Inner City Contracting LLC v. Charter Twp. of Northville

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INNER CITY CONTRACTING, LLC, Plaintiff, v. CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF NORTHVILLE, MICHIGAN, et al., Defendants.

No. 22-11349

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

November 22, 2022

OPINION & ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Sean F. Cox United States District Court Judge

Plaintiff Inner City Contracting, LLC (“Plaintiff”) is an unsuccessful bidder that sought a demolition contract with the Charter Township of Northville, Michigan (“the Township”). In this action, Plaintiff asserts claims against both the Township and a private consulting firm hired by the Township. The action was removed to federal court based upon Plaintiff's federal claims. The matter is before the Court on motions to dismiss filed by the two Defendants, brought pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The parties have briefed the issues. The Court concludes that a hearing is not necessary and the Court shall rule based upon the briefs. For the reasons below, the Court shall dismiss with prejudice all federal claims in this action. Because the Court is doing so at a very early stage in the litigation (ie., at the motion-to-dismiss stage, prior to discovery) the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state-law claims and shall remand those claims back to state court.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Inner City Contracting, LLC filed this action in state court. Defendants removed this case to federal court based upon federal-question jurisdiction over Plaintiff's § 1983 claims.

Following removal, Plaintiff filed a “Notice of Filing Complete Record,” that included a motion for temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction motion that Plaintiff had filed in state court, and had been briefed by the parties. Defendants also filed those same materials that had been filed in the state court prior to removal. (See ECF No. 7). In an Opinion and Order issued on June 30, 2022, this Court denied Plaintiff's motion seeking a preliminary injunction because the Court concluded that Plaintiff had not met its burden of establishing that it is likely to prevail on the merits of its claims.

Thereafter the Township filed a Motion to Dismiss and this Court issued its standard order, giving Plaintiff the option of either responding to that motion or filing an amended complaint in order to cure any pleading deficiencies. Plaintiff chose to file an amended complaint.

Thus the operative complaint is Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff attached the twelve exhibits to that pleading. (See ECF No. 19). Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint asserts claims against the Township and Fleis & Vandenbrink Engineering, Inc. / Fleis &amp Vandenbrink (“Fleis”).^[1] Plaintiff asserts the following claims: 1) “Deprivation of Rights to Equal Protection of Law Brought Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” asserted against both Defendants (“Count I”); 2) “Deprivation of Due Process Rights Brought Pursuant To 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” asserted against both Defendants (“Count II”); 3) “Deprivation of Equal Rights Brought Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981,” asserted against both Defendants (“Count III”); 4) “Claim Under Act 170 of 1933 Bidders of Public Works M.C.L. 123.501 et seq.,” asserted against the Township (“Count IV”); 5) “Libel and Slander of ICC by F&V,” asserted against Fleis (Count V); and “6) “Tortious Interference by F&V with Advantageous Business Expectancies,” asserted against Fleis (Count VI).

In September of 2022, both the Township and Fleis filed Motions to Dismiss. It appears that Fleis filed its motion twice - as both ECF Numbers 24 and 25.

B. Standard of Decision

Both of the pending motions were filed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a case where the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept its allegations as true. DirectTV, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must offer sufficient factual allegations that make the asserted claims plausible on their face. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Legal conclusions couched as factual allegations will not suffice. Rondigo, LLC v. Township of Richmond, 641 F.3d 673, 670 (6th Cir. 2011). Rather, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

“When a court is presented with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it may consider the Complaint and any exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached to defendant's motion to dismiss so long as they are referred to in the Complaint and are central to the claims contained therein. See Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir.2001).” Bassett v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). Thus, in reviewing the pending motions, this Court may consider the twelve exhibits attached to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint.

