Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters Local Union 230, v. City of San Jose

195 Cal.App.4th 1179

125 Cal.Rptr.3d 832

11 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6264

2011 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7501

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS LOCAL UNION 230, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.CITY OF SAN JOSE, Defendant and Appellant.

International Association of Firefighters Local Union 230, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.City of San Jose, Defendant and Respondent.

Nos. H035065, H035425.

Court of Appeal, Sixth District, California.

May 24, 2011.

Rehearing Denied June 21, 2011.

Review Denied Sept. 14, 2011.

Christopher E. Platten, Mark Renner, Wylie, McBride, Platten & Renner, San Jose, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Richard Doyle, Los Angeles, Nora Frimann, Robert Fabela, Steven B. Dippell, Office of the City Attorney, for Defendant and Appellant, and Respondent.

W. David Holsberry, Davis, Cowell & Bowe, LLP, San Francisco, Thomas A. Woodley, Baldwin Robertson, Woodley & McGillivary, for Amici Curiae for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Richard Doyle, Los Angeles, Nora Frimann, Robert Fabela, Hannibal P. Odisho, Office of the City Attorney, for Amici Curiae for Defendant and Appellant, and Respondent.

BAMATTRE–MANOUKIAN, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

These appeals arise from a labor dispute between the City of San Jose (City) and the International Association of Firefighters, Local 230 (Union), which represents the firefighters employed by the City. After the Firefighters Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov.Code, §§ 3250–3262; FFBOR) ¹ became effective in 2008, the Union requested that the City meet and confer over the implementation of the FFBOR's new procedures for administrative appeals of firefighter discipline. The City refused to meet and confer on the ground that, as a charter city, it was not obligated to implement the FFBOR.

The Union then filed a petition for a writ of mandate and to compel arbitration of the dispute regarding the City's obligation to meet and confer over the implementation of the FFBOR. The City opposed the petition and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, in which it argued that under the home rule provisions of the California Constitution, article XI, section 5, it was not required to implement the FFBOR's procedures for administrative appeals in firefighter disciplinary proceedings because the FFBOR's procedures conflicted with the City's existing procedures.

The trial court denied the Union's petition. The court determined that the Union's petition was based upon the City's refusal to meet and confer regarding the implementation of the FFBOR, which might constitute a violation of the Meyers–Milias–Brown Act (§§ 3500 et seq.; MMBA), and therefore the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) had exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute. Alternatively, the trial court denied the petition on the grounds that arbitration could not be compelled under the parties' collective bargaining agreement because the Union had failed to meet its burden to show that the parties had reached an impasse after meeting and conferring in good faith, and, in any event, the petition was moot since the memorandum of agreement had expired.

In its first appeal (H035065), the Union contends that the trial court erred in denying its petition for a writ of mandate and to compel arbitration because the court has jurisdiction in this matter. For reasons that we will explain, we determine that the Union's petition is not moot and PERB has exclusive initial jurisdiction because the petition alleges an unfair labor practice within the meaning of section 3509 of the MMBA: City's refusal to meet and confer regarding the implementation of the FFBOR. ( City of San Jose v. Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3 (2010) 49 Cal.4th 597, 604, 110 Cal.Rptr.3d 718, 232 P.3d 701( Operating Engineers ).) We will therefore affirm the judgment.

In its second appeal (H035425) ² the Union seeks review of the postjudgment order awarding attorney's fees to the City in the event the Union prevails in its first appeal and the judgment is reversed on the merits. Since we have affirmed the judgment, we will also affirm the postjudgment order awarding attorney's fees.

The City has filed a cross-appeal in the Union's first appeal (H035065). In the proceedings below, the trial court denied the City's motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the Union had sufficiently pleaded a petition to compel arbitration and a claim for declaratory relief. The City has appealed that order on the ground that, as a matter of law, under the home rule provisions of the California Constitution (art. XI, § 5) the City is not obligated to implement the FFBOR because it is a charter city. As we will further explain, the City's motion for judgment on the pleadings was properly denied because, under the California Supreme Court's decisions in Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 185 Cal.Rptr. 232, 649 P.2d 874( Baggett ) and County of Riverside v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 278, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 713, 66 P.3d 718( County of Riverside ), the FFBOR is a procedural statute that does not violate the home rule provisions of the California Constitution and therefore the FFBOR applies to the City.

