International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Delaware River Port Authority, Civil No. 98-2307 (JBS) (D. N.J. 12/30/1998)

Page 1

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL UNION NO. 351, and WILLIAM HOSEY, Plaintiffs, v. DELAWARE RIVER PORT AUTHORITY, Defendant.

Civil No. 98-2307 (JBS)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

December 30, 1998.

Robert F. O'Brien, Esq., Patricia A. Barasch, Esq., TOMAR, SIMONOFF, ADOURIAN, O'BRIEN, KAPLAN, JACOBY & GRAZIANO, Cherry Hill, New Jersey, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.

Peter A. Gold, Esq., Jonathan M. Korn, Esq., BLANK ROME COMISKY & MCCAULEY LLP, Cherry Hill, New Jersey, Attorneys for Defendant.

OPINION

JEROME B. SIMANDLE, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 351 and William Hosey, filed this action in lieu of prerogative writs pursuant to the New Jersey Right to Know Act, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1, et seq., and New Jersey common law, to obtain access to and copies of certified payroll records relating to certain construction work being carried out by defendant, the Delaware River Port Authority, for the PATCO High Speed Line project. Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on March 25, 1998, in New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, Camden County. Defendant removed the case to this Court on May 13, 1998, claiming original federal question jurisdiction. Now before the Court are three motions: plaintiffs' motion to remand the case back to state court for lack of federal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), plaintiffs' motion for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs "incurred as a result of the removal" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), and defendant's motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated herein, plaintiffs' motion for remand will be granted, but their motion for fees and costs will be denied. As this Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction over the case, defendant's motion for summary judgment is not properly addressable by this Court.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Parties

Defendant, the Delaware River Port Authority ("DRPA"), is a Congressionally-approved bi-state public corporate instrumentality of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the State of New Jersey.¹ (Def.'s Br. Opp'n Remand at 2.) It was created as the Delaware River Joint Commission in 1931 pursuant to the Compact Clause of Article I of the United States Constitution, and it was approved by Congress in 1932. (Id.) Its name changed to the Delaware River Port Authority in 1951, but its authorization — to build bridges, establish connecting roads, and provide transportation services within the Delaware River port district — remained the same. (Id. at 3.)

Plaintiffs in this case are the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 351 ("Local 351") and William R. Hosey. Local 351 is an unincorporated labor organization representing members throughout Southern New Jersey. (Compl. ¶ 3.) Hosey, an individual who resides in Camden County, New Jersey, is a member of Local 351. (Id. at ¶ 4.)

B. The Underlying Facts

The facts giving rise to this lawsuit arise from the DRPA's construction and renovation work on the PATCO High Speed Line that runs through Camden County, extending from Philadelphia to Lindenwold, New Jersey, which was scheduled to take place between April 1997 and August 1998. (Compl. ¶¶ 6-7.) Plaintiffs requested from DRPA access to and copies of the certified payroll records of contractors performing construction work on the PATCO High Speed Line Project, as well as copies of the prevailing wage rates established for the project and the bid proposals received from contractors. (Id. at ¶ 10.) According to plaintiffs, they requested this information for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the New Jersey Prevailing Wage Act, N.J.S.A. 47:14-1, et seq., and other relevant state and federal statutes. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Defendant has denied plaintiffs' requests for this information and records. (Id. at ¶ 12.)

According to plaintiffs, defendant is obligated to maintain and make available to the public these records due to the New Jersey Prevailing Wages Act, N.J.S.A. 47:14-1, et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder at N.J.A.C. 12:60-6.1. (Pls.' Br. Supp. Remand at 3-4.) On March 25, 1998, plaintiffs filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, charging that defendant's denial of their requests for these alleged public records violated both the New Jersey Right to Know Act, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1, et seq., and New Jersey common law. (Compl. ¶¶ 13, 16.) The Complaint seeks an order compelling DRPA to turn over to plaintiffs all public records relating to the PATCO High Speed Line Project, including bid proposals, certified payroll records submitted by contractors, and the prevailing wage determination for the project, as well as the costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. (Compl. at 4, 5.)

On May 31, 1998, defendant removed the case to this Court, claiming original federal question jurisdiction over this matter. Defendant claims that DRPA, as a bi-state instrumentality created by interstate compact, is immune from the constitutional, statutory, and common law burdens and obligations of either New Jersey or Pennsylvania unless provided by the Compact, or unless both states consent to the application thereof by enacting similar laws imposing such an obligation. (Notice of Removal ¶ 6.) According to defendant, an interpretation of the language of the DRPA Compact would be "crucial to answer the threshold federal question of whether the United States Congress has approved of, and New Jersey and Pennsylvania have consented to, the production by DRPA of the information and records in dispute." (Id. at ¶ 7.) In June 1998, plaintiffs filed a motion seeking remand to the Superior Court of New Jersey, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447, for lack of federal court jurisdiction. Plaintiffs also seek reasonable fees and expenses incurred as a result of removal. The remand and fee motions are now before this Court, as is defendant's motion for summary judgment, filed in November 1998.

II. DISCUSSION

Defendants removed this matter to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), claiming federal subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 on the grounds that the plaintiffs' complaint states claims "arising under" Art. I., § 10, cl. 3 of the United States Constitution (the Compact Clause). Defendants argue that resolution of plaintiffs' New Jersey state law claims will necessarily require the Court to interpret the DRPA Compact between New Jersey and Pennsylvania, and thus there is federal question jurisdiction over this matter. Defendants are incorrect. As explained below, the Court finds that an interpretation of the Compact is not necessarily a part of the plaintiff's cause of action, even if such interpretation is likely to occur as a result of defenses raised by DRPA, and thus no federal question jurisdiction exists.

A. Whether a Federal Question Jurisdiction Exists

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), a plaintiff may move to have a case remanded to the state court from which it was removed on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction at any time before final judgment. Where removal is predicated on federal question jurisdiction, remand is proper where the plaintiff's claim does not "arise under" federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

To determine whether a case "arises under" federal law, a court must look to the allegations on the face of the plaintiff's "well pleaded complaint." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983). Lower federal courts have jurisdiction to hear "only those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law." Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 27-28. Further, the federal law under which a claim arises must be a direct and essential element of the cause of action in order to establish federal question jurisdiction. Id. at 10-11. A case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, even if the defense is anticipated and discussed in the plaintiff's complaint, and even if both parties concede that the federal defense is the only question truly at issue. See Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 118 S. Ct. 921, 925 (1998); Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908); Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 12.

Although the court should look to the complaint in determining whether the claim arises under federal law, a plaintiff should not be permitted to use "artful pleading" to close off a defendant's right to a federal forum where the real nature of the claim is federal. See Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 397 n.2 (1981). Otherwise, the plaintiff is the "master of the claim" and can avoid federal jurisdiction by "exclusive reliance on state law." Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392. "[A] defendant cannot, merely by injecting a federal question into an action that asserts what is plainly a state-law claim, transform the action into one arising under federal law, thereby selecting the forum in which the claim shall be litigated." Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 399.

The burden of proving federal jurisdiction rests on the party asserting it, here, the defendants. See Abels v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26, 29 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Pulman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 537, 540 (1939)). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has cautioned that "[b]ecause lack of jurisdiction would make any decree in the case void and the continuation of the litigation in federal court futile, the removal statute should be strictly construed and all doubts should be resolved in favor of remand." Id. at 29 (citing 14 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper,...