Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 1600 v. PPL Elec. Utilities Corp.

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS LOCAL 1600, Plaintiff, v. PPL ELECTRIC UTILITIES CORPORATION, Defendant.

ALICIA WATKINSON, Plaintiff, v. PPL ELECTRIC UTILITIES CORPORATION, Defendant.

No. 5:16-cv-04675

No. 5:16-cv-04676

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

December 22, 2017

OPINION

Plaintiff Local 1600's Motion for Summary Judgment, Case No. 4675, ECF No. 18-Denied Defendant PPL's Motion for Summary Judgment, Case No. 4675, ECF No. 19—Granted Plaintiff Watkinson's Motion for Summary Judgment, Case No. 4676, ECF No. 17-Denied Defendant PPL's Motion for Summary Judgment, Case No. 4676, ECF No. 18—Granted

Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

These two consolidated cases involve a challenge to an employer's leave policy under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611-2654. PPL Electric Utilities Corporation requires all employees taking sick leave to call their supervisor on the day leave is required. If an employee is using FMLA leave, though, she must make a three- to five-minute phone call to a third party administrator in addition to calling her supervisor. This Court must decide whether this arrangement violates the FMLA. It concludes that it does not.

Plaintiff Alicia Watkinson is an employee of Defendant PPL Electric Utilities Corporation who failed to call the third-party administrator on several days when she wanted to take FMLA leave. As a result, PPL denied her requests for FMLA leave. Watkinson brought suit contending that PPL's policy violates FMLA regulations and interferes with her rights under the FMLA. Plaintiff International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 1600 is the union to which Watkinson belongs, which brought a grievance on her behalf challenging the denial of FMLA leave. The grievance was resolved by arbitration, and the arbitrator dismissed the grievance. Local 1600 brought suit to set aside the arbitration award, arguing that because the award upheld a PPL policy that violates FMLA regulations, it is manifestly contrary to federal law. Furthermore, the union argues that the arbitrator's finding that the policy contains an exception for unusual circumstances was not supported by the record. PPL cross-moved for summary judgment.

This Court concludes that the FMLA regulations do not prohibit an additional requirement for giving notice of FMLA leave, and that PPL's policy does not otherwise violate the FMLA. Furthermore, the PPL policy contains an exception for unusual circumstances, but Watkinson has not established that unusual circumstances prevented her from complying with the call-in requirement on the dates in question. Therefore, PPL did not interfere with her rights under the FMLA. Because PPL's policy comports with the FMLA and does in fact contain an unusual circumstances exception, the arbitration award was proper. This Court therefore denies both plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment and enters summary judgment in favor of PPL.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

The two instant cases were consolidated on December 20, 2016. ECF No. 13 (No. 4675); ECF No. 12 (No. 4676).

Local 1600 v. PPL: No. 4675

Local 1600 filed its complaint against PPL on August 29, 2016. ECF No. 1. Local 1600 filed its motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 18, on May 1, 2017, and PPL filed its motion for summary judgment on the same day. ECF No. 19. Local 1600 filed its opposition on May 15, 2017, ECF No. 21, as did PPL. ECF No. 20.

Watkinson v. PPL: No. 4676

Watkinson filed her complaint against PPL on August 29, 2016. ECF No. 1. Watkinson filed her motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 17, on May 1, 2017, and PPL filed its motion for summary judgment on the same day. ECF No. 18. Watkinson filed her opposition on May 15, 2017, ECF No. 20, as did PPL. ECF No. 19.

B. Factual Background

PPL is a public utility company that provides electricity to residential and commercial customers in Pennsylvania. Def.'s Statement of Material Facts (SMF) ¶ 1, ECF No. 19-2; Pl.'s Response to Def.'s Statement of Material Facts (RMF) ¶ 1, ECF No. 23.¹ Watkinson works for PPL as a customer service representative in its office in Scranton, Pennsylvania,² and belongs toPlaintiff International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 1600. Def.'s SMF ¶ 2; Pl.'s RMF ¶ 2. Local 1600 and PPL are parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that governs the terms and conditions of Watkinson's employment. Def.'s SMF ¶ 3; Pl.'s RMF ¶ 3.

