Iqbal v. Pinnacle Airlines, Inc.

802 F.Supp.2d 909

Najeeb IQBAL, Plaintiff,

v.PINNACLE AIRLINES, INC., Defendant.

No. 09–2815–STA–DKV.

United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division.

July 14, 2011.

Najeeb Iqbal, North Miami, FL, pro se.

W. Chris Harrison, Esq., Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., Memphis, TN, for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOCKET ENTRY 21) ORDER OF DISMISSAL ORDER CERTIFYING APPEAL NOT TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH AND ORDER DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL

S. THOMAS ANDERSON, District Judge.

On December 15, 2009, Plaintiff Najib Iqbal filed a pro se complaint alleging that Defendant Pinnacle Airlines, Inc. had discriminated against him under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–16, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (Docket Entry (D.E.) 1.) The complaint alleged that Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff Iqbal on the basis of his age, national origin, accent, race, and religion and terminated him without cause. ( Id. at 2–3.) Plaintiff also alleged that he was retaliated against for asserting his rights under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) and his rights under Title VII. ( Id. at 3.) On March 12, 2010, Defendant filed an answer to the complaint. (D.E. 6.)

On May 2, 2011, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, supported by a legal memorandum, a statement of undisputed facts, portions of Plaintiff's deposition testimony, the affidavit of Scott Foley, Defendant's Director of Flying, the affidavit of Fadi Hamza, Defendant's Assistant Flight Standards Manager,¹ and other exhibits. (D.E. 21.) On June 3, 2011, Plaintiff responded to the motion for summary judgment.² (D.E. 25.)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, on motion of a party, the court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The party moving for summary judgment “bears the burden of clearly and convincingly establishing the nonexistence of any genuine [dispute] of material fact, and the evidence as well as all inferences drawn therefrom must be read in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Kochins v. Linden–Alimak, Inc., 799 F.2d 1128, 1133 (6th Cir.1986); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party can meet this burden by pointing out to the court that the respondent, having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, has no evidence to support an essential element of his case. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2); Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir.1989).

When confronted with a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the respondent must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine dispute for trial exists if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The nonmoving party must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). One may not oppose a properly supported summary judgment motion by mere reliance on the pleadings. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Instead, the nonmovant must present “concrete evidence supporting [his] claims.” Cloverdale Equip. Co. v. Simon Aerials, Inc., 869 F.2d 934, 937 (6th Cir.1989) (citations omitted); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). The district court does not have the duty to search the record for such evidence. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3); InterRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir.1989). The nonmovant has the duty to point out specific evidence in the record that would be sufficient to justify a jury decision in his favor. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1); InterRoyal Corp., 889 F.2d at 111. “Summary judgment is an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action[,] rather than a disfavored procedural shortcut.” FDIC v. Jeff Miller Stables, 573 F.3d 289, 294 (6th Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant's statement of material facts. (D.E. 21–2.) Rather, Plaintiff responded to the facts contained in Defendant's memorandum in support. (D.E. 25–1.) Under Local Rule 56.1(b):

Any party opposing the motion for summary judgment must respond to each fact set forth by the movant by either:

(1) agreeing that the fact is undisputed;

(2) agreeing that the fact is undisputed for the purpose of ruling on the motion for summary judgment only; or

(3) demonstrating that the fact is disputed.

Each disputed fact must be supported by specific citation to the record. Such response shall be filed with any memorandum in response to the motion. The response must be made on the document provided by the movant or on another document in which the non-movant has reproduced the facts and citations verbatim as set forth by the movant. In either case, the non-movant must make a response to each fact set forth by the movant immediately below each fact set forth by the movant. In addition, the non-movant's response may contain a concise statement of any additional facts that the non-movant contends are material and as to which the non-movant contends there exists a genuine issue to be tried. Each such disputed fact shall be set forth in a separate, numbered paragraph with specific citations to the record supporting the contention that such fact is in dispute.

Plaintiff's response to the facts contained in Defendant's memorandum in support does not comply with Local Rule 56.1(b).

(D.E. 25–1.) Under Local Rule 56.1(d), a “[f]ailure to respond to a moving party's statement of material facts, or a non-moving party's statement of additional facts, within the time periods provided by these rules shall indicate that the essential facts are not disputed for purposes [of] summary judgment.” ³

Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e):

If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may:

(1) give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact;

(2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion;

(3) grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials—including the facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to it; and

(4) issue any other appropriate order.

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3).⁴

The Court has, therefore, adopted Defendant's proposed factual findings to the extent they are properly supported by record evidence. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3); see Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 454–55 (6th Cir.1991). The Court cannot deny a motion for summary judgment on the expectation that the plaintiff will be able to produce evidence at trial to support his claims. Cox v. Kentucky Dep't of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 149 (6th Cir.1995) (“Essentially, a motion for summary judgment is a means by which to challenge the opposing party to ‘put up or shut up’ on a critical issue.”).

The facts relevant to the pending motion are as follows: ⁵

1. Defendant is a regional airline providing scheduled air transportation service throughout the United States, Canada, and Mexico for Delta Airlines. Pinnacle flies two kinds of aircraft manufactured by Bombardier: the Canadair Regional Jet (“CRJ”) models CRJ200 and CRJ–900. The CRJs are designed with glass integrated cockpit avionics.⁶

2. Defendant's trainee pilots are required to go through an intensive training program and must pass all phases to be employed as a First Officer.

3. Defendant's training program consists of four weeks of ground school, 24 hours of simulator training sessions, simulator check rides, line oriented flight training, and operations experience (“OE”).

4. If a trainee fails to complete training, he or she may be terminated under the terms of the Flight Operations Training Manual (“FOTM”).

5. Flight training for all pilot candidates takes place in a CRJ–200 simulator and actual CRJ aircraft.

6. Plaintiff had never flown a CRJ or flown in any glass cockpit aircraft.

7. Plaintiff spent more time with the cockpit procedures portion of his simulator training than his classmates because he was not familiar or comfortable with the more advanced and modern glass cockpit.

8. At the start of training, Plaintiff acknowledged to some of his instructors that “this computer scanning and those programming and analysts, I am not really sharp at it.” (D.E. 21–3, Deposition of Iqbal, page 82.)

9. Following cockpit procedures training, Plaintiff advanced to flight simulator training in a full motion flight simulator. (Id. at 98.)

10. Plaintiff failed one simulator session because of performance problems and lack of experience in the glass cockpit. He required extra training and an additional simulator ride. (Id. at 99.)

11. On June 1, 2008, Plaintiff's instructor noted that Plaintiff needed to work on his stall profile and his approach briefing.

12. On June 2, 2008, the instructor noted that Plaintiff needed to continue working on stalls.

13. On June 3, 2008, Plaintiff needed an LOC approach, had trouble with slow flows, procedures and check V cuts.

14. On June 4, 2008, Plaintiff needed additional training on VOR, VOR/DME approach and company procedures.

15. On June 8, 2008, Plaintiff needed work on normal First Officer procedures.

16. On June 9, 2008, Mike Tygart reviewed Plaintiff's performance and noted that Plaintiff was not at required proficiency levels...