Interstate Med. Licensure Compact Comm'n v. Bowling

INTERSTATE MEDICAL LICENSURE COMPACT COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. WANDA BOWLING, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-02942-CMA-NYW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

June 23, 2021

AMENDED¹ RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang

This matter is before the court on the following motions:

(1) Defendant's Motion for Clarification of the Report and Recommendations Issued March 12^th, 2021 ("Motion to Clarify") [#28, filed March 29, 2021];

(2) Defendant Wanda Bowling Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss ("Defendant's Motion to Dismiss") [#7, filed October 16, 2020]; and

(3) Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Counterclaim ("Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss")² [#17, filed December 1, 2020]; and(4) Plaintiff's "Motion to Strike and Dismiss as Untimely Filed 'Counterclaimant Reply to Plaintiff Motion to Dismiss'" ("Plaintiff's Motion to Strike") [#21, filed January 11, 2021].

These Motions have been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), the Order Referring Case dated September 29, 2020 [#4], and the Memoranda dated October 20, 2020; December 4, 2020; January 11, 2021; and April 1, 2021, respectively [#8, #19, #22, #30].

Upon review of the Motions and the associated briefing [#10, #10-1, #20, #23], this court finds that oral argument will not materially assist in their resolution. Based on the court's review of the Motions and related briefing, the entire docket, and the applicable case law, this court ORDERS that Defendant's Motion to Clarify is GRANTED; this court's March 12, 2021 Recommendation and Order is WITHDRAWN; and Plaintiff's Motion to Strike is DENIED. This court also respectfully RECOMMENDS that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss be DENIED, and Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Interstate Medical Licensure Compact Commission ("Plaintiff" or "IMLCC") initiated this action against Defendant Wanda Bowling ("Defendant" or "Ms. Bowling") on September 29, 2020, invoking "§17 [sic] (c) of the Interstate Medical Licensure Compact (hereinafter "Compact") and its authorized rules" and contending that the "case arises under the U.S. Constitution; the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §1331 [sic]; and the provisions of the foregoing interstate compact which is authorized under Art. I, §10 [sic], Cl.3 [sic] of the U. S. [sic] Constitution but for which the consent of Congresswas not required." [#1 at ¶ 1]. The IMLCC asserts two claims for relief arising from its allegations that Ms. Bowling is in material breach of her Independent Contractor Agreement that expired on June 30, 2020: (1) "Injunctive Relief Specific Performance" ("Claim I"); and (2) "Damages, Fees and Costs" ("Claim II"). See generally [id.].

Ms. Bowling, proceeding pro se,³ moves to dismiss this action, arguing that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the IMLCC has failed to state a cognizable claim pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, respectively. [#7]. In construing Ms. Bowling's Motion to Dismiss liberally as is required, this court understands Ms. Bowling to be arguing that there is no federal question presented by this action. [Id. at 7]. In addition, Defendant contends that there has been no showing of injury and Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to support the amount in controversy required to invoke the court's diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. [Id. at 8]. Finally, she argues that even if the court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims, Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts—even when accepted as true—to state a cognizable claim. [Id. at 8-9].

On November 20, 2020, Ms. Bowling also filed a Counterclaim⁴ against the IMLCC. [#11]. Therein, Ms. Bowling asserts the following counterclaims against the IMLCC: (1) "misclassification" ("Counterclaim I") [id. at 15-16]; (2) wrongful termination under Texas law ("Counterclaim II") [id. at 16-18]; (3) wrongful termination under the False Claims Act (or "FCA"), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 ("Counterclaim III") [id. at 18-21]; (4) libel under Texas law ("Counterclaim IV") [id. at 21-26]; and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress ("Counterclaim V") [id. at 26-28]. Plaintiff filed its Motion to Dismiss on December 1, 2020 [#17], seeking to dismiss Defendant's Counterclaim for failure to state a claim [#17-1]. Ms. Bowling responded to Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss on December 23, 2020. [#20 ("Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss")]. Plaintiff subsequently sought to strike Ms. Bowling's Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss as untimely, improperly formatted, and non-compliant with various civil rules. [#21]. Ms. Bowling responded [#23 ("Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Strike")]. No replies were filed with respect to Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss or Motion to Strike.

On March 12, 2021, this court issued a Recommendation and Order (or "March 12 Recommendation") on the Motions to Dismiss and Motion to Strike. [#24]. Therein, this court recommended that Ms. Bowling's Motion to Dismiss be granted and this case be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. [Id.]. On the same basis, this court denied Plaintiff's Motion to Strike as moot and recommended denying Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss as moot. [Id.]. The March 12 Recommendation did not independently consider whether, without original jurisdiction over the Complaint, it could or should neverthelessretain jurisdiction over Ms. Bowling's Counterclaim. [Id.].

Ms. Bowling subsequently filed an "Objection to the Report and Recommendations Issued March 12^th, 2021" [#27] and the instant Motion to Clarify [#28], wherein Ms. Bowling requests clarification with respect to whether the court—in recommending dismissal of this action—thereby recommends dismissal of her counterclaims. She further indicates that, if this court intended to dismiss her Counterclaim, her Objection articulates the basis for why this court should not dismiss her "compulsory" Counterclaim. [#27 at 2].

In light of the procedural background of this case, I first consider Ms. Bowling's Motion to Clarify before turning to the factual background of and jurisdictional issues implicated by this case. Because this court is satisfied that it has subject matter jurisdiction, I then proceed to consider the arguments asserted in Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff's Motion to Strike, and Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss, in turn.

MOTION TO CLARIFY

Ms. Bowling's Motion to Clarify seeks clarification with respect to the undersigned's recommendations to dismiss this action without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and deny Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss as moot. [#28 at 1]. More specifically, Ms. Bowling seeks to clarify whether the undersigned thereby also recommended dismissal of her counterclaims. [Id.]. She asserts that to the extent that this court recommended dismissal of her Counterclaim, she has filed an Objection. [#27, #28].

Nearly a month before asserting her counterclaims, Ms. Bowling challenged subject matter jurisdiction and specifically asserted that the IMLCC failed to claim the necessary jurisdictional amount to confer diversity jurisdiction. [#7 at 8 ("The Plaintiff hasfailed to establish the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000 as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1332.")]. Because this court agreed with Ms. Bowling's jurisdictional argument and found subject matter jurisdiction lacking over Plaintiff's claims as asserted in the Complaint, it recommended granting Ms. Bowling's Motion to Dismiss and dismissing this action on jurisdictional grounds. In doing so, this court did not address the merits of Ms. Bowling's Counterclaim or the motions related to the same. See [#24]. Nor did it analyze whether Ms. Bowling's Counterclaim should remain in this District, because no argument was made with respect to the retention of the Counterclaim. Upon review of its March 12 Recommendation and the docket, this court finds additional analyses and clarification warranted with respect to (a) jurisdiction over this action; (b) the Motions to Dismiss; and (c) Plaintiff's Motion to Strike.

Accordingly, Defendant's Motion to Clarify is GRANTED and the undersigned's March 12 Recommendation is hereby WITHDRAWN. I turn now to the factual background of this case before I consider whether this court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

I. Plaintiff's Complaint

The IMLCC asserts two claims for relief arising from its allegations that Ms. Bowling is in material breach of her Independent Contract Agreement that expired on June 30, 2020: (1) "Injunctive Relief Specific Performance" ("Claim I"); and (2) "Damages, Fees and Costs" ("Claim II"). See generally The IMLCC alleges the following facts in support of its claims.

On or about April 4, 2019, Ms. Bowling entered into an Independent ContractorAgreement (or "Agreement") with the IMLCC. [#1 at ¶¶ 1, 7]. Throughout her relationship with the IMLCC, Ms. Bowling was the "Super Administrator" of the IMLCC data system and held the credentials for the same. [Id. at ¶ 7]. Pursuant to the Agreement, wherein Ms. Bowling and the IMLCC are defined as the "Contractor" and "Client," respectively [#1-2 at 1],

All intellectual property and related materials (the "Intellectual Property") including any related work in progress that is developed or produced under this Agreement, will be the sole property of the Client. The use of the Intellectual Property by the Client will not be restricted in any manner.

...

Upon expiration or termination of this Agreement for any reason, or at any other time upon the Client's written request, Contractor shall within 5 calendar days after such expiration, termination, or request: deliver to the Client all deliverable undertaken in furtherance of Services (whether complete or incomplete) and

...