Israel v. U.S. Bank

653 F.Supp.3d 685

Jaie ISRAEL, Plaintiff, v. U.S. BANK, NA, Defendant.

No. CV-20-01185-PHX-GMS

United States District Court, D. Arizona

Signed January 31, 2023

Bradley D. Gardner, David R. Schwartz, Udall Shumway PLC, Mesa, AZ, for Plaintiff.

Jacqueline Faith Langland, John Greg Coulter, Jackson Lewis PC, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant.

ORDER

G. Murray Snow, Chief United States District Judge

Before the Court is Defendant U.S. Bank, NA's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 58). For the reasons below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Jaie Israel ("Plaintiff") worked as a banker for Defendant U.S. Bank ("Defendant") beginning in 2015. In 2018, she was hired by a branch in Scottsdale, Arizona ("Scottsdale branch"), which was located inside a Safeway grocery store. (Doc. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff is an African American woman who was eight months pregnant at the time she was hired by the Scottsdale branch. (Doc. 58 at 1.) Branch Manager Travis Canfield ("Mr. Canfield") made the decision to hire Plaintiff. (Id.) The parties dispute when exactly Mr. Canfield was made aware of Plaintiff's race and pregnancy.

Shortly after Plaintiff began working at the Scottsdale branch, she began to have difficulty standing due to her pregnancy. Although the parties dispute the course of events leading up to Plaintiff's request for a chair, on September 10, 2018, she provided Mr. Canfield with a doctor's note stating that she needed to conduct her work sitting down. (Doc. 59 ¶ 23.) By September 20, 2018, a chair was provided to Plaintiff. (Doc. 59 ¶ 26.) Plaintiff alleges that the chair provided to her was unsafe. Although the details of the events that followed are also disputed, the parties agree that sometime thereafter, Mr. Canfield discussed a potential transfer to a different location, which Plaintiff declined, and an arrangement was made for Plaintiff to use Mr. Canfield's office, when needed, so she could sit down while working. (Doc. 59 ¶ 31; Doc. 69 ¶ 31.) Plaintiff also asserts that during that time period, Mr. Canfield critiqued her for taking time off work for her doctor's appointments and did not offer her the opportunity to work overtime hours, unlike other employees. Plaintiff took leave from October 30, 2018, to January 30, 2019; she states that she used one week of unpaid leave to begin her maternity leave early. (Doc. 69 ¶ 116.)

While Plaintiff was on maternity leave, her business cards were removed from display at the Scottsdale branch. After she returned from maternity leave, Plaintiff alleges that she had difficulty finding a private and sanitary location to pump breast milk. The parties dispute to what extent Mr. Canfield was made aware of Plaintiff's requests for a proper space to pump, but Plaintiff states that she made Mr. Canfield aware of her request for a location to pump at the branch one or two days after her return. (Doc. 69 ¶ 121.) Plaintiff alleges, and Mr. Canfield denies, that Mr. Canfield suggested that she use the Safeway restroom to pump. (Id.) Defendant attempted to arrange for Plaintiff to transfer to a location with a proper lactation room, but Plaintiff declined the transfer because the hours did not work for her. (Doc. 69 ¶ 128.) Defendant ultimately created a lactation room at a branch in Sun City on May 23, 2019, to which it agreed to transfer Plaintiff. (Doc. 59 ¶¶ 71-72.)

Plaintiff alleges that in March 2019, she initially requested to be placed on short-term disability leave or receive a workplace accommodation, but her psychologist erroneously denied the request, "believing that company policy did not allow her to complete paperwork for the assessment." (Doc. 69 ¶ 132.) Plaintiff also alleges that she felt overwhelmed and experienced panic attacks at work in May 2019. (Doc. 69 ¶¶ 137-38.) On May 23, 2019, Plaintiff went on bereavement leave for five days for a death in her family. (Doc. 69 ¶ 140.) She further alleges that as of May 24, 2019, her milk supply was decreasing. (Doc. 69 ¶ 141.) In June 2019, Plaintiff was placed on short-term disability leave, and she remained on disability leave until December 2019. In July 2019, Defendant transferred Plaintiff to the Sun City branch, where she began working upon her return from leave in December 2019. (Doc. 59 ¶¶ 72, 74; Doc. 69 at 1.)

Additionally, in March 2019, Plaintiff applied for a personal banker position at Defendant's location in Surprise, Arizona. Plaintiff interviewed for the position, and she alleges that she was verbally offered the role. Shortly thereafter, however, the role was offered to someone else, and Plaintiff was notified she did not receive the position on April 17, 2019.

Over the course of events, Plaintiff filed three charges with the Arizona Civil Rights Division ("ACRD") and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The first charge was filed in December 2018, alleging discrimination based on race and sex. In that charge, Plaintiff highlighted Mr. Canfield's statement that he did not know she was pregnant, her pay, the fact that she had to work weekends, lack of training, lack of overtime, and difficulty getting time off for doctor's appointments. (Doc. 62-1 at 9-10.) She received a right to sue letter from ACRD on June 6, 2019, but did not receive a right to sue letter from the EEOC. Plaintiff filed her second and third charges with the ACRD and EEOC on June 25, 2019. The first of these charges alleged retaliation related to her December 2018 charge, and the second addressed her complaints surrounding her inability to pump at work. (Doc. 65 at 9, 17.) It does not appear that she received a right to sue letter from the EEOC on either charge. Additionally, in January 2020, Plaintiff amended her third charge to include discrimination on the basis of a disability. (Doc. 65-5 at 36.) On June 15, 2020, she filed her complaint in this case.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

Defendant moves for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims. The purpose of summary judgment is "to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit will preclude the entry of summary judgment, and the disputed evidence must be "such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

"[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. "Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." In re Oracle Corp. Securities Litigation, 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010). "Where the moving party meets that burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to designate specific facts demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial." Id. As the Ninth Circuit has said, "[t]his burden is not a light one." Id. To meet this burden, the "non-moving party must come forth with evidence from which a jury could reasonably render a verdict in the non-moving party's favor." Id. Additionally, parties opposing summary judgment are required to "cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the record" establishing a genuine dispute or "show[ ] that the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). A district court has no independent duty "to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact." Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996).

II. Analysis

A. Counts I, II, III, and IV (Title VII Discrimination and Retaliation)

Plaintiff's Title VII claims are not impacted by the Arizona Civil Rights Division's Right to Sue Notice. The Ninth Circuit has expressly held that a state agency's right to sue letter does not trigger the ninety-day clock to sue under Title VII or the ADA; the right to sue notice must come from the EEOC. Scott v. Gino Morena Enters., LLC, 888 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2018) ("[T]he statute makes no reference to a state agency's right-to-sue notice starting the 90-day clock. Instead, the statute describes the duty of 'the Commission'—i.e., the EEOC—to 'notify the person aggrieved' and provides that a civil action may be brought 'within ninety days after the giving of such notice.' "). Thus, the ACRD right to sue notice has no bearing on Counts 1 through IV.

1. Race and Sex Discrimination

To establish a prima facie case of race or sex discrimination, Plaintiff must show that "(1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was qualified for her position; (3) she was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside her protected class were treated more favorably." Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1090 (9th Cir. 2008). "The requisite degree of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case for Title VII . . . claims on summary judgment is minimal and does not even need to rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence." Id. (quoting Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994)). Once a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant, under the McDonnell Douglas framework, to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the alleged disparate treatment. Vasquez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 2003). If the employer can do so, the burden shifts...