Ingram v. District of Columbia

TONIA INGRAM, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.

Civil Action No.: 18-1598 (RC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

July 30, 2021

Re Document No.: 40

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Tonia Ingram, a former employee of the District of Columbia Child and Family Services Agency, brings this employment discrimination action against the District of Columbia ("the District") alleging both disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, and the D.C. Human Rights Act ("DCHRA"), D.C. Code §§ 2-1401.01 to 1404.04, as well as a retaliatory discharge under the DCHRA. The District has moved for summary judgment, arguing that Ms. Ingram cannot establish a prima facie case under either claim, and that even without this deficiency, that Ms. Ingram was terminated for a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason that she fails to show was pretextual. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant the District's motion for summary judgment.

II. PRELIMINARY MATTERS

As a preliminary matter, the Court will first discuss Ms. Ingram's failure to comply with the requirements of Local Civil Rule 7(h)(1) in regard to her statement of genuine issues filed along with her opposition brief. This District has supplemented Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with Local Civil Rule 7(h), pursuant to which a party filing a motion for summary judgment must include a statement of material facts as to which that party contends there is no genuine dispute. See Herbert v. Architect of Capitol, 766 F. Supp. 2d 59, 63-64 (D.D.C. 2011). "The party opposing the motion must, in turn, submit a statement enumerating all material facts which the party contends are genuinely disputed." Id. at 63 (citing LCvR 7(h)(1)). This statement of disputed facts "shall include references to the parts of the record relied on to support the statement." LCvR 7(h)(1); Footbridge Ltd. Tr. v. Zhang, 584 F. Supp. 2d 150, 154 (D.D.C. 2008), aff'd, 358 F. App'x 189 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (noting violation of Rule 7(h) by party who submitted "several facts that lack any citation to record evidence" despite this "clear requirement" of the Local Rules) (emphasis in original). This requirement places the burden of summarizing the record with the parties, as they are most familiar with the particulars of the case. See Potter v. District of Columbia, 558 F.3d 542, 550 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ("[E]vidence laying dormant in the record is not enough, for the district court is not obliged to sift through hundreds of pages of depositions, affidavits, and interrogatories in order to make [its] own analysis and determination of what may, or may not, be a genuine issue of material disputed fact.").

When the party opposing summary judgment fails to comply with this obligation, by either failing to submit a statement of disputed facts or submitting a deficient statement, "a court may take all facts alleged by the movant as admitted." Essroc Cement Corp. v. CTI/D.C., Inc., 740 F. Supp. 2d 131, 139 (D.D.C. 2010); see also Arrington v. United States, 473 F.3d 329, 335 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that non-compliance with Local Civil Rule 7(h) permits the district court to assume the facts identified by the moving party as admitted, though the court retains the discretion to review the entire record); United States v. Mohammad, 15-cv-514, 249 F. Supp. 3d 450, 456-57, 2017 WL 1403144, at *4 (D.D.C. Apr. 19, 2017) ("[C]ourts may accept as true anyfactual assertions submitted by the movant in support of its motion, unless the non-movant submits his or her own evidence showing the movant's assertions are untrue.").

Ms. Ingram has failed to comply with the requirements of Local Rule 7(h). She did not respond or attempt to rebut any of the nineteen undisputed material facts submitted by the District, see Def.'s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("Def.'s SUMF"), ECF No. 40, instead providing four of her own "facts" she contends are in dispute. See Pl.'s Statement of Mat. Facts in Dispute ("Pl.'s SMF"), ECF No. 41. But Ms. Ingram's purported "material facts in dispute" are in actuality unsupported factual assertions that veer into the territory of legal conclusions, the entirety of which are provided without any of the required record citations. See, e.g., Pl.'s SMF ("Throughout the course of her employment at CFSA, Plaintiff was subjected to a pattern of harassment, including, but not limited to, hostile comments directed at her mental health history."). The District argues that as a result, the Court "should treat the District's statements as undisputed," thus "leading to the inescapable conclusion that the District's termination of Plaintiff from her position with CFSA was due to her job performance and not impermissible discrimination based on her disability." Def.'s Reply in Further Supp. of Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. ("Def.'s Reply") at 2-3, ECF No. 42. Accordingly, the District requests that the Court grant its motion for summary judgment on this basis alone.

