter and one count of driving under the influence of intoxicants. The charges were based on an incident in which petitioner was driving, ran a red light, and struck another vehicle, killing its occupants. After the crash, petitioner was transported to a hospital, where a blood test revealed the presence of cannabis, an anti-depressant medication, and two anti-psychotic medications. When interviewed at the hospital, petitioner was hallucinating. He said that, during the crash, he "knew that aliens [were] there and he [thought] that something else [was] in control of the wheel of the car." He attributed the crash to "aliens" or "the Holy Spirit." The month before the incident, petitioner, who was 18 years old, had been self-admitted to three hospital psychiatric wards, diagnosed with schizophrenia, and prescribed the anti-psychotic medications that he took on the day of the incident.

In the trial court, petitioner was represented by a defense lawyer, McCauley. On McCauley's recommendation, petitioner waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded to a stipulated facts trial, during which he raised an insanity defense pursuant to ORS 161.295. That statute provides that "[a] person is guilty except for insanity if, as a result of a qualifying mental disorder at the time of engaging in criminal conduct, the person lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of the conduct or to conform the conduct to the requirements of the law." ORS 161.295(1). During the stipulated facts trial, the prosecutor described a report by a psychologist who had evaluated petitioner and concluded that it was likely that petitioner "was unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law" at the time of the crash "because of [his] underlying psychiatric condition." The prosecutor agreed with the psychologist's conclusion, informing the trial court that, at the time of the crash, petitioner had been acting pursuant to a "delusional set of beliefs." The court found petitioner "guilty except for insanity" on all three counts, placed him under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board for an indefinite period not to exceed 20 years, and committed him to the Oregon State Hospital.

The trial court entered the judgment into the register on November 10, 2009. Petitioner did not appeal. Consequently, the two-year limitations period for filing for post-conviction relief expired on November 10, 2011.

B. Post-Conviction Trial-Level Proceedings

On March 14, 2018, which was more than eight years after petitioner's convictions became final, petitioner, who was in custody at the state hospital, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner requested and received a court-appointed lawyer, Patterson, who amended the petition twice.

In the operative petition, petitioner alleged that his convictions were the result of a substantial denial of his constitutional right to counsel under both Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Specifically, he alleged that McCauley's representation had been inadequate and ineffective because, even though McCauley knew or should have known about petitioner's mental impairments, he had failed to ensure that petitioner understood the consequences of being found guilty except for insanity—including that he would likely spend 20 years at the state hospital—before encouraging him to waive his right to a jury trial and raise an insanity defense. Petitioner further alleged that he did not make—and, given his mental impairments could not have made—a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his right to a jury trial.

In addition to alleging his grounds for relief, petitioner addressed the timing of his petition. He acknowledged that his petition was untimely but asserted that the escape clause applied because he could not reasonably have raised his grounds for relief within the two-year limitations period. In support of that assertion, petitioner alleged that, during the limitations period, he was "intellectually disabled as a result of his diagnosed schizophrenia and his forced consumption of extremely powerful psychotropic medications." He further alleged that his mental disease and medicated state "substantially impaired his ability to concentrate, to reason, to understand the legal remedies available to challenge his convictions, and to understand the legal proceedings that resulted in his imposed sentence." In addition, he alleged that his mental disease "substantially impaired his ability to read and comprehend legal documents related to those proceedings and deprived him of the ability to appreciate, identify, allege, and support with the requisite evidence, the relevant claims for relief." In a declaration attached to the petition, he stated that he filed his pro se petition as soon as he was able to comprehend what had occurred in his underlying criminal case.

The state moved to dismiss the petition, asserting that it was barred by the statute of limitations, ORS 138.510(3). See ORCP 21 A(1)(i) (allowing a party to move to dismiss a claim before filing an answer on the ground that "the pleading shows that the action has not been commenced within the time limited by statute"). The state argued that, under Court of Appeals case law—including Fisher v. Belleque , 237 Or App 405, 240 P.3d 745 (2010), rev. den. , 349 Or. 601, 248 P.3d 419 (2011) —petitioner's mental impairments were irrelevant to whether the escape clause applied.

The post-conviction court granted the...