Ionia Educ. Ass'n v. Ionia Pub. Sch., Docket No. 321728.

311 Mich.App. 479

875 N.W.2d 756

IONIA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION

v.IONIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

Docket No. 321728.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted July 8, 2015, at Grand Rapids.

Decided July 28, 2015, at 9:05 a.m.

Thrun Law Firm, PC, East Lansing (by Roy H. Henley ), for the Ionia Public Schools.

Kalniz, Iorio & Feldstein Co, LPA (by Fillipe S. Iorio, Grand Rapids and Kurt Kline), for the Ionia Education Association.

Before: SERVITTO, P.J., and BECKERING and BOONSTRA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The Ionia Education Association (IEA) appeals as of right the order of the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC) dismissing the unfair-labor-practice charge that the IEA brought against respondent, Ionia Public Schools (the school district). We affirm.

I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. THE "BID–BUMP" PROCEDURE

This case primarily involves a matter of statutory interpretation and the pertinent facts are undisputed. The IEA and the school district are parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that expired on or about August 25, 2011. The expired CBA contained sections that described, among other matters, a procedure for the assignment of vacant teaching positions. The CBA called for a meeting, referred to by the parties as a "bid-bump" meeting, or "teacher assignment meeting," that was to take place near the end of the school year, in either April, May, or June. For the sake of simplicity, the purpose of the "bid-bump" meeting, as set forth in the now-expired CBA, was to permit teachers to bid on open positions, on the basis of a number of criteria. According to the IEA, it had used the bid-bump procedure for approximately 27 years.

B. MCL 423.215(3)(J)

The Public Employee Relations Act (PERA), MCL 423.201 et seq., establishes, among other matters, the duties of public employers and public employees with regard to collective bargaining. MCL 423.215(3) sets forth prohibited subjects of bargaining between a public school employer and the bargaining representative of its employees. The matters described as prohibited subjects of bargaining "are within the sole authority of the public school employer to decide." MCL 423.215(4). Historically, PERA did not include decisions regarding the placement of teachers among the prohibited subjects of bargaining. In 2011, the Legislature enacted a series of amendments to PERA and expanded the list of prohibited subjects of bargaining between public school employers and employees. 2011 PA 103, which became effective July 19, 2011, added several prohibited subjects, including those set forth in MCL 423.215(3)(j). MCL 423.215(3)(j) prohibits bargaining with regard to "[a]ny decision made by the public school employer regarding teacher placement, or the impact of that decision on an individual employee or the bargaining unit."¹

C. UNFAIR–LABOR–PRACTICE CHARGE

In the spring of 2012, the school district did not hold the bid-bump meeting, despite three requests by the IEA. The IEA filed an unfair-labor-practice charge in July 2012, citing the failure to hold a bid-bump meeting as set forth in the CBA.² In response, the school district argued that the enactment of MCL 423.215(3)(j) removed any duty to bargain over teacher-placement decisions and gave it unilateral authority to make decisions relating to teacher placement. According to the school district, it was no longer required to employ the bid-bump procedure described in the now-expired CBA. Following oral argument, the administrative law judge (ALJ) agreed with the school district and issued a recommended decision and order dismissing the unfair-labor-practice charge. Accepting as true the facts alleged by the IEA, the ALJ denied the IEA's request for an evidentiary hearing after finding that there were no disputed issues of fact. The ALJ also found that the language of § 15(3)(j) was clear and that it prohibited bargaining over any decision pertaining to teacher placement, including the bid-bump procedure.

The IEA filed exceptions to the ALJ's recommended decision and order and requested oral argument and an evidentiary hearing. In a written opinion and order, MERC denied the request for oral argument and an evidentiary hearing, finding that neither would aid in its decision. MERC adopted the ALJ's factual summary. As to the interpretation of § 15(j)(3), MERC rejected the IEA's exceptions and concluded that the ALJ had not erred in his interpretation of the statute. MERC dismissed the unfair-labor-practice charge in its entirety. This appeal followed.

II. INTERPRETATION OF MCL 423.215(3)(J)

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Our review of MERC's interpretation of MCL 423.215(3)(j) is de novo.