The Court is not, however, convinced that this issue should be disposed of in such a cursory fashion. Certainly, "[r]equiring strict compliance with th[is] local rule is justified both by the nature of summary judgment and by the rule's purposes." Wilkins v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 17-cv-884, 2019 WL 3767164, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 2019) (discussing how "when the statement['s]. . . references to the record are lacking . . . [t]he casualty is the Court's ability to maintain docket control and to decide motions for summary judgment efficiently andeffectively") (citation omitted). This requirement exists, of course, because to survive a motion for summary judgment, a party's claims must rely on evidence and not bare allegations, see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986), which is all Ms. Ingram has provided in her statement. Indeed, Ms. Ingram's Statement of Material Facts in Dispute "fail[s] . . . to controvert most of the facts set forth by defendant" and instead "merely repeats the complaint's allegations and conclusions." Carter v. Greenspan, 304 F. Supp. 2d 13, 21 (D.D.C. 2004). Accordingly, the court would be within its discretion to "assume that [Ms. Ingram] admits those facts presented by defendant in [its] statement of material facts. . . which [s]he does not refute." Id.; Jackson v. Finnegan, 101 F.3d 145, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("[P]ursuant to the remedy afforded by Rule [7(h)], the district court is to deem as admitted the moving party's facts that are uncontroverted by the nonmoving party's Rule [7(h) ] statement."); Burt v. Nat'l Republican Club of Capitol Hill, 828 F. Supp. 2d 115, 118-19 (D.D.C. 2011) (same).

Nevertheless, the Court does not wish to penalize Ms. Ingram for an error committed by her counsel. As a result, despite Ms. Ingram's failure to appropriately identify the evidence at issue in her Statement of Disputed Facts, the Court has undertaken its own independent review of the record, as is its prerogative. See Arrington, 473 F.3d at 335 ("Rule 7(h) permits, but does not require . . . the district court to enter judgment because of the nonmoving party's default in complying with the local rule.") (internal quotations and citation omitted). The Court will accordingly disregard any of the proffered facts in Ms. Ingram's Statement of Disputed Facts that based on its own assessment are not properly supported by the record.

III. BACKGROUND

Ms. Ingram is a licensed clinical social worker with over fifteen years of experience. See Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s First Int. at 3-6, ECF No. 41-3. After working for the Child ProtectiveServices Administration ("CPS") of the District of Columbia Child and Family Services Agency ("CFSA") for several years as an investigator social worker, Ms. Ingram was promoted to the role of supervisory social worker on September 18, 2016. Def.'s SUMF ¶ 1. In this position, Ms. Ingram managed four social workers within CFSA, who were responsible for investigating reports of child abuse and neglect. See Dep. Tr. of Tonia Ingram ("Ingram Dep. Tr.") at 29:19-30:17, ECF No. 40-6. During her tenure in this role, Ms. Ingram reported to CPS Program Manager Cheryl Irving who, in turn, reported to CPS Program Administrator Elizabeth Muffoletto. Def.'s SUMF ¶¶ 2-3.

Around the time of Ms. Ingram's promotion in 2016, she spoke to her new supervisor, Ms. Irving, about her anxiety. She represents that she told her, "you know, I get anxious. I get anxious at times. Sometimes it impacts my speech, you know, it may speed up rapidly sometimes. Nervous. Even though I know my job. I'm good at what I do. But I still live with this. I still deal with it." Ingram Dep. Tr. at 184:10-16. She did not, however, disclose to any of her CFSA supervisors that she had a formal medical diagnosis of generalized anxiety disorder, id. at 194:14-17, that she was in treatment or on medication for this condition, id. at 196:1, 196:12-13, or that she required assistance to perform her job in light of this disability, id. at 197: 15. That said, at least one of Ms. Ingram's former co-workers, Robert Mays, represents that he is aware of Ms. Ingram's "long standing mental health diagnosis," although the circumstances of how or when he came into this knowledge have not been made clear. See Affidavit of Robert Mays ("Mays Aff.") ¶¶ 3-4, ECF No. 41-1.

It would appear that Ms. Ingram's tenure as a manager at CFSA got off to a strong start following her promotion in late 2016. During the fiscal year 2017 performance rating period, Ms. Irving rated Ms. Ingram on her performance review as a 3.45/5 or "valued performer,"which is an average rating for a CPS manager in this role. Def.'s SUMF ¶ 5. It bears noting that during this performance period, Ms. Ingram's timely investigation and case closure rates were well above average when compared to other CPS managers in her same position. Id. ¶ 6. However, Ms....