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

To provide context for our summary of the facts, the procedural background, and the parties' contentions on appeal, we will begin with a brief overview of two statutes, the MMBA and the FFBOR, and one state agency, PERB.

A. The Meyer–Milias–Brown Act ( MMBA )

“In 1961, the Legislature enacted the George Brown Act (Stats.1961, ch. 1964, pp. 4141–4143), which for the first time recognized the rights of state and local employees to organize and to have their representatives meet and confer with their public agency employers over wages and working conditions. In 1968, the Legislature went a step further by enacting the MMBA (Stats.1968, ch. 1390, pp. 2724–2729), which ‘authorized labor and management representatives not only to confer but to enter into written agreements for presentation to the governing body of a municipal government or other local agency.’ [Citations.]” ( Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v. California Public Employment Relations Bd. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1072, 1083, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 234, 112 P.3d 623( Coachella Valley ).)

The stated purpose of the MMBA “is to provide ‘a reasonable method of resolving disputes regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment....’ ( [§] 3500.)” (Santa Clara County Counsel Attys. Assn. v. Woodside (1994) 7 Cal.4th 525, 536, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 617, 869 P.2d 1142.) To achieve this legislative purpose, “[t]he MMBA imposes on local public entities a duty to meet and confer in good faith with representatives of recognized employee organizations, in order to reach binding agreements governing wages, hours, and working conditions of the agencies' employees. ( [§ ] 3505.)” ( Coachella Valley, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1083, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 234, 112 P.3d 623.)

It is well established that the MMBA applies to charter cities. ( People ex rel. Seal Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Seal Beach (1984) 36 Cal.3d 591, 597, 205 Cal.Rptr. 794, 685 P.2d 1145( Seal Beach ).)

B. The Public Employment Relations Board ( PERB )

“The history of the PERB begins in 1975, when the Legislature adopted the Educational Employment Relations Act ( [§§ ] 3540–3549.3; hereafter the EERA).... As part of this new statutory scheme, the Legislature created the Educational Employment Relations Board (EERB), an ‘expert, quasi-judicial administrative agency modeled after the National Labor Relations Board, to enforce the act.’ [Citation.] The Legislature vested the EERB with authority to adjudicate unfair labor practice charges under the EERA. [Citation.] [¶] The Legislature structured the EERA with the intention that it would eventually be expanded to incorporate other public employees.” ( Coachella Valley, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 1084–1085, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 234, 112 P.3d 623.) The EERB was renamed the PERB in 1977. ( Id. at p. 1085, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 234, 112 P.3d 623.)

“Since 1977, the PERB's jurisdiction has continued to expand as the Legislature has enacted new employment relations laws covering additional categories of public agencies and their employees.” ( Coachella Valley, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1085, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 234, 112 P.3d 623.) “In 2000, the Legislature extended PERB's jurisdiction to cover matters under the MMBA—this was done through enactment of [section] 3509, which became effective July 1, 2001. (Stats.2000, ch. 901, § 8.) Subdivision (b) of that statute provides in relevant part: ‘A complaint alleging any violation of [the MMBA] ... shall be processed as an unfair practice charge by [PERB]. The initial determination as to whether the charge of unfair practice is justified and, if so, the appropriate remedy necessary to effectuate the purposes of this chapter, shall be a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of [PERB].’ This enactment removed ‘from the courts the initial jurisdiction over MMBA unfair practice charges' [citation] and vested such jurisdiction in PERB [citation].” ( Operating Engineers, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 605, 110 Cal.Rptr.3d 718, 232 P.3d 701.)

C. The Firefighters Procedural Bill of Rights Act ( FFBOR )

The FFBOR (§§ 3250–3262) became effective on January 1, 2008. (Stats.2007, ch. 591, § 2.) The Legislative Counsel's Digest described the legislation as follows: “This bill would enact the Firefighters Procedural Bill of Rights Act to prescribe various rights of firefighters, defined as any firefighter employed by a public agency, including a firefighter who is a paramedic or emergency medical technician, with specified exceptions. The bill would prescribe rights related to, among others, political activity, interrogation, punitive action, and administrative appeals, with specified requirements imposed upon the employing agency and the imposition of a civil penalty for a violation thereof. The bill would also specify that reimbursement of funds by the state shall be limited to the...