C. Relevant Allegations In First Amended Complaint

Plaintiff Inner City Contracting, LLC is a limited liability company. (First Am. Compl. at ¶ 1). The First Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff “is a 51% minority owned LLC” but does include factual allegations specifying the type of minority-owned business it is (ie., is it a women-owned business, etc.) or any information about any of its member-owners. Plaintiff alleges that “[a]s a minority-owned entity, [it] is a member of a suspect class,” and that the “actions of defendants of which [it] complains were motivated by considerations based on race.” (First Am. Compl. at ¶ 132 & 134). Notably, however, Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint fails to include any factual allegations to identify “Plaintiff's race,” or the races of any of its member-owners.

In March of 2022, the Township advertised a public bid request for the demolition of some buildings at the Northville Psychiatric Hospital. (First Am. Compl. at ¶ 6). The Township “retained a consultant” for this project, Defendant Fleis - a Michigan corporation. (Id. at ¶¶ 3 & 10).

Plaintiff submitted a bid for the project. (First Am. Compl. at ¶ 18). Plaintiff alleges that it was the lowest bidder on the project. (Id. at ¶ 19). Plaintiff also alleges that is was the most qualified bidder. (Id. at ¶ 22). Yet the Township awarded the project to another bidder. (Id. at ¶ 126).

Plaintiff alleges that Fleis was biased against it. (Id. at ¶ 24). Plaintiff further alleges that, “[a]s the Township's agent,” the actions of Fleis “can be fairly attributed to the Township.” (Id. at ¶ 132). Plaintiff alleges that the “actions of defendants of which [Plaintiff] complains were motivated by considerations based on race.” (Id. at ¶ 134).

ANALYSIS

Defendant Fleis's motion challenges all claims asserted against it and the Township likewise seeks dismissal of all claims asserted against it.

I. Challenges To Plaintiff's Federal Claims

Because this matter is in federal court based upon federal-question jurisdiction, and the matter comes to the Court on motions to dismiss filed before discovery, the Court considers the challenges to Plaintiff's federal claims first.

A. Plaintiff's § 1981 Claims

In Count III of its Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against both Defendants.

Section 1981 “prohibits intentional race discrimination in the making and enforcing of contracts.” Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 440 F.3d 350, 358 (6th Cir. 2006). In order to establish a prima facie claim of racial discrimination under section 1981, a plaintiff must plead and prove that: 1) he belongs to an identifiable class of persons who are subject to discrimination based on their race; 2) the defendant intended to discriminate against him on the basis of race; and 3) the defendant's discriminatory conduct abridged a right enumerated in section 1981(a). Id.

In their respective motions, Defendants assert that Plaintiff's § 1981 claims against them are deficient in numerous respects and must be dismissed. The Court need not address all of their challenges to this count, as Plaintiff's § 1981 claim fails in the most basic respects.

To establish a prima facie claim, Plaintiff must plead that it belongs to an identifiable class of persons who are subject to discrimination based on its race. Plaintiff is not an individual, but rather, is a limited liability company owned by its members. The operative complaint alleges that Plaintiff “is a 51% minority owned LLC, formed in April 2009.” (First Am. Compl. at ¶ 4). There are no allegations specifying the type of minority-owned business it is (ie., is it a women-owned business, etc.). Plaintiff alleges that “[a]s a minority-owned entity, [it] is a member of a suspect class,” and that the “actions of defendants of which [it] complains were motivated by considerations based on race.” (First Am. Compl. at ¶ 132 & 134). Notably, however, Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint fails to include any factual allegations to identify “Plaintiff's race,” or the races of any of its member-owners. Plaintiff's failure to include factual allegations as to it own race is a fatal defect. See, eg., Hill v. SRS Dist., Inc., 2022 WL 3099649 at *3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 4, 2022) (“Other than the fact Hill alleges racial discrimination, there is no indication in the Complaint regarding Hill's race. In other words, as it is not known if Hill is Caucasian, Black, Hispanic, or some other race, the Complaint does not allege Hill is a member of a protected class of persons.”)

In addition, there are also no...