Van Buren Co. Ed. Ass'n v. Decatur Pub. Schs., 309 Mich.App. 630, 639, 872 N.W.2d 710 (2015). However, we note that our Supreme Court has explained that "an agency's interpretation of a statute is entitled to ‘respectful consideration,’ but courts may not abdicate their judicial responsibility to interpret statutes by giving unfettered deference to an agency's interpretation. Courts must respect legislative decisions and interpret statutes according to their plain language." In re Complaint of Rovas Against SBC Mich., 482 Mich. 90, 93, 754 N.W.2d 259 (2008). This standard requires " ‘cogent reasons' " for overruling an agency's interpretation. Id. at 103, 754 N.W.2d 259 (citation omitted). "However, the agency's interpretation is not binding on the courts, and it cannot conflict with the Legislature's intent as expressed in the language of the statute at issue." Id.

B. PERA AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

"PERA governs the relationship between public employees and governmental agencies." Van Buren Co. Ed. Ass'n, 309 Mich.App. at 640, 872 N.W.2d 710. The act imposes upon public employers a mandatory duty to bargain over certain subjects, such as "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment...." MCL 423.215(1). See also Van Buren Co. Ed. Ass'n, 309 Mich.App. at 640, 872 N.W.2d 710. While PERA requires bargaining on some subjects, § 15(3) sets forth prohibited subjects of bargaining. See Mt. Pleasant Pub. Schs. v. Mich. AFSCME Council 25, 302 Mich.App. 600, 608–609, 840 N.W.2d 750 (2013). "Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3)(f),^{[3 ]} the matters described in subsection (3) are prohibited subjects of bargaining between a public school employer and a bargaining representative of its employees, and, for the purposes of this act, are within the sole authority of the public school employer to decide." MCL 423.215(4). If there is no duty to bargain over the subject matter, the employer can take unilateral action. See Van Buren Co. Ed. Ass'n, 309 Mich.App. at 649, 872 N.W.2d 710. This Court has explained that, when the list of prohibited subjects of bargaining found in subsection 3 is read together with subsection 4, the subsections "evince a legislative intent to make public school employers solely responsible for these subjects by prohibiting them from being the subjects of enforceable contract provisions and by eliminating any duty to bargain regarding them." Mich. State AFL–CIO v. Mich. Employment Relations Comm., 212 Mich.App. 472, 487, 538 N.W.2d 433 (1995).

2011 PA 103 expanded the list of prohibited subjects of bargaining. Pertinent to this case, 2011 PA 103 added § 15(3)(j), which expanded the prohibited subjects of bargaining to include "[a]ny decision made by the public school employer regarding teacher placement, or the impact of that decision on an individual employee or the bargaining unit." MCL 423.215(3)(j). The salient issue in this case is whether § 15(3)(j) and the prohibition on bargaining over "[a]ny decision" regarding "teacher placement" applies to the bid-bump procedure.

The starting point for this inquiry is the plain language of the statute. Van Buren Co. Ed. Ass'n, 309 Mich.App. at 643, 872 N.W.2d 710.

In interpreting a statute, we consider both the plain meaning of the critical word or phrase as well as its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.

As with any statutory interpretation, our goal is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature by focusing on the statute's plain language. [Speicher v. Columbia Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 497 Mich. 125, 133–134, 860 N.W.2d 51 (2014) (citations and quotation marks omitted).]

If the statutory language is clear, we must enforce the statute as it is written. Braska v. Challenge Mfg. Co., 307 Mich.App. 340, 352, 861 N.W.2d 289 (2014). We may consult a dictionary to determine the plain and ordinary meaning of statutory terms that are undefined. Spartan Stores, Inc. v. Grand Rapids, 307 Mich.App. 565, 574, 861 N.W.2d 347 (2014).

C. APPLICATION

Turning to the statute at issue, § 15(3)(j) provides that collective bargaining between a public school employer and a bargaining representative of its employees "shall not include" "[a ]ny decision made by the public school employer regarding teacher placement, or the impact of that decision on an individual employee or bargaining unit. " MCL 423.215(3)(j) (emphasis added). The word "any" is not defined in the statute, but is commonly understood to be all-encompassing, meaning "every" or "all," and can be "used to indicate one selected without restriction" or "to indicate a maximum or whole." Merriam–Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.). The word "decision," meanwhile, is defined to mean "the act or process of deciding." Id. The term "placement" as used in the statute is commonly understood to refer to "an act or instance of placing" or "the assignment of a person to a suitable place (as a job or a class in school)." Id.

Given the broad language employed in § 15(3)(j), we conclude that the Legislature intended to prohibit an employer from bargaining over any decision, including policies or procedures such as the bid-bump procedure, with regard to teacher placement. The plain language of the statute gives broad discretion to public school employers to make "[a]ny decision," i.e., every decision or all decisions, "unmeasured or unlimited in...