Watkinson received approval for intermittent FMLA leave in 2015. Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts (SMF) ¶ 1, ECF No. 18; Def.'s SMF ¶ 27. PPL uses Sedgwick, a third party administrator, to manage FMLA leave for PPL employees; PPL's FMLA leave policy requires employees using intermittent FMLA leave to contact both their supervisor and Sedgwick on the day they take leave. Pl.'s SMF ¶¶ 4-5; Def.'s SMF ¶¶ 4, 10, 19. Employees taking regular sick leave must only call their supervisor. Pl.'s SMF ¶ 15; Def.'s SMF ¶ 10. A call to Sedgwick takes between three and five minutes. Def.'s SMF ¶ 14; Pl.'s RMF ¶ 14.

On July 13, 2015, Watkinson advised her supervisor that she needed to leave early, referencing FMLA time, and left to go home. Pl.'s SMF ¶ 3; Def.'s SMF ¶ 46. Watkinson drove herself home, a twenty- to thirty-minute trip on the highway. Def.'s SMF ¶ 50; Pl.'s RMF ¶ 50. As of July 13, 2015, Watkinson had been informed that she needed to call Sedgwick on the day she took leave, and had previously had leave requests denied when she did not call Sedgwick as required. Pl.'s SMF ¶ 10; Def.'s SMF ¶¶ 30, 31. However, Watkinson did not call Sedgwick to report her FMLA absence on July 13, 2015, and as a result, PPL denied her request for FMLA leave for that day and recorded an unexcused absence on her record. Pl.'s SMF ¶¶ 12-13; Def.'s SMF ¶¶ 30-31, 48, 53; Pl.'s RMF ¶ 53. Watkinson contends that on July 13 and the other days she did not call Sedgwick, she was too "incoherent" to call; by "incoherent" she means that her anxiety became so great that her mind was "ruminating" and she had to go home, get into bed,contact her doctor, and take prescription medications. Def.'s SMF ¶¶ 36, 38, 39; Pl.'s RMF ¶¶ 36, 38, 39. Watkinson believes that she may have contacted her doctor on July 13. Def.'s SMF ¶ 51; Pl.'s RMF ¶ 51.

When she returned to work, Watkinson offered to provide a doctor's note explaining why she did not call Sedgwick on July 13, but she was not permitted to do so. Pl.'s SMF ¶ 14; Def.'s SMF ¶¶ 53, 57. She admits, though, that doctor's notes were brought in only for sick leave, and that she had never brought in a doctor's note previously for FMLA leave; she was "grasping at straws" to avoid the unexcused absence on her record. Pl.'s SMF ¶ 56-57; Def.'s SMF ¶¶ 56-57.

In her 2015 performance review, Watkinson received an "unsatisfactory" rating with respect to dependability because of her absences, although she received a "satisfactory" rating overall. Ex. E to Pl.'s Mot. Summ. Judg., ECF No. 18-3. Local 1600 filed a grievance pursuant to the CBA, challenging PPL's denial of Watkinson's requested FMLA leave and the resulting "unsatisfactory" rating in her performance review. Pl.'s SMF ¶ 20; Def.'s SMF ¶ 73. Watkinson attended the first and second step grievance meetings, but never mentioned that she had been too incoherent to call Sedgwick on July 13. Pl.'s SMF ¶ 52; Def.'s SMF ¶ 52. The grievance was heard in an arbitration hearing by Arbitrator Stanley Aiges on May 4, 2016; on July 30, 2016, the arbitrator issued an arbitration award in which he denied Local 1600's grievance. Pl.'s SMF ¶¶ 21, 23; Def.'s SMF ¶¶ 74-75.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment "should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp., 901 F.2d 335, 340 (3d Cir. 1990). A disputed fact is "material" if proofof its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of the case under applicable substantive law, and a dispute is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 257 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

Once such a showing has been made, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings with affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or the like in order to demonstrate specific material facts which give rise to a genuine issue. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (stating that the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts"). The party opposing the motion must produce evidence to show the existence of every element essential to its case, which it bears the burden of proving at trial, because "a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; see also Harter v. G.A.F. Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1992). "Inferences should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and where the non-moving party's evidence contradicts the movant's, then the non-movant's must be taken as true." Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am. Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 912 (1993).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Watkinson's FMLA Interference Claim

Congress passed the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611-2654, "to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families." 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1).The FMLA entitles an eligible employee to a...