Irvin v. Prentiss Cnty.

HARLEY IRVIN PLAINTIFF v. PRENTISS COUNTY, MISSISSIPPPI, et al. DEFENDANTS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:19-CV-60-SA-DAS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI ABERDEEN DIVISION

January 27, 2021

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OPINION

On March 11, 2019, Tina Irvin, in her capacity as mother and next friend of her son, Harley Irvin, initiated this action against Prentiss County, Sheriff Randy Tolar, Deputy Sheriff Bobby Cage Potts, Deputy Sheriff Todd Knight, Deputy Sheriff Joe Carroll, and the City of Booneville.¹ On June 24, 2020, the Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [56], requesting dismissal of all claims against them. Irvin has not responded to the Motion [56], and his time to do so has passed. The Court is prepared to rule.

Relevant Factual and Procedural Background²

On March 18, 2018, Harley Irvin, an eighteen-year-old male, was arrested by the Booneville Police Department on an attempted murder charge. He was then taken to the Prentiss County Jail, where he was booked in accordance with the facility's normal procedures and placed in a cell with other inmates. Irvin initially appeared in the City of Booneville Municipal Court on March 20, 2018, at which time his bail was set at $200,000.00. Irvin was ultimately released from custody on March 26, 2018, after his bail was lowered to $100,000.00 and he was able to secure payment.

At some point prior to his release, Irvin began experiencing abdominal pain, nausea, and diarrhea. In fact, Irvin's symptoms were so noticeable that other inmates, believing he had a stomach virus, asked the guards to move him out of their cell. Irvin was then placed in a separate cell apart from other inmates. On March 26—the same day he was released from custody, Irvin was treated by Martha Bell Shields, a licensed practical nurse employed at the Jail. According to Nurse Shields, she "saw Harley Irvin on the morning of March 26, 2018 at approximately 10:30 a.m. At that time he stated that he had vomited several times the night before. It was my understanding from speaking to him that one of his cellmates also had similar symptoms. He had no fever and reported that he had eaten some of his breakfast." [56], Exhibit 7, p. 1. Nurse Shields gave Irvin a drink and crackers and checked his temperature again an hour later. Id. Nurse Shields stated that she believed Irvin had the stomach virus. Id.

According to the Amended Complaint [7], after he was released from custody on March 26, Irvin's mother "drove [him], in extreme agony, directly to the Booneville Baptist Hospital." After initial tests indicated that Irvin had a ruptured appendix, he was transported to North Mississippi Medical Center. Further testing revealed that Irvin did in fact need surgery, and the appropriate procedure was performed that day.

On March 11, 2019, Irvin commenced this action. In the Amended Complaint [7], Irvin names as defendants: Prentiss County and the City of Booneville, as well as Sheriff Randy Tolar, Deputy Sheriff Bobby Cage Potts, Deputy Sheriff Todd Knight, and Deputy Sheriff Joe Carroll.³ Irvin contends that the Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs,allegedly in violation of his Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment rights. The Amended Complaint [7] also makes a reference to the Equal Protection Clause and asserts that the Defendants failed to properly train and/or supervise jail staff. Finally, Irvin asserts a negligence claim. On November 11, 2019, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation of Dismissal [32] as to all claims against the City of Booneville, and the City was accordingly terminated as a defendant.

As further procedural background, when this action was commenced, Irvin was represented by counsel. However, on April 8, 2020, Irvin's counsel requested that the Court permit them to withdraw from the case. On April 11, 2020, Magistrate Judge Sanders entered an Order [52] granting that request and giving Irvin until May 11, 2020 to either have new counsel enter an appearance on his behalf or advise the Court of his intent to proceed pro se. Magistrate Judge Sanders then granted Irvin an additional two weeks to obtain counsel, extending his deadline to May 25, 2020. See Order [54]. After Irvin failed to obtain new counsel or indicate his intent to proceed pro se as directed by the Orders [52, 54], the Defendants filed the present Motion for Summary Judgment [56] on June 24, 2020. When Irvin missed his deadline to respond to the Motion [56], and after a significant period of time passed, on September 17, 2020, Magistrate Judge Sanders entered an additional Order [64], granting Irvin more time to obtain counsel and/or respond to the pending Motion for Summary Judgment [56]. Irvin still has not done so. However, considering the extensive leniency that has been granted to Irvin, the length of time that the Motion [56] has been pending, and the upcoming trial date of this matter, the Court is prepared to rule on the Defendants' Motion [56].⁴Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is warranted when the evidence reveals no genuine dispute regarding any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). Rule 56 "mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Nabors v. Malone, 2019 WL 2617240 at *1 (N.D. Miss. June 26, 2019) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986)).

"The moving party 'bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.'" Id. (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). "The nonmoving party must then 'go beyond the pleadings' and 'designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). Importantly, "the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts contained in the affidavits, depositions, and exhibits of record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Waste Management of Louisiana, LLC v. River Birch, Inc., 920 F.3d 958, 964 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Reingold v. Swiftships, Inc., 126 F.3d 645, 646 (5th Cir. 1997)). However, "[c]onclusory allegations, speculation, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalist arguments are not an adequate substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial." Nabors, 2019 WL 2617240 at *1 (citing TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgewick James of Wash., 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002)) (additional citations omitted).Analysis and Discussion

As previously noted, Irvin has asserted a variety of claims, including purported violations of his Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment rights as well as state law negligence claims. Irvin sued Prentiss County, as well as several officials in both their official and individual capacities. In the present Motion [56], the Defendants contend that the federal claims must be dismissed because no constitutional violation occurred.

I. Official Capacity Claims

Prior to analyzing the substance of Irvin's claims, the Court will address a preliminary matter concerning the manner in which Irvin's claims were pled. All officials have been named in both their official and individual capacities.

Unlike suits against officers in their personal capacities, suits brought against officers in their official capacities "generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Social Svcs, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). "As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity." Estate of Manus v. Webster Cty., Miss., 2014 WL 1285946, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 31, 2014) (reversed in part on other grounds) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985)). Therefore, "the dismissal of allegations against municipal officers in their official capacities is proper when the allegations duplicate claims against the governmental entity itself." Id. (citing Castro Romero v. Becken, 256 F.3d 349, 355 (5th Cir. 2001)).

Here, Irvin makes no distinction between his claims against Prentiss County and his claims against the Sheriff and the Deputy Sheriffs. In other words, his allegations against the Sheriff andDeputy Sheriffs mirror his allegations against the County. Therefore, Irvin's official capacity claims are duplicative of his claims against Prentiss County and should be treated as claims against the County. As a result, the official capacity claims are dismissed.

II. Federal Municipal and Individual Capacity Claims

Having dismissed the official capacity claims, the Court next turns to Irvin's federal claims against Prentiss County and his individual capacity claims against the other Defendants. Those claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for purported violations of the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment.

"Regarding Section 1983, the United States Supreme Court has held that the statute's 'very purpose . . . was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights—to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law.'" Alexander v. McAdams, 2017 WL 5642328, *3 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 18, 2017) (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242, 92 S.Ct. 2151, L.Ed.2d 705 (1972)) (emphasis omitted). To prevail on a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must "(1) allege he has been deprived of a right secured by the United States Constitution or the laws of the